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ABSTRACT 
 This dissertation will define the contemporary American encyclopedic novel and the 
significant role that irony plays in shaping meaning.  The dissertation constructs a model of the 
encyclopedic novel based upon the history of the encyclopedia – from Denis Diderot's 
Enlightenment influenced Encyclopédie – and Northrop Frye's conception of the encyclopedic 
form.  It claims (1) that the contemporary encyclopedic novel continues in the cycle of modal 
progression toward mythic integration that Frye proposes in Anatomy of Criticism; and (2) that 
the encyclopedic novel utilizes different forms of irony to challenge authoritative discourse and 
elevate marginal discourse. 
 The first chapter defines the encyclopedic novel by examining the history of the 
encyclopedia and existing criticism on the encyclopedic text in literature.  It draws on theorists 
such as Denis Diderot  and Richard Yeo to define an “encyclopedic project” that adopts a 
dialogic rhetorical style and seeks to democratize access to information.  This chapter also 
defines the encyclopedic novel as a generic form that combines other forms into a unified whole 
and utilizes irony as a tool for integration. 
 The second and third chapters form a thematic pairing that shows the self-reflexive 
progression of the encyclopedic novel from individualistic to humanistic focus.  The second 
chapter argues that Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow is an “anarchistic encyclopedic novel” 
that promotes associational thinking – in the form of paranoia, open forms, and horizontal 
transmission of knowledge.  Gravity's Rainbow adopts a disintegrative irony to empower the 
oppressed individual against industry-state collusion in the post-WWII era.  The third chapter 
 vi 
argues that David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest seeks to reinvent irony as an integrative force and 
redirect Pynchon's individualistic anarchism toward an inclusive humanism.   
 The fourth chapter demonstrates a break from both of the preceding chapter and argues 
that Leon Forrest's Divine Days adopts a syndetic model of composition that further works to 
incorporate forms and integrate irony.  Using Northrop Frye's “interpenetration,” I argue that 
Divine Days integrates competing traditions and discourses by demonstrating their mutual-
necessity.  In the concluding chapter, I examine “meta-encyclopedic” by Jorge Luis Borges and 
Roberto Bolaño as an extension of the dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 In Roberto Bolaño's 2666, Amalfitano, a professor of literature, meditates on a young 
man's preference for reading the shorter works of the masters over the longer ones.  “Qué triste 
paradoja,”1 thinks Amalfitano, that even the bookish shy away from  
las grandes obras, imperfectas, torrenciales, las que abren camino en loe descondido.  
Escogen los ejercisios perfectos do los grandes maestros. . . . quieren ver a los grandes 
maestros en sesiones de esgrima de enterameinto, pero no quieren sber nada de los 
combates de verdad, en donde los grandes maestros luchan contra aquello, ese aquello 
que nos atemoriza a todos, ese aquello acoquina y encacha, y hay sangre y herida 
mortales y fetidez.  (289-90)
2
 
Amalfitano values the difficulty and the imperfection of the larger works; he mourns that this 
young man will know “Bartleby, the Scrivener” but not Moby-Dick.  The “imperfect and 
torrential” long novel poses a set of challenges to the reader that the slimmer novel does not.  
Intersecting plot lines, jumbled chronologies, casts of hundreds of characters – these long novels 
compound the difficulty of other novels, which may also contain these same elements, while 
requiring more sustained attention and perseverance.   
                                                 
1
 “What a sad paradox,” unless otherwise noted, translations from the Spanish are my own. 
2
 “the great works, imperfect, torrential, those that open the way into the unknown.  They choose the great masters' 
perfect exercises. . . . They want to see the great masters in training bouts, but do not care at all to know their true 
combat, when the great masters struggle against that thing, that thing that frightens us all, that thing that moves 
and pushes, with blood and mortal wounds and stench.” 
 
 2 
 Just as Amalfitano is not quite able to identify the difficulty behind the longer work – he 
is only able to identify the appeal of the shorter, perfect exercises – critics of the contemporary 
long novel have also had difficulty identifying what it is that sets these novels apart from their 
shorter counterparts.  Three approaches to the contemporary long novel have emerged that seek 
to characterize the novels as something apart from their contemporaries and also attempt to 
provide methodologies for reading and making sense of these difficult works.  The first two 
critical approaches, what I will term “ecological” and “systems” approaches, examine the 
question of “wholeness” of the novel, while the third uses the encyclopedia as a model for the 
contemporary long novel.  Although the first two models do work to provide adequate readings 
under certain circumstances, the encyclopedic offers a fuller picture and will be my ultimate 
focus. 
 Very generally, ecological models of reading seek to expose the parallel between the 
novel as a complete whole and the singular wholeness of an environment, or ecological system.  
This model of reading shares important characteristics with environmentalism because it 
encourages agents to take action immediately in order not to just push off onto future generations 
the consequences of present actions.  Because the ecological reading recognizes the connections 
among environment, humans, culture, and nature, it encourages a totalized, integrated 
worldview.  In other words, ecological readings hinge upon mutual interaction among seemingly-
disparate areas of experience. 
 Karl Kroeber writes in Ecological Literary Criticism: Romantic Imagining and the 
Biology of Mind that ecological literary criticism is a holistic approach to literature that 
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“concentrates on linkages between natural and cultural processes” (1).  In connecting the natural 
and cultural, Kroeber draws a distinction between ecological criticism and what he calls the more 
accepted “philosophic” approach to criticism that, he argues, needlessly cuts off the discourse 
from the object of study.  By reducing this distance between critic and object, Kroeber suggests 
that ecological criticism “resists current academic overemphasis on the rationalistic at the 
expense of sensory, emotional, and imaginative aspects of art” (2).  Ecological criticism, as 
Michael McDowell points out in his essay “The Bakhtinian Road to Ecological Insight,” 
challenges more conventional critical approaches by contextualizing the text (as opposed to a 
New Critical study of the text in-itself) and avoids many of the linguistic pitfalls of postmodern 
criticism by returning focus to the physical world (371-2).  What Kroeber and McDowell argue 
in common is that literary criticism needs to connect with the “hard” sciences the way that it has 
with such “soft” sciences as anthropology and psychology.   
 The benefit that the ecological model offers the long novel is two-fold: first, many of the 
long novels of the late twentieth-century take a renewed interest in science and incorporate this 
fascination with scientific theories and language into the fiction.  Inclusion of scientific elements 
in the fiction – and critical attention to the same – expands the potential for understanding reality 
by diversifying the means by which it is possible to understand reality.  Comparing inclusion of 
“soft” sciences with “hard” ones clarifies this logic.  In much the same way that Sigmund Freud's 
psychoanalysis or Claude Levi-Strauss' anthropology influenced both literature and criticism in 
the early and mid-twentieth century, Albert Einstein's theory of relativity and Charles Darwin's 
theory of evolution have influenced literature in the late-twentieth and early twenty-first 
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centuries.  Second, many long novels, and particularly the ones I will call encyclopedic, engage 
in a “world-making” practice.  By this I mean that the novels attempt to create a more complete 
world within the narrative rather than focusing solely on individual characters.  Viewed from an 
ecological perspective, these more-inclusive narratives describe a wider swath of the world.   
 In contrast, the second critical type, the systems novel, proposed by Tom LeClair,  
accounts for open-system novels in addition to the closed-system ecological novel. In In the 
Loop: Don DeLillo and the Systems Novel, LeClair calls “Systems theory”  “a set of assumptions 
about nature and an interpretive methodology … a metascience” that studies “all living systems, 
including social systems, and the specialized disciplines that study them” (3).  Rather than 
attempting to define the rules of a closed system or ecology, as ecological readings of the long 
novel do, the systems approach is more interested in the interaction among numerous systems, 
present within and outside of the text.  Each of these systems may be subject to its own set of 
assumptions and rules.  Considering postmodernism a largely deconstructive movement, LeClair 
considers the systems novel to be a continuation of modernist tradition because the systems 
novels try to construct a unity of disparate parts rather than expose disjointed fragments.  
Systems novels, LeClair writes, are aware of and respond to the pressure of enhanced technology 
(particularly that which affects communication), offer themselves as an analogy to the 
extraliterary life in all of its complexity, provide a solution in holistic formulations to 
fragmentation, and reignite an interest in craft or mastery (9-11).  
 The third option, the encyclopedic approach, provides a much different way of 
understanding certain contemporary long novels because it both takes into account the concept of 
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ecological totality and acknowledges the importance of systems. The encyclopedic approach 
reaffirms the importance of knowledge, order, and epistemological variety in the contemporary 
encyclopedic novel.  Each of these three perspectives – ecological, systems, and encyclopedic – 
acknowledge the importance of science in the novel, but where the encyclopedic novel differs is 
in the acknowledgement, explicit or otherwise, that science is but one method of understanding 
the world.
3
  The encyclopedic novel, much like the encyclopedia itself, exposes the variety of 
means by which people understand their world.  In a similar fashion, the encyclopedic novel 
often does concern systems in much the way that LeClair argues that the systems novel does, but 
goes beyond this recognition to claim or imply that systems in themselves may not be adequate 
to explain the complex interactions amongst characters, between characters and their 
environment, and so on.  By juxtaposing competing, or even conflicting, epistemologies, the 
encyclopedic novel highlights areas of overlap and potential aporia of knowledge. 
 The contemporary encyclopedic novel is an extension of a longer encyclopedic tradition 
that has its roots in Enlightenment rationality and is aligned with a long history of social and 
political critique.  This dissertation examines two roots of the contemporary encyclopedic novel: 
the history of the  encyclopedia and criticism of the encyclopedic form in literature.  The first, 
embodied in the “encyclopedic project” of Denis Diderot and the “encyclopedic vision” of 
Richard Yeo, leads to my claim that the contemporary encyclopedic novel is based on a dialogic 
approach to the encyclopedia that assumes a transhistoric communication of knowledge from 
                                                 
3
 Troy Strecker argues for a combination of ecology and encyclopedic narrative because “the concept of narrative 
ecology provides a valuable model which attends to the symbiotic interconnections and ecological processes 
active between different systemic levels and demonstrates how various cultural, social, and biological networks 
join us to our complex environment” (283). 
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author to audiences.  The second, based upon the criticism of the encyclopedic form by Northrop 
Frye, leads to my claims, first, that the contemporary encyclopedic novel continues the recursive 
modal progression that Frye sets up, moving from modernist irony to myth but not leading fully 
into a new stage or mythic literary mode.  In addition, it leads to my focus on post-1960s fiction, 
because the contemporary encyclopedic novel viewed through Northrop Frye's theory of 
historical modes is located at a historical cusp.  Pressed to the end of ironic representation, the 
contemporary encyclopedic novel seems to search for a new method of expression. 
 In addition, in this dissertation I make two claims about irony: first, that the encyclopedic 
novel uses multiple forms of irony to identify, diagnose, and critique contemporary culture; and 
second, that the contemporary encyclopedic novel employs irony primarily as a corrective and 
community-building type of knowledge.  My central argument is that the encyclopedic novel 
self-reflexively proposes and tests alternative logics that, working in tandem with ideological 
critique, seek to answer questions that ideological critique alone cannot or will not address.  The 
encyclopedic novel demonstrates ideology's inability to describe the world accurately.    
Moreover, by placing reconstructive logics next to deconstructive ones, the encyclopedic novel 
elevates the stature of the marginal.  The encyclopedic novel is a mediation between competing 
epistemologies, often betraying a deep ambivalence toward the epistemological models it 
presents. 
 The first chapter of this dissertation traces two lines of influence that make up the 
contemporary encyclopedic novel: Denis Diderot's Encyclopédie and Northrop Frye's “Theory of 
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Modes” in Anatomy of Criticism.  This chapter offers a generic definition of the encyclopedic 
novel. 
 The second and third chapters of this dissertation form a thematic link, demonstrating the 
continuity of the encyclopedic genre between Gravity's Rainbow and Infinite Jest.  The last 
chapter explores the encyclopedic novel within a different tradition – Forrester's Divine Days in 
the African-American literary tradition.  Chapter 1 begins with the heterological tension between 
the “They-system” and paranoid logic in Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow.  Gravity's 
Rainbow is as natural a starting place as any for a study of the post-1960s encyclopedic novel.  
Mendelson centers his consideration of the encyclopedic narrative around Pynchon's novel, and 
this call has been taken up by other critics after him.  Pynchon's work embodies an anarchistic 
diagnosis of the ills of Western civilization.  This has been read in a variety of ways, from a 
pessimistic recognition of the triumph of dehumanizing international corporations to the 
paradoxical retention of individual integrity through disintegration.  The melding of science, 
occult, and popular culture presents a critique of prevailing cultural tendencies toward 
complacency and fatalism.  I argue that Gravity's Rainbow adopts is an “anarchistic encyclopedic 
novel” that presents a series of alternatives to authoritative discourse in politics, systems of 
thought, and pedagogy.   
 Chapter 3 continues to develop a fuller account of irony in the late-twentieth century 
encyclopedic novel.  Although David Foster Wallace has very famously denounced empty irony 
in this non-fictional writings, Infinite Jest is deeply ironic and seems to offer a certain kind of 
“knowing” irony as an escape from the ironic/sincere dichotomy.  This escape permits a person 
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to retain self-awareness while engaging in activities which seek to destroy the self.  Wallace 
presents a model of integration that couples ironic distance with extreme self-awareness that 
requires a keen sense of the ironic in different forms (local, infinite, stable and unstable).  In this 
chapter I argue that Wallace strives to re-invent an integrative irony that counters what he sees as 
a corrosive postmodern irony. 
 Chapter 4 examines the cross-traditional influence academic and  oral traditions in Leon 
Forrest's Divine Days.  Through protagonist Joubert Jones, Forrester's novel attempts to 
legitimize the epistemological strength of the African-American oral tradition in the novel, while 
at the same time criticizing the need for such legitimation.  Jones seeks to mythologize two men 
from his community by transforming the oral stories shared within the community into drama.  
He struggles with several double-identities and conflicting desires.  He wants to legitimize the 
two men but fears that his work will not do them justice and he wants to become an intellectual 
playwright and also retain his heritage, which he perceives to be in conflict with academic 
writing.  I argue that Forrest adopts the use of syndesis and interpenetrative logic to progress 
toward a mythic integration. 
 The conclusion to this dissertation briefly expands the scope of this project to include 
texts that engage with topics close to encyclopedism, but could not be considered to be 
encyclopedic.  I consider two texts by Jorge Luis Borges, Roberto Bolano’s Nazi Literature in 
the Americas, and Ambrose Bierce's Deveil's Dictionary as examples of two branches of “meta-
encyclopedic texts.” 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIC NOVEL 
 
 “The plan is so vast that the contribution of each writer is infinitesimal.”   
  Jorge Luis Borges, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” 72 
 
2.1 The Encyclopedia 
 Before discussing the encyclopedic novel, it is necessary to define what an encyclopedia 
is and why this term is useful for describing a kind of fiction.  The first definition for the word 
“encyclopedia” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “a circle of learning; a general course of 
instruction.”  This description fits the earliest encyclopedias (such as Pliny the Elder's Naturalis 
Historia), but the concept of the encyclopedia has changed over time.  Richard Yeo writes that 
the Enlightenment brought about a new paradigm in science and changed the relationship 
between humans and knowledge of the world in such a profound way as to necessitate the 
creation of the encyclopedia.  Yeo writes, “encyclopedias, science and Enlightenment 
assumptions about knowledge […] form a natural alliance of mutually reinforcing elements” 
(xii).  Although the approach and purpose of the encyclopedia shifted over time, its central 
assertion that all knowledge is interrelated has remained constant.   
 There are two primary approaches to the encyclopedia that I term “pedagogic” and 
“dialogic.”  The pedagogic approach to the encyclopedia considers the work to be a repository of 
knowledge to be absorbed by the reader and incorporated into everyday life.  The older of the 
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two approaches, the pedagogic, bears little similarity to contemporary encyclopedias, tending to 
be arranged thematically rather than alphabetically.  The cross-referencing in the modern 
encyclopedia is a remnant of this thematic tendency.  The pedagogic encyclopedia was primarily 
a teaching tool; thematic organization was beneficial because the reader would expect to read the 
work from start to finish, gaining a full education in the process.  The circle is an important 
symbol for the pedagogic encyclopedia, first because the encyclopedia was a full pedagogical 
course, or cycle of learning, and second because the information contained within the pedagogic 
encyclopedia tended to have a strong theological center around which all natural knowledge was 
arranged.  Describing an encyclopedia as a “circle of learning” had the effect of placing 
boundaries on the knowledge to be conveyed.
4
   
 Pliny the Elder's Naturalis Historia is one example of the pedagogic encyclopedia.  The 
work compiled abridged portions of other texts thought to be indispensable to the educated man.  
The first Book begins with a dedication to Emperor Titus and then  details the contents of the rest 
of the work.  Beginning the second Book, the work is written in a continuous prose style, absent 
article headings standard in modern encyclopedias.
5
  Each of the thirty-eight Books focuses on 
one broad area of study that is further divided within the book.  Pliny likens his work to a 
storehouse of information, acknowledging the contributions of scholars before him:  
                                                 
4
 Hilary Clark argues that the encyclopedia wants to “encircle” knowledge, to present knowledge by first 
cordoning it off (98). 
 
5
 The volumes I examine, a side-by-side Latin-English translation edited by H. Rackham (1938), have marginal 
glosses in the place of subject titles.  These glosses are an editorial addition, not appearing in the original Latin.   
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by perusing about 2000 volumes, very few of which, owing to the abstruseness of their 
contents, are ever handled by students, we have collected in 36 volumes 20,000 
noteworthy facts obtained from one hundred authors that we have explored, with a great 
number of other facts in addition that were either ignored by our predecessors or have 
been discovered by subsequent experience” (13).   
Pliny overwhelms the reader with the magnitude of his undertaking, demonstrating to Titus his 
dedication to the process of compilation. 
 Pliny opens Book II with a description of the nature of the world, ascribing to it divine 
characteristics.  He then presents a general top-down organization within subject groups.  Book 
II begins with the broad description of the universe, its size, shape, and make-up, moving next to 
a description of the Earth, the occurrence of eclipses, and then a description of the moon and 
heavenly bodies.  This leads next to a description of theories behind the mechanism of eclipses 
and the cyclic nature of the eclipse.  Although these topics are related in a general fashion, their 
exact organization is typical of much of the work: a broad topic, divided into smaller topics with 
frequent digressions onto related topics.  This organization functions well for the pedagogic 
encyclopedia because it provides a practical progression in learning – the reader learns first of 
the earth, then the moon, and finally eclipses, knowledge of the last requiring knowledge of the 
former.   
 Pliny's work, then, has the double purpose of presenting a wealth of knowledge found by 
Pliny in his reading and in his own experience and also contributing to the glory of his dedicatee.  
Naturalis Historia is both a memorial to the achievements of Rome and an attempt to record a 
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complete catalogue of human knowledge.  As such, the Historia testifies to the authority of 
Rome.
6
  The pedagogic encyclopedia, despite (or perhaps because of) its educational purposes, 
thus from the start possesses a secondary purpose that reconfirms the authority of the ruler.  Pliny 
cedes the provinces of knowledge to Titus through his dedication of the work.   
 The dialogic approach to the encyclopedia adopts many of the practices of the pedagogic 
but re-envisions the purpose of the text.  The dialogic approach considers the encyclopedia to be 
a mediating text between scholars, or between author and reader.  The structure of the dialogic 
encyclopedia shifted along with the purpose.  Whereas thematic organization in the pedagogic 
encyclopedia allowed the reader to read seamlessly from one topic into the next without having 
to jump around in pages or even in separate volumes, structured organization and cross-
referencing permitted the reader to pick and choose among topics.
7
  Thus, just as the circle is an 
important symbolic figure to the pedagogic encyclopedia, the tree is an important symbolic 
figure for the dialogic encyclopedia.  The tree's limbs symbolizing the different bodies of 
knowledge, smaller branches designating sub-fields within the disciplines. 
 Denis Diderot's monumental Encyclopédie is a prominent example of the dialogic 
approach to the encyclopedia.  Diderot's work began as a translation of Ephraim Chamber's 
Cyclopedia but eventually evolved into a work of twenty-seven volumes published over the 
                                                 
6
 See Trevor Murphy's Pliny the Elder's Natural History for more on the interplay of politics and epistemology in 
that text. 
 
7
 Although thematically organized encyclopedias do exist, alphabetical organization has far outstripped it in 
popularity.  The emergence of online encyclopedias, such as Wikipedia, have permitted a new type of 
organization that is densely cross-referenced through the use of hyperlinks between articles. 
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course of 25 years.
8
  Although the authorship of much of the material is contested (some of it is 
plagiarized from Chambers or other sources while the bulk seems to have been written by 
Diderot and a handful of other editors),
9
 Diderot sought to write an encyclopedia that would 
outlast his historical moment and lead to a greater understanding of the world.  In contrast to 
Pliny's aim of flattering authority, Diderot wanted his Encyclopédie to promote Enlightenment 
rationality that would challenge religious notions of propriety and of monarchical authority.
10
  
John Lough remarks that the Encyclopédie was received in two ways: as a work of reference, but 
also as a method of spreading ideas of the Enlightenment (Encyclopédie 91).  Contemporary 
critics were quick to pick up on the philosophical and political undertones, and not all 
appreciatively.
11
  Lough further remarks that “alongside his purely objective observations on the 
                                                 
8 
There are a great many critical works offering similar histories of the publication of Diderot's Encyclopédie but 
the level of detail varies.  Douglas Gordon and Norman Torrey provide a somewhat detailed history of the 
publication in The Censoring of Diderot's Encyclopédie.  The book contains reconstructed fragments that Gordon 
found bound as an extra volume in one of the original printings: this book of errata contains proofs corrected in 
Diderot's hand, proofs bearing the censoring marks of Le Breton (the publisher), and other unpublished material.  
Philipp Blom's Enlightening the World: Encyclopédie, The Book that Changed the Course of History offers a 
wonderfully detailed history of publication of the Encyclopédie, biographical sketches of the most prominent 
encyclopedists, as well as the political and economic context, and even a chapter describing the importance of 
Paris in French intellectual life in the early 18
th
 century.   
 
9
 Blom writes of the early difficulty of the Encyclopédie, which began as simply a translation of Ephraim 
Chamber's Cyclopedia but was plagued by a charlatan who (it was rumored) barely knew French.  Diderot was 
eventually sought out for the editorship and it was he who eventually altered the privilege (formal decree 
granting royal permission to publish a specific work).  Some of the material in the Encyclopédie remained from 
its early stages (35-40). 
 
10
 Daniel Brewer writes in his 2011 essay “The Encyclopédie: innovation and legacy” in New Essays on Diderot 
that Diderot's Encyclopédie reflects “the most powerful tenet of Enlightenment thought, namely, the belief in the 
individual's power to understand the world critically” (48).   
 
11 
Lough points to the dedication of a supplement to the third edition of the Encyclopedia Britannica to King 
George III that  states, in part, “The French Encyclopédie has been accused, and justly accused of having 
disseminated far and wide the seeds of Anarchy and Atheism.  If the Encyclopedia Britannica shall in any degree 
counteract the tendency of that pestiferous work, even these two volumes will not be wholly unworthy of Your 
Majesty's patronage” (qtd. In Lough, Encyclopédie 91-2). 
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aims of such a work of reference, [Diderot] inserted passages in which he shows his pride in the 
progress of the Enlightenment and his determination to use the Encyclopédie to hasten that 
progress” (Encyclopédie 92).  
 Today's conception of the encyclopedia is quite different from Diderot's Enlightenment-
influenced ideal because it has retained the form of the dialogic approach but not the purpose.  
For Diderot, the encyclopedia is a revolutionary medium that is perfectly in line with 
enlightenment sensibility: it questioned religious and monarchical authority and attempted to 
traffic in revolutionary ideas by, in effect, overwhelming government censors with huge amounts 
of material.
12
  Critics attacked Diderot's Encyclopédie for these revolutionary ideals and its 
attempts to spread atheism and dissent.  Thus, for Diderot, the importance of the encyclopedia 
was cultural, political, and even moral.
13
  He foresaw two distinct purposes for his project.  First, 
the Encyclopédie would be a type of “time capsule of the Enlightenment” so that if some 
catastrophe were to take place the world would not need to build itself back up to Enlightenment 
reasoning, but would be able to, in effect, pick up where it had left off (Yeo 3).  The second 
purpose of the encyclopedia would be to inspire a conversation that would outlast Diderot and 
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Philipp Blom describes the encyclopedists' use of cross-reference to insert subsersive content into the 
Encyclopédie by linking contrasting ideas or suggestive juxtaposition.  Blom writes, “ANTHROPHAGES 
(Cannibals) was surreptitiously commented on by the addition 'See Eucharist, Communion.' Similarly, LIBERTÉ 
DE PENSER (Freedom of Thought) had as a contrasting reference 'See: Intolerance & Jesus Christ'” (154). 
 
13 
Daniel Brewer further argues that Diderot's work structured and revalued knowledge in a such a way that 
“aimed to establish and display the fundamental interconnectedness of all forms of human knowledge” (48).  
While the interconnectedness of knowledge itself is not revolutionary, Diderot's idea that the encyclopedia would 
map the “order that the encyclopedists believed that thought imprints upon the world” disrupted a top-down 
conception of knowledge with a central authority figure (whether God or monarch) (48).  The encyclopedists, 
Brewer argues, believed that structures of knowledge were independent from knowledge itself, thus freeing the 
individual from an authoritative, pre-conceived, and ultimately arbitrary structure (54).  “Thus,” Brewer writes, 
“it falls to the knower to determine the criteria according to which he or she lays claim to know the world” (54). 
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the Encyclopédie.  This ongoing conversation, Wilda Anderson writes, would take place between 
scholars of the past, the present, and those of the future: “the act of writing for the Encyclopédie 
is the pretext for the conversation that will organize the real encyclopedia, the living 
encyclopedia made up of the philosophers' exchange of ideas as they work to adjust their articles 
to each others'” (919).  In this way, the encyclopedia is never actually complete and, thus, never 
authoritative.
14
   
 One of the more notorious entries in the Encyclopédie is the article titled 
“*Encyclopédie” in which Diderot outlines his thoughts on the project and sets up his 
philosophical outlook regarding knowledge and enlightened rationality.
15
  The mere presence of 
this article within the text of the Encyclopédie illustrates Diderot's self-conscious editorial aims 
(both Diderot and his co-editor d'Alambert had also written introductory material, and Diderot 
wrote a prospectus arguing for the necessity of a French-language reference work, all of which 
one would expect to be paratextual material).  This self-reflexive turn is in keeping with the ever-
vigilant Enlightenment philosophy to which Diderot was dedicated.  Diderot argues in this article 
that “the aim of an encyclopedia is to assemble knowledge scattered across the earth, to reveal its 
overall structure to our contemporaries and to pass it on to those who will come after us; so that 
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 Anderson argues that the true encyclopedia is the dialogue between scholars and not the written books and that 
the purpose of the encyclopedia must focus on that act of communication.  The “progress [of knowledge] is made 
possible not by the content, but by the provoking of an act of thinking: that of questioning definitions of words 
and the status of an argument [. . .] the encyclopedia becomes a very different project – it doesn't store 
knowledge; it provokes speculation on the part of both its authors and readers and therefore creates new 
knowledge” (921, 925). 
 
15 
Entries in the early volumes bearing an asterisk (*) or unsigned were written by Diderot.  One of the 
Encyclopédie's notable novelties was contribution of material from recognized names in the particular field of 
interest.   
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the achievements of past ages do not become worthless for the centuries to come, so that our 
descendants, in becoming better informed, may at the same time become more virtuous and 
content, and so that we do not leave this earth without having earned the respect of the human 
race” (21-2).  For Diderot, the encyclopedia must be undertaken voluntarily by a group of like-
minded scholars.
16
   
 The Enlightenment influence is clear when Diderot considers the important role of 
current philosophy to the Encyclopédie, arguing that the “revolution” in thinking will make past 
encyclopedias obsolete.  He writes,  
as philosophy today advances with giant strides; as it brings order to all the 
subjects it embraces; as it sets the predominant fashion under which the yoke of 
authority and precedent comes to be shaken and to yield to the laws of reason, 
scarcely one work of dogma survives for which wholehearted approval is felt.  
Such works come to be perceived as copies of human artifice rather than drawn 
from the truth of nature. (23)   
The agenda Diderot sets for himself is to abandon the influence of authority for the truth of 
empirical observation and of critical inquiry.  The order which Diderot seeks, and that which will 
thence be viewed with suspicion, is not the order of established legal and religious authority but 
the scientific and philosophical desire for integration of science, philosophy and life.   
                                                 
16
 “Encyclopedic discourse is a metadiscourse,” writes Hilary Clark in “Encyclopedic Discourse” (98).  Drawing 
on a Foucauldian suspicion of order, Clark contends that the encyclopedia recognizes its own shortcomings and 
“ideological blind spots” (97).   
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 Diderot's approach to his Encyclopédie is a model of sorts for the contemporary novel of 
a systematic yet open-ended, dialogic approach.  In form, the encyclopedic novel rarely 
resembles an actual encyclopedia;
17
 rather, the encyclopedic project that Diderot initiates 
provides an epistemological and political model for the novel.  The Enlightenment project of the 
encyclopedia includes the potential for transhistoric dialogue, a broad interest in culture, and a 
self-aware, self-reflective turn that is conducive to social critique.  Diderot was not interested in 
a straightforward “objective” presentation of information in the way that many modern 
encyclopedias attempt, but wore his ideology and critical approach on his sleeve.  In 
foregrounding his critical approaches and including his philosophy on the encyclopedia as an 
element of the Encyclopédie, Diderot disrupts the enclosed and encircling tendency of the 
pedagogic encyclopedia.  The formal and epistemological circle does not close but includes 
itself, like a moebius strip, projecting dialogue into the future.  The dialogic approach to the 
encyclopedia does not accept the limits of the printed text but focuses on the process of 
developing and refining knowledge that comes from the interaction of present and future 
scholars. 
 
2.2 The Encyclopedic Novel 
 The relationship between the encyclopedia and the novel is the central question behind 
the current project.  The two have been related in literary criticism in the term “encyclopedic 
novel,” which is most commonly used to describe very long and complex novels, what Henry 
                                                 
17
 There are some novels that emulate the literal form of the encyclopedia, most notably Roberto Bolaño's La 
literatura nazi en America and Dictionary of the Khazars by Milorad Pavic. 
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James would have called a “loose baggy monster.”18  However, more useful and specific 
definitions exist and have exerted considerable influence in critical circles.  Foremost among 
these is that by Northrop Frye.  Frye's study of the encyclopedic form in fiction appears first in 
Anatomy of Criticism, although the term “encyclopedic” will reappear in his criticism throughout 
his career.
19
   
 Northrop Frye's approach to the encyclopedic form in literature emphasizes integration of 
generic form, reintroduces the concept of the cycle, and constructs a long history of the 
encyclopedic form in literature that unifies all of literary genres.  In Anatomy of Criticism Frye 
argues for the centrality of the encyclopedic form in each literary “mode”  that characterizes each 
literary historical period.  Anatomy of Criticism is constructed in such a way that its four essays 
are deeply intertwined, and terms which are often used loosely in one part will be strictly defined 
in another or definitions are built and refined in several essays.  To get to Frye's definition of 
encyclopedic form in the fourth essay, it is necessary to track back to the first essay, “Historical 
Criticism: Theory of Modes” to pick up Frye's overall schema and define some of his more 
elementary terms.     
                                                 
18
 In the preface to his novel The Tragic Muse, Henry James questions the artistic meaning of novels that have 
“queer elements of the accidental and the arbitrary,” or that attempt to tell “two stories . . . in one,” calling them 
“large loose baggy monsters” (83-4).  James' objection, however, could describe many contemporary novels but 
the term has retained popularity in describing those large novels full of seeming loose ends or that resist 
interpretation in some way.  The “accidental and arbitrary” may easily describe the scatological and ironic in 
postmodern literature. 
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 In Frye's later works the term “encyclopedic” takes on greater significance, transforming from a word defining a 
formal category of fiction into one that integrates the artistic and the social.  The definition in Anatomy of 
Criticism leaves open the possibility for this expanded meaning, and at points even seems to suggest that this 
broader definition lies behind the writing somewhere.  As with much of Frye's work, it is important to keep in 
mind the double meanings that everything has (outlined particularly in Frye's posthumous Double-Vision) – a 
natural meaning and a second, apocalyptic meaning. 
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 Frye's first essay in Anatomy of Criticism develops a theory of “modes” that constructs 
literary historical periods.  Classification of modes is based upon a hero's “power of action” 
compared to other humans and to the environment; the modes are based upon the Aristotelian 
concept of ethos, or character.  Frye defines these modes as the following:  
1) mythic – in which the hero is superior in kind to other people and to the surrounding 
environment; 
2) romantic – in which the hero is superior in degree to other people and to the environment;  
3) high mimetic – in which the hero is superior to other humans but not to the environment;  
4) low mimetic – in which the hero is superior to neither other humans nor the environment, 
but is a normal person of normal abilities; and  
5) ironic – in which the hero is inferior either to other humans or to the surrounding 
environment.   
These five modes are “historical” in the sense that they associate form with historical periods; 
however, the historical is abstracted, based upon Frye's sense of formal aesthetic categories and 
social values.  Works of literature are not mythic or romantic because of the time at which they 
were written, but rather because of their reflection, in the person of the hero, of the social values 
which Frye argues are prevalent in one era or another.  This style of analysis, though it appears 
diachronic and historical, is also synchronic because all modes are perpetually present as a part 
of the whole structure.  A.C. Hamilton notes that this conceptual framework can classify 
literature both diachronically and synchronically because “[the framework] describes the shape 
of a general literary history, one that may accommodate any number of specific histories” (63).  
 20 
Since Frye's focus in Anatomy is the whole of literature, he can describe the broad trends, 
trusting these to accurately describe a great number of works.
20
   
 The movement from myth to irony in literature, for example, marks not just a movement 
through time but a thematic movement away from socially integrated myth into plots that 
gradually show more interest in human affairs.  The hero's power of action demonstrates this 
clearly: the mythic hero is clearly greater than most humans while the ironic hero is somewhat 
less, to be pitied or scorned.  Significantly, in this schema, as the relative power of action 
decreases, realism increases. 
 
Myth  Romance High Mimetic  Low Mimetic  Ironic 
 
     increasing realism 
 
 
     increasing “power of action”   
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 Paul Ricoeur disagrees in his essay “Anatomy of Criticism or the Order of Paradigms” from Centre and 
Labyrinth: Essays in Honour of Northrop Frye, arguing that Frye's approach is “neither ahistorical nor historical, 
it is rather transhistorical, in the sense that it traverses history in a cumulative and not simply an additive mode” 
(13).  While Ricoeur finds this method valuable, he cannot reconcile this historical approach with a schema of 
recursive modes.  Likewise, Marco Andreacchio disputes Frye's use of recursion (“Questioning Northrop Frye's 
Adaptation of Vico” in Interpretation: A Journal of Political Philosophy), but on the grounds that it is not well 
founded in Giambattista Vico's philosophy.  Andreacchio interprets Vico's “ages,” which Frye adapts into modal 
eras, to be focused more on the common origins of nations than on a recurring course of historical progression 
(284). 
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 Frye's five-part historical schema describes one element of fiction that Frye derives from 
Aristotle – ethos, or character.  To this he adds two other elements: mythos and dianoia.  Mythos 
is equivalent to plot type, while dianoia signifies theme, idea, or thought as its central shaping 
principle.  This split in fictional representation into mythos and dianoia represents a balance 
between plot and idea.   
 The principles of mythos and dianoia define macro-categories of fiction that Frye further 
subdivides – mythos into tragic and comic, dianoia into episodic and encyclopedic.  From here, 
Frye refers to fictional forms categorized by mythos as simply “fictional” and those characterized 
by dianoia as “thematic.”  Thus, “the fictional” for Frye signifies texts in which plot takes 
precedence over theme or idea, and thematic texts are more typically novels of ideas in which 
theme is of greater importance.  Any given text might contain tragic, comic, episodic, and 
encyclopedic elements, but will do so in varying proportions.  Taking into account these 
subdivisions to fiction and theme, Frye constructs twenty distinct categories, outlined in the 
figure below. 
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 Mythos 
(fictional - plot) 
Dianoia 
(thematic) 
 
Tragic Comic Episodic Encyclopedic 
Myth     
Romance     
High 
Mimetic 
    
Low 
Mimetic 
    
Ironic     
 
Ethos (Hero Character) 
 Significantly, for Frye (as for Aristotle) tragedy and comedy express ethos, but for Frye 
tragedy and comedy are not just forms of drama.  The ultimate outcome of the hero in society 
divides mythos into either tragedy and comedy.  The tragic is a fictional form in which “the hero 
becomes isolated from his society” while the comic fictional form incorporates the hero into 
society (35).    
 Likewise, Frye divides the thematic mode (dianoia) into episodic and encyclopedic 
forms; this split in thematics parallels the split in the fictional forms tragedy and comedy.  The 
episodic and encyclopedic thematic forms are roughly analogous to the tragic and comic fictional 
forms, but the former refers to the author's relationship to society rather than (as the latter) to the 
hero's relationship to her society.  The tragic mode tends to alienate the hero from society while 
the comic tends to integrate the hero with society, and this is also a good way to consider 
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position of the author in the episodic and encyclopedic, respectively.  Frye writes that “the poet 
may write as an individual, emphasizing the separateness of his personality and the distinctness 
of his vision,” or the poet may “devote himself to being a spokesman of his society” (54).  The 
first poet writes in the episodic form and the second the encyclopedic.  Viewed as “alienated,” 
the episodic poet writes apart from his or her own society, as a distinct individual informing a 
divided society about itself.  The “integrating,” or encyclopedic, author views himself or herself 
as a part of that same society addressing itself. 
 Frye provides examples of the encyclopedic and episodic thematic forms in each of the 
five historical modes, but my concern here is with his definition of the encyclopedic.  In the 
mythic mode, the encyclopedic poet “who sings about gods is often considered to be singing as 
one, or as an instrument of one” (55).  Because in the mythic mode the poet is fully integrated 
into the broader society, he (or she) will participate in the dominant poetic tradition, which can 
be taken to form an “encyclopedic aggregate.”  To put this another way, the poet writes in 
accordance with other poets (and is in accord with the hegemonic ideology of his or her culture), 
contributing to society's cultural project.  Frye's primary example of this is the Christian Bible, 
which was written by many authors over a long history and in numerous geographical locations.  
What binds the “mythic encyclopedic” Bible together is a unifying belief in the word of the 
Judeo-Christian God and an integration into a society of fellow Christians.  Thus, Frye argues, it 
is vital to read the Bible as a closed whole with a unified purpose rather than to fragment it and 
consider its parts separated from the whole.  The Bible as encyclopedic form integrates its 
implied author (God/man) with society. 
 24 
 Moving through the epochs, away from the mythic, the encyclopedic form will arise as 
“increasingly human analogies” of the mythic (emphasis original 56), so in the romantic epoch 
the poet is more distant from God, delivering an analogy of divine knowledge, and playing the 
role myth assigns to a prophet.  Both the high mimetic and low mimetic modes in the 
encyclopedic form reveal a gap widening in the unified cultures in the previous epochs.  The low 
mimetic particularly reveals a society that has become more focused on the individual than the 
collective.  Frye notes that the role of the poet in the low mimetic mode is similar to the hero in 
the romantic: “an extraordinary person who lives in a higher and more imaginative order of 
experience than that of nature” (59).  To put it another way, even in the encyclopedic form, 
which highlights integration and unity with society, the mimetic mode shows a fragmenting of 
society that will deepen into the ironic.  Individuals in societies become disassociated from one 
another and diversify in their values and beliefs.  The encyclopedic literature which reflects this 
disassociation must necessarily be written by an author who can witness and understand the 
social fracturing while being a spokesperson for, and remaining a part of, society as a whole – a 
difficult prospect. 
 Frye's analysis of the encyclopedic form takes on the greatest importance for the current 
project when he begins to detail the encyclopedia in the ironic mode/age.  In this age, Frye tells 
us, the texts “devote their entire energy to the poet's literal function as a maker of poems,” and 
that “the thematic poet in the ironic age thinks of himself more as a craftsman than as a creator” 
(60).  The society of the poet has become so fragmented and the narrative so displaced from a 
central organizing myth that the poet must focus all energy into locating significant moments in a 
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sea of mundane minutiae.  Frye calls attention to Proust's repetitions of specific memories, for 
example, to create “timeless moments” of significance.  The works of Eliot and Woolf share a 
common “sense of contrast between the course of a whole civilization and the tiny flashes of 
significant moments which reveal its meaning” (61).  In the ironic age, encyclopedic and 
episodic seem to merge, as “[t]he paradoxical technique of poetry which is encyclopedic and yet 
discontinuous […] is […] a technical innovation heralding a new mode” (61).  
 In the ironic mode, the simple fact of the text takes precedence over its content, and the 
content of the text is focused on the authorial perspective – the author's experience of the world, 
the author's inability to make sense of the world, the author's experience of the very text she is 
writing.  In these inward-facing moments, the desire the author has to capture meaning – or, to 
act as spokesperson for a fragmented society from within that society – pushes the author toward 
the creation of a new form.   
This new form seems to blend characteristics of the ironic and the mythic.  The ironic mode 
lacks the shared knowledge of an integrated mythic society, yet the timeless moments of Proust 
or the significant moments of Woolf and Eliot spark recognition within the reader of a broader 
(perhaps “universal” is too strong a word) truth.  This shared knowledge shows a tendency 
toward integration that should be unexpected in a progression of modes that have grown more 
distant from myth and integration. However, there is a connection between these mythic and 
ironic modes.  Frye differentiates between the specific sorts of myth that appear within each of 
his broad categories of literature (fictional and thematic works, also termed mythos and dianoia) 
and the “more common and easily recognized form as a certain kind of narrative” (21).  This 
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narrative concerns characters who are gods or are in some way superior to other humans.  The 
action takes place in a world outside of or prior to time as we recognize it, the actions are treated 
as though they have “really happened,” and the actions tend “to stick together and build up 
bigger structures” (31).  Most importantly, myth tries to assimilate humans and nature, and it 
works to erode the division between legend and history.  Because myths so often include creation 
stories, ancestry, origin-of-mankind stories and the like, the combination of legend and history 
forms a more integrated sense of cultural history and identity.  In other words, myths, when 
believed, encourage an integrated cultural worldview.  Frye further expands on this formulation 
of myth in “The Archetypes of Literature” from the collection Fables of Identity, writing that 
“the central myth of art must be the vision of the end of social effort, the innocent world of 
fulfilled desires, the free human society” (18).  This myth is a unifying structure that envisions an 
eternal present, or utopian time of unchanging and integrated social being.   
  An important counter to myth is the concept of “displacement,” which is a movement 
away from myth, or an “indirect mythologizing” (36).  Displacement works against myth in that 
it moves narrative away from the unified myth and toward a consensus of scientifically verifiable 
reality.  In “Myth, Fiction, and Displacement” also collected in Fables of Identity, Frye calls 
displacement “the techniques a writer uses to make his story credible, logically motivated, or 
morally acceptable – lifelike, in short” (36).  This notion is expanded in Anatomy of Criticism so 
that the displacement is relative, increasing from mythic through ironic modes.  As literature 
moves away from myth, and verisimilitude increases, there must also be a corresponding 
movement away from the unifying power of the myth.  If, then, one of the hallmarks of the myth 
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is integration, then a characteristic of the realistic and the ironic is disintegration caused by 
displacement.  Myth gradually separates itself from history and becomes recognized as literature, 
which Frye says is what happened to Roman mythology in the early Christian era. 
  Yet this part of Frye's schema is key to the current project: at a critical point the ironic 
begins bending back to the mythic.  As previously noted, in Frye's work displacement from myth 
coincides with an increase in realism.  Frye writes: “Reading forward in history, therefore, we 
may think of our romantic, high mimetic and low mimetic modes as a series of displaced myths, 
mythoi or plot-formulas progressively moving over towards the opposite pole of verisimilitude, 
and then, with irony, beginning to move back”  (52, emphasis original).  The ironic is not, then, 
the most realistic of the modes (the low mimetic is), but it is the one which hearkens a move in 
the other direction, back toward myth.  Frye picks up this thread again in his consideration of the 
thematic: the loss of such devices as apostrophe, mimesis of direct address (later to be termed 
epos), and symbolic patterning (replaced by juxtaposition of images)  indicates “the implicit 
sense of an initiated group aware of a real meaning behind an ironically baffling exterior” (61).  
Frye argues that irony implicitly indicates a shared knowledge between author and audience (or 
in-group mentality) and that this sharing is the beginning of a return back to myth.   
 The movement from irony back to myth initiates the beginning of a new cycle.  This is 
precisely why Frye offers parallel examples from the Classical and the Judeo-Christian worlds: 
the Bible marked the beginning of a new mythic epoch which began a new sequence of historical 
modes.  A.C. Hamilton and others have noted the influence on Frye of Vico's theory of recursive 
history and Spengler's notion of organic civilization.  Vico and Spengler both hypothesized an 
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historical model which operated in cycles rather than linearly.  At this point we see an additional 
dimension to Frye's historical schema: the system is recursive. 
     The point of cleavage between irony and myth is significant to this study for, if we accept 
Frye's structure, this is the point at which the contemporary encyclopedic novel resides: after the 
ironic Finnegans Wake but before a new social myth emerges.  The intrusion of the fantastic into 
“realistic” novels breaks the expected pattern of increasing verisimilitude, but perhaps this is not 
to be considered regressive, but the opening up of an indication of a new era of shared 
knowledge.  The irony of postmodern or so-called post-postmodern texts that from one angle 
seem purposeless may perhaps from another be seen as productive in creating a shared 
knowledge.  The very precariousness of these texts on the edge of the ironic mode suggests their 
existence at a point of jointure. 
 A final point before returning to Frye's definition for the encyclopedic form is the role of 
the reader of ironic fiction.  Frye holds up Finnegans Wake as the example of his contemporary 
ironic epic.  He asks who the hero of the book is, saying “one feels that this book gives us 
something more than the merely irresponsible irony of a turning cycle.  Eventually it dawns on 
us that it is the reader who achieves the quest, the reader who, to the extent that he masters the 
book […] is able to look down on its rotation, and see its form as something more than rotation” 
(emphasis orginal 323-4).  The author of the ironic fiction, then, does make a sort of direct 
communication that imitates the communication of the mythic poet.  Though the ironic author 
does not speak for God, as it were, she does speak in an abstracted way about society from her 
position inside of society.  The recipient, the reader, understands the idea (dianoia) that is 
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expressed because of the shared societal knowledge and cultural values which had seemed to be 
obscured in previous instantiations of irony. 
 Later in the Anatomy of Criticism, in addition to addressing the problem of mode for the 
contemporary encyclopedic novel, Frye also addresses the problem of genre by presenting a 
definition of the encyclopedic form as an integration of other prose genres.  Under the category 
of “specific continuous forms”  (ie, prose fiction), Frye delineates four genres within fiction: 
novel, confession, anatomy, and romance.  The distinction that Frye makes between the romance 
and the novel “lies in the conception of characterization”:  the novelist wants to create “real 
people” while the romancer creates “stylized figures which expand into psychological 
archetypes” (304).  Romance does tend toward allegory, has a longer tradition than the novel, 
and seems more geared toward remembrance of the past than is the novel (304-7).  Frye qualifies 
the inclusion of the confession and the anatomy as fictional genres in terms of the author's 
creative intent.  The confession expresses in the author's desire to construct narrative [an 
“impulse to select only those events and experiences in the writer's life that go to build up an 
integrated pattern,” as Frye has it (307)], and so the confession is fictional.  The anatomy is, 
perhaps, the most important form of fiction in relation to the current project because it is a 
category that today is little-discussed.  Frye calls the anatomy a genre of fiction because of the 
“creative treatment of exhaustive erudition” that it shares with Menippean satire (311).  What 
many critics identify as “encyclopedic” in contemporary novels is actually the influence of the 
anatomy (as Frye describes it) on fiction.  The anatomy, Frye says “means a dissection or 
analysis, and expresses very accurately the intellectualized approach to [the] form” (311).  Most 
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importantly, the anatomy builds its own structure in the process of exposition (this seems to be 
the element many critics identify as “encyclopedic”).  As with all of the above terms and 
concepts, these four genres of fiction are relative and, what is more, they combine in most 
fiction. There are six possible combinations of the four genres: novel-confession, novel-anatomy, 
novel-romance, confession-anatomy, confession-romance, and anatomy-romance.
21
  These forms 
rarely exist in a pure form but are more commonly hybrids.   Significantly, however, 
according to Frye the encyclopedic form within continuous fiction includes all four – novel, 
romance, confession, and anatomy – combined in such a way as to form a complete prose epic in 
which “all [forms are] of practically equal importance, and all essential to one another, so that 
the book is a unity and not an aggregate” (314).  The key phrase here is “unity.”  Based upon the 
thematic encyclopedic form seen earlier, Frye's encyclopedic form actively integrates the other 
forms into itself.  Without this, it is simply another hybrid continuous fictional form.
22
 
 Frye demonstrates the existence of the encyclopedic form in all five of the historical 
epochs or modes, but there are two which are important to this project: the Bible and Finnegans 
Wake or the mythic and ironic instantiations of the form.  According to Frye, the Bible is the 
central mythic encyclopedia of Western culture, while  Finnegans Wake, on the other hand, pulls 
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 Hamilton counts eleven hybrids, including the four previously mentioned: four triple permutations (novel-
romance-confession; novel-romance-anatomy; novel-confession-anatomy; romance-confession-anatomy) and 
one quadruple (novel-romance-confession-anatomy) (177-8). 
 
22
 Interpenetration is a useful model for understanding the integration of genre because, if the encyclopedic form 
were to fully integrate all genres, one would expect the genres to become indistinguishable.  Over the course of 
the reading, the elements of individual genres may stand out but upon reflection – the important second 
consideration Frye considers necessary for true criticism to take place – the reader can recognize the text as a 
unified whole.  Thus, the encyclopedic novel is both fragmentary – consisting in many genres – and unified – 
fully integrating genre – at the same time.  Interpenetration allows for this paradoxical unity of opposed entities 
and may perhaps be the rationale behind Frye's assertion that accreted episodic poems may result in an 
encyclopedic form.   
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in these same four strands of continuous fiction, but works them in an ironic fashion – 
developing that shared ironic symbolism which is recognized by the in-group.  The irony of 
Finnegans Wake, argues Frye, builds to something which the reader can recognize as something 
more than an empty irony.  It is this shared recognition that paves the way back to myth as the 
shared recognition forges new archetypal symbols. 
 At this point, all of the strands of Frye's theory come together.  The movement in literary 
history from the Bible to James Joyce represents nearly a complete circuit.  The next step, given 
everything to which Anatomy of Criticism builds, should be a recursion to the mythic.  In every 
one of Frye's essays, modernist literature stands in the final “Ironic” phase of the historical 
schema, and Finnegans Wake marks a recursion.  The question that Frye leaves unanswered, and 
could not possibly have answered given the time of his writing, is how do post-1980s 
encyclopedic novels fit into the schema?  Had Finnegans Wake completed the cycle, 
encyclopedic novels to follow should have marked the beginning of the cycle again.  Conversely, 
Joyce's novel may not have been the turning-point that Frye had thought it to be.  
 The two elements of Frye's definition of the encyclopedic text that are most important to 
this dissertation are the concepts of integration and recursion.  Both of these concepts serve to 
represent multiple ideas within Frye's Anatomy.  Each of the modes describes a relationship 
between the hero and society; this integration of the protagonist, for example, is parallel to the 
relationship of the author to society.  Most importantly, the integration of forms proves a strong 
working definition for the encyclopedic form.  Recursion, likewise, refers to both a cultural 
concept and an important formal element within encyclopedic texts.  The recursive historical 
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schema that Frye adopts from Oswald Spengler parallels the cyclical nature that Frye finds in 
such encyclopedic texts as Finnegans Wake and the Bible.  Integration and recursion are primary 
thematic and formal concerns in contemporary encyclopedic novels, but also crucial elements in 
Frye's literary theory because of the closeness he saw between literature and the social sphere. 
 Following Frye, critics of the encyclopedic form can be grouped into two categories: 
those who use a formal definition for the encyclopedic novel and those who identify a conceptual 
“encyclopedism” apart from form.  In addition to this broad division, criticism of the 
encyclopedic novel is also split along historic lines, some critics tending to a synchronic 
interpretation, other to diachronic.  Interestingly, both lines of criticism stem from elements 
discussed by Frye. 
 A number of critics define the encyclopedic novel formally, and critics in this group tend 
to consider the form diachronically, as having developed from the epic or another source.  Aside 
from generic conventions, the formal critics tends to examine the role of language in the novel 
and also the scope or breadth of topics addressed.   
 Edward Mendelson, for example, constructs a definition for the encycopedic narrative 
that is very constricted, and comprised of seven points a text must fulfill in order to be 
considered encyclopedic.  Each encyclopedic narrative must  
1)  give a “full account of at least one technology or science” (164) 
2)  incorporate other literary styles;  
3)  be monstrous or include monstrous elements  
4)  not “culminate in a completed relation of sexual love” (165) 
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5) be both analytic and synthetic; 
6) tend toward a mythical history or toward a history of the genre 
7) be polyglot or provide a history of language. 
Additionally, the encyclopedic narrative makes extensive use of synecdoche and has its roots in 
the epic.  Like Frye, Mendelson focuses on both formal and historical dimensions of the genre, 
but Mendelson rejects Frye's recursive model, charging Frye with inattention to the specific 
cultural importance of the encyclopedic narrative that reflects the identity of a nation.  However, 
Mendelson seems to agree with Frye in finding a tradition for the encyclopedic text in  the 
mythic, and attributing its history to the epic.
23
  Also like Frye, Mendelson attributes generic 
importance to  the role of the author, but Mendleson imbues his encyclopedic author with an 
additional status: 
each major national culture of the west, as it becomes aware of itself as a separate 
entity, produces an encyclopedic author, one whose work attends to the whole 
social and linguistic range of his nation, who makes use of all the literary styles 
and conventions known to his countrymen, whose dialect often becomes 
established as the national language, who takes his place as national poet or 
national classic, and who becomes the focus of a large and persistent exegetic 
and textual industry comparable to the industry founded on the Bible. 
(“Encyclopedic” 1267-8). 
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 Franco Moretti devotes a couple of lines to the encyclopedic text in his Modern Epic (1996).  Moretti recognizes 
the exaulted place that Mendelson gives the encyclopedic narrative, but rejects the encyclopedia because it does 
not connote narrative properly. 
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Mendelson's focus on the author is much like his focus on the encyclopedic text as a fulcrum 
between “national pre-history and national history” (1267).  Mendelson's celebration of the 
author is secondary to the text because it is only after the text has entered the national stage that 
it can be considered by critics to be encyclopedic (1268).  Mendelson also recognizes the 
important myth-making aspect of the encyclopedic narrative's representation of history.  Though 
his account of history differs from Frye's in rejecting the recursive model.  The strength of 
Mendelson's essay lies in his identification of these seven characteristics of the encyclopedic 
narrative.  Two important aspects of the encyclopedic narrative in Mendelson's essay to which 
critics return, and that are also important to this study, are the characteristics of a blended 
analytic and synthetic logic and the polyglot nature of the encyclopedia.  Taken together, these 
elements are evidence of what   Mendelson refers to as the dialogic model of the encyclopedia.  
For Mendelson, the blending of analytic and synthetic is at once a communication and a conflict. 
 Adopting several of Mendelson's defining criteria but infusing them with his own Marxist 
perspective, Alan Clinton reimagines the encyclopedic text within the context of a postmodern 
poetics of space.  Clinton argues that accounts of science and a history of language – elements 
Mendelson identifies as necessary to the encyclopedic text – “have attained a central position in 
our postmodern, information-based technoculture.”  In other words, these elements have become 
so common in postmodern literature that they can no longer be used as defining characteristics of 
the encyclopedic text.  Instead, Clinton argues that the encyclopedic narrative is “crowded” with 
information in a way that parallels the crowdedness of overabundance in a late capitalist culture.  
The form of the novel mirrors “a culture capable of saturating both physical and mental space 
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with commodities.”  The encyclopedic narrative, for Clinton, transforms into an allegory in 
which excess is the primary metaphor connecting the encyclopedia with contemporary life – an 
implicit critique of the encyclopedia within the encyclopedic form.  Clinton's study differs from 
Mendelson's in historical aspect: Clinton argues for a specifically postmodern encyclopedic 
narrative while Mendelson, more in line with Frye, presents a diachronic model for the 
encyclopedic narrative that has its roots in the epic.  However, Clinton adopts a postmodern's 
view of a pedagogic encyclopedia, for the encyclopedia for Clinton is shut down and out-of-date.  
The crowdedness of the encyclopedia points to superfluity of content that appears similar to 
Mendelson's characteristic of monstrosity.  Clinton's critique does not consider the long history 
of the encyclopedia, but focuses on the contemporary model of the encyclopedia that reinforces 
authority rather than challenging it in the style of Diderot. 
 The formal approach to the encyclopedic narrative does not so much differ from Frye's as 
it does isolate one of the methods Frye uses.  In Frye's Anatomy, the blending of forms is more 
strictly limited to four types of continuous prose fiction, but Mendelson opens this up to include 
styles of poetry, drama, and non-fiction.  This is an important development in the criticism 
because Mendelson and others identify a tendency in the contemporary encyclopedic novel to 
incorporate these non-prose  elements.  These elements point to a mediating effect that the 
encyclopedic narrative has on form, in a manner analogous to its mediative effect on competing 
epistemologies or narrative logics.   
 In contrast to those critics who define the encyclopedic novel formally, there are a 
number of critics who identify a desire to accumulate knowledge that is separate from the text 
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that I will call “encyclopedism” or the “encyclopedic project.”  For these critics, a text is 
encyclopedic for what it does rather than for what it is.  By this, I mean that these critics identify 
a tendency in novels to collect knowledge, to attempt to offer a full rendering of human 
experience, or to critique these tendencies that, for them, outweighs blending of generic form as 
a primary identifying factor of encyclopedism.  Ronald Swigger, for instance, divides the 
encyclopedic form into the text itself and “encyclopedism” or the “encyclopedic impulse.”  
Swigger argues that encyclopedism is a reflection of the human desire for knowledge.  The 
connection between encyclopedic texts and the encyclopedia is this shared desire for knowledge, 
the encyclopedic impulse.  Swigger also identifies encyclopedic texts that satirize 
encyclopedism, such as Gustave Flaubert's Bouvard et Pécuchet, which in this reading 
demonstrates the arbitrary nature of organization of knowledge.  Swigger writes that the 
satirization of the encyclopedic impulse reveals a sense of “nostalgia for the comprehensive, 
unfragmented view” (364), or, to put it in terms he does not use, a loss of a unified, fully-
integrated mythic worldview.   
 Anna Arnar, basing her work on both Swigger and Mendelson, argues that the criticism of  
encyclopedism is not just an element that may appear in the encyclopedic text but is the natural 
extension of the encyclopedic text.  Encyclopedism represents an “ontological imperative,” a 
desire to know that is “impelled by the desire to define [our] role in the universe” (xi).  For 
Arnar, the encyclopedic text is a self-conscious genre that synthesizes other genre forms while 
celebrating the native language.  Arnar is also attuned to the role of influence in literature, 
emphasizing the encyclopedic narrative as a model for future authors.  Between the ontological 
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imperative of encyclopedism that focuses on the present's need for sense-making and the 
modeling that the encyclopedic text does for future authors, Arnar connects Swigger's concept of 
the encyclopedic impulse with a dialogic model of the encyclopedia that Mendelson presents.  
For Arnar, encyclopedism represents a broader method of critique that can extend beyond literary 
criticism: 
Modern readers no longer presume that encyclopedias include information in all 
fields, nor do we expect them to present a method to interpret knowledge.  
Rather, our relationship is detached: we simply consult the encyclopedia for 
isolated facts.  Yet we should recognize [. . .] that there is no such thing as 
“impartial” information. (57) 
Arnar is correct in calling the critique of encyclopedism an element of encyclopedism, an 
inheritance, she does not acknowledge, from the dialogic model of encyclopedia pioneered by 
Diderot.  The project that Arnar calls for relies on the kind of vigilance that spurred Diderot to 
create his Encyclopédie in the first place: a suspicion of authority and a desire for empirical and 
rationality-based knowledge.   
 Arnar's concept of the encyclopedic text draws strongly upon the literary critical works of 
Swigger and Mendelson – and upon Frye via these two critics – but more closely resembles a 
criticism of the encyclopedia that uses literary examples.  This distinction is important because 
Arnar's work marks a shift in the drift of criticism from an allegorical relationship between 
literature and encyclopedia to a more literal connection to the encyclopedia based on the dialogic 
model.   
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 One such critic who follows the shift Arnar initiates is Stephen Burn, who blends together 
an allegorical rendering of the encyclopedic text with the project of encyclopedism.  Burn adopts 
a Lyotardian perspective, describing a “dream of total knowledge” that characterized early 
encyclopedias but is to be doubted as a “grand narrative” in a postmodern era.  The breakdown 
of this dream, for Burn, has worked to obscure the relationship between the encyclopedia and the 
encyclopedic novel.  However, Burn argues that the encyclopedic novel is uniquely suited to 
represent the desire for knowledge in a postmodern era because the encyclopedic novel 
“demonstrates the limitations of encyclopedic knowledge to show that in a world of proliferating 
information we can never master enough data” (“Collapse” 161).  The encyclopedic text 
overwhelms the reader with information in order to demonstrate the an inability to possess a 
“total knowledge.”  Further, Burn proposes that the postmodern encyclopedic novel “explores 
the negative impact endlessly proliferating information has upon the lives [. . .] of characters” 
(“After” 163).  Burn seeks to redefine the encyclopedia in order to correct the mistaken 
impression that the encyclopedia is simply a “data storage device.”   
 Burn describes an “encyclopedic urge” that arises in a culture as an acknowledgement of 
decline.  The encyclopedic urge is the expression of a culture's desire to record its history and 
knowledge in the face of its own fragility.  The acknowledgement of decline, I would argue, 
carries an apocalyptic undertone that parallels Frye's moment of recursion from irony to myth.
24
  
Both represent  
                                                 
24
 Frye considers the apocalyptic “the final polarization of reality” (Frye, Collected 5:41).  Apocalypse and reality 
together form a totality of vision akin to heaven and earth or the supernatural and natural – a vision without one 
or the other can never be complete.  Although Frye presents these ideas as opposites they are also completely 
bound to one another.  Brian Russell Graham's Necessary Unity of Opposites demonstrates the Blakean-inflected 
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an impending turning point, but one that is more intuited than initiated.  The difference is that, 
for Frye, the recursion does provide for a way to actualize the “dream of total knowledge” in a 
way that Burn cannot answer because of the synchronic nature of his study.  Burn's conception of 
the encyclopedic form also differs from Diderot's conception of the encyclopedic project in that 
what was positive for Diderot (that is, the incompletion of information and provocation to 
dialogue), becomes a negative for Burn, incompletion exposes the impossibility of knowledge, 
and therefore dialogue. 
 This thematic approach to the encyclopedic text that is characterized by concern with 
“encyclopedism” is, like the formal approach, not so much different from Frye's approach as it is 
a taking up of one element of Frye's approach.  Swigger's encyclopedic impulse, Arnar's 
ontological imperative, and Burn's encyclopedic urge all describe the integrative potential Frye 
attributes to the encyclopedic form, but have subtle differences.  Swigger's focus on the satirical 
elements of the encyclopedic text, Arnar's call for greater reader participation in knowledge 
formation, and Burn's skepticism of the encyclopedia and encyclopedic knowledge in the 
postmodern era all point to a self-critical aspect of the encyclopedia that a strictly formal 
definition misses.   
 What this focus on encyclopedism does, however, is to refine the ways in which the 
encyclopedic novel can be self-critical but not confine its criticism to literary matters.  Arnar and 
                                                                                                                                                             
dialectic that pervades Frye's thought, he writes that Frye's thought “moves dialectically beyond the level of 
opposition onto a higher level where seemingly antithetical modes of thought prove to be complementary” (6).  
Graham attributes this dialectical model to Blake's Orc and Urizen cycle in which two opposing forces balance 
one another out.  He opposes this to the Hegelian dialectic which resolves a thesis and antithesis in a synthesis.  
In Frye's thought coexistence is key as the non-resolution of competing forces is not progressive or teleological. 
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Burn, in particular, seem to suggest a shift in hermeneutic expectation from an older 
encyclopedism to a newer version.  The revised hermeneutic promotes a skepticism of structure 
and comprehensive content with which the encyclopedia must constantly contend.  The historical 
offspring of Diderot's dialogic encyclopedia necessarily must remain skeptical of knowledge 
itself because, in questioning authoritative knowledge, the dialogic encyclopedia must derive 
authority from its rigorously applied, self-critical inquiry and skepticism.   
 In sum, a review of the literature concerning the encyclopedic novel shows a division of 
approaches that can generally be categorized as Frye's modal approach, a formal approach, and a 
thematic approach centered on the encyclopedic project.  This dissertation will define the 
encyclopedic novel  in a way that corresponds to the dialogic model of the encyclopedia, one that 
admits to non-completion and encourages transhistorical communication.  It forwards a formal 
definition of the encyclopedic novel as a genre that incorporates and integrates other generic 
forms from both fictional and non-fictional sources, and has a self-aware, self-critical bent that is 
often expressed through irony or satire.  Moreover, the encyclopedic novel makes extensive use 
of cycles or the figure of a circle, structurally and metaphorically.  Finally, the encyclopedic 
novel is integrative in promoting a social or cultural reunification – in the sense that Frye 
suggests – and also in the sense of promoting alternate, coextensive hermeneutic systems – as 
Mendelson suggests.   
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2.3 The Problem of Irony 
 When Northrop Frye speaks of the “ironic mode” in literature, he means specific 
relationship between the hero and that hero's society and environment, called the “power of 
action.”  However, this is a very different approach to irony than  that which arises in discussions 
of postmodernism, where irony is understood as a skepticism toward totalizing knowledge.  This 
skepticism is pervasive in post-1960s literary and art criticism.  Given its climate of 
epistemological skepticism, any discussion of the post-1960s encyclopedic novel must deal with 
the problem of irony.  Because the encyclopedic novel claims totalizing knowledge in one way or 
another, there is a high likelihood of conflict between the form and the epistemological 
assumptions of these post-1960s novels.  However, I would argue , in keeping with some of the 
major post-War theories of irony, 1) that the encyclopedic novel makes use of multiple forms of 
irony (including irony that satirizes this very skeptical postmodern irony), and 2) that irony, as a 
communicative act between implied author and audience,  functions as a community-building 
trope. 
 Studies of irony in fiction significant to this dissertation identify irony as a rhetorical and 
figurative communicative act between an implied author and audience and identify the 
ideological underpinnings of irony.  These studies aim implicitly to reclaim irony from its 
association in postmodern theory with a static, all-encompassing skepticism.
25
  These critics 
concentrate on irony's productive and sense-making capabilities as well as its mode of critique.   
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 Alan Wilde notes a similar tendency in Horizons of Assent for irony to “manage again and again to escape its 
association with this or that school and to recast itself constantly into new and unpredictable modes” (1).  Wilde's 
phenomenological approach explores the recast  associations that irony has with each Modernism, Late 
Modernism, and Postmodernism rather than constructing a rhetorical theory of irony as a concept on its own.  
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 Wayne C. Booth's 1974 book A Rhetoric of Irony, for example, differs both in scope and 
in outlook from many studies of postmodern irony.  Because the book is a study of the rhetoric of 
irony, it focuses on recognizing and understanding irony, dividing it into stable and unstable 
versions.  Booth does not seek to redefine irony within the context of a particular theory, but to 
explore the way that irony works and the way that it can be accurately assessed.  Booth rejects 
open-ended or ambiguous irony that resists interpretation, reclaiming irony as a neutral literary 
device that has correct and incorrect interpretations.  Booth wants to move beyond the idea that 
irony “undermines clarities, opens up vistas of chaos, and either liberates by destroying all 
dogma or destroys by revealing the inescapable canker of negation at the heart of every 
affirmation” (ix).  Most of all, Booth writes to inform readers that irony is an ethical interaction 
between the author and reader; irony is linguistic and rhetorical by nature.
26
 
 Underlying the entire work is Booth's assumption that irony is ultimately something that 
readers can determine with some degree of certainty; he also assumes that the reader can 
reconstruct meaning from irony, or, in other words, that the reader can discern what is being said 
from how it is being said.  Booth stresses this point in the opening chapter by emphasizing 
irony's status as a rhetorical device and comparing it to other devices such as metaphor, allegory, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Significantly for this dissertation, Wilde writes that “The need may be, then, not to transcend irony but to accept 
it” (6).  Claire Colebrook positions postmodern irony in a different light in her study Irony.  Colebrook sees 
postmodern irony as a contested element, “both questioning and elitist, both disruptive of norms and constructive 
of higher ideals” (153).  Colebrook's study investigates historical conceptions of irony.  Her postmodern 
definition of irony is heavily inflected with poststructuralist thought, focusing on the instabilities as in “All 
speech is haunted by irony” (165), which is precisely what Booth strives to overcome.   
 
26
 Booth describes four characteristics of irony, it is intended, covert, stable and localized.  All four of these 
characteristics rein in irony, reestablishing the rhetorical context of the irony and, thus, rendering it susceptible to 
interpretation.   
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and pun, all of which appear to say other than what is meant and require the reader to interpret 
meaning.  Booth's secondary assumption is that ironies tend to be integrative – forming “amiable 
communities” of readers who share meaning – rather than disintegrative – focusing on the 
“victim” of irony, the one who does not “get it” (28).  This perception of irony as an integrative 
device reverses a view of irony as elitist because it excludes those who do not spot the “real” 
meaning.  Booth celebrates irony as a joining together of the author and the reader in a moment 
of shared knowledge.
27
 
 Even though Booth mildly rebukes Frye for what he sees as a restrictive definition of 
irony,
28
 their positions on irony bear some resemblance.  One of the elements of Frye's ironic 
mode, as discussed above, is the assumption of shared knowledge that makes explanation of 
metaphors or images unnecessary.  Booth's major point, however, and the one that is most 
important to this study, concerns stability.  For Booth, it is possible to determine the degree of 
stability or instability in a given instance of irony – whether it be local (confined to a statement 
or passage) or infinite (unconstrained).  Stable ironies invite reconstruction and do not later 
undermine those reconstructions (233).  An example Booth uses earlier in the book is Jonathan 
Swift's “A Modest Proposal.”  This is an example of stable irony because it is clear that a 
meaning other than the literal one is meant and the reader is encouraged to discover that 
                                                 
27 Booth writes that “the building of amiable communities is often far more important than the exclusion of naïve 
victims” in order to point out the essentially communicative function he ascribes to irony (28).  Further, he writes 
that the ironist “assumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and secret truths on which … recontruction 
is built” (28).   
 
28 
Citing Frye's Anatomy of Criticism, Booth agrees that Frye describes a kind of irony, but misses the opportunity 
to identify irony in its many forms and functions.  Since Frye's “vision is on an Ideal Order,” attempting to take 
in all of literature, Booth – whose purpose is to construct a model of communication between author and reader – 
concedes that his purpose differs from Frye's and must “come at things from a different angle entirely” (ix-x). 
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meaning.  Further, nothing in the text suggests that the discovered meaning is faulty or in doubt.  
The reward for reconstructing Swift's irony is clear: the reader may understand Swift's intended 
meaning with confidence. 
 Instability of ironic interpretation presents a greater degree of difficulty.  Not only are 
instabilities unpredictable, but the manner and degree of instability also varies.  Booth writes, 
everyone knows that it is often difficult and sometimes impossible to find any 
such solid  ground.  In many works that are called ironic, very different demands 
are made, yielding very different and often incompatible rewards.  By their 
nature, such rough beasts defy us.  We can know in advance of any encounter that 
they will not yield to clear and final classification and that our interpretations will 
slip away from us even as they are made.  (233) 
Ironies that are unstable still call for reconstruction even, perhaps most often, when the implied 
author seems to discourage it.  Reconstruction is always dependent on context and textual clues: 
reconstructions of irony are seldom if ever reducible either to grammar or 
semantics or linguistics.  In reading any irony worth bothering about, we read life 
itself, and we work on our relations to others as they deal with it.  We read 
character and value, we refer to our deepest convictions.  For this reason, irony is 
an extraordinarily good road into the whole art of interpretation.  Though ironic 
statements are only a small part of all that men say to each other – even in this 
highly ironic age – they bring to light the hidden complexities that are mastered 
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whenever men succeed in understanding each other in any mode, even the most 
flat and literal. (43-4) 
All ironies take place within a context that permits more-or-less accurate interpretation.  Even in 
the most unstable of ironies there is likely to be some stability, some point or points from which 
to base an interpretation.  Booth constantly searches for these points of stability that aid the 
reader in coming to a reasonable reconstruction of meaning.  He rejects a model of criticism 
which takes instabilities in irony for license to interpret as one wishes:  
modern critics have tended to stress the value of diversity in interpretation, and 
they have had no difficulty finding innumerable examples of conflicting 
interpretation by responsible and sensitive readers, and of conflicts between such 
readers and the stated intentions of authors […] this is a commonplace about 
irony, and like most commonplaces it is true enough when confined to its proper 
domain.  But the irony that disorients by resisting univocal interpretation, the 
irony that evades committed speech, is only a branch of a great and ancient art; 
even those modern works which are rightly celebrated for their rich ambiguity 
reveal, on close inspection, large tracts of stable irony […] about which no 
careful reader experiences any ambiguity whatever. (48) 
To understand ironies properly, then, one must adopt a vocabulary such as that which Booth 
suggests, one that provides a way to discuss different kinds of irony that is more finely tuned 
than the styles of irony typically presented in postmodern theory.
29
  Using Booth's taxonomy of 
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 Additionally, Booth makes a distinction between local and universal ironies, writing that “some of the finest 
effects of modern literature have been achieved by authors who have learned to shift their assertions of irony 
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irony, it becomes possible to parse texts that are richly layered in their ironic sensibility.  The 
reader is no longer confined simply to calling a novel “ironic” when the novel may in fact 
engage in several varieties of irony – stable and unstable, covert and overt, local and infinite.   
 In many respects, Linda Hutcheon's conception of  irony in her study Irony's Edge: The 
Theory and Politics of Irony is similar to Booth's version.  Hutcheon, like Booth, gives special 
importance to the act of interpretation of irony and, also like Booth, works to dispel the concept 
of “victimization” in irony by transferring focus to the community that makes irony possible – 
although Hutcheon revises both of these positions.  Hutcheon makes two important observations 
regarding irony: first, it is transideological – it is a shared moment of communication between 
author and audience, inferred by the reader – and second, it is always “edged.”  While these 
points look familiar by now, Hutcheon's approach to irony is more cautious than is Booth's, more 
aware of the inherent difficulties and dangers that irony presents (she even warns several times 
that her book is about irony but is not ironic, that it is not humorous).  Throughout the study, 
Hutcheon makes clear the potential for misunderstanding and the care that must be taken when 
considering irony.  From early in the book, Hutcheon writes, “irony happens as part of a 
communicative process; it is not a static rhetorical tool to be deployed, but itself comes into 
being in the relations between meanings, but also between people and utterances and, sometimes, 
between intentions and interpretations” (13).  Irony is not a simple rhetorical device because it 
                                                                                                                                                             
from local to universal and back again” (238).  Far from an instability in irony, this shift from the universal to the 
local – and vice versa – is one of the methods that appears to introduce uncertainty of interpretation, but close 
attention, as Booth calls for, reveals this seeming-instability to be something more easily interpretable. 
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informs the way that individuals relate to the world, and this brings to it ethical and political 
implications.   
 It is important to review some of the observations that Hutcheon makes about irony.  
Irony is not bound to any ideology or politics.  Hutcheon calls this the “transideological” 
character of irony.  This idea is elegant in its simplicity; for Hutcheon, irony does not signify a 
lack but indicates a meaning other than what is expressly stated.  On the surface this seems 
simple enough, but it calls to mind the layered interpretations of irony that Booth calls for: the 
reader must know when to read irony and how far to read it.  The transideological nature of irony 
poses a separate kind of risk, however, in that it is a weapon anyone can wield and it can also 
misfire if readers do not “get” it.  Hutcheon writes that irony “can and does function tactically in 
the service of a wide range of political positions, legitimating or undercutting a wide variety of 
interests” (10).  Neither authority nor rebellion can claim irony as their own any more than either 
could claim metonymy or the pun for its own. 
 If irony is transideological, its danger lies in its “edged” quality.  Unlike the other 
rhetorical devices, irony must have a target.  In the chapter “The Cutting Edge,” Hutcheon 
defines the effects that irony can have, from most mild (reinforcing) to most severe (assailing 
and aggregative).  Irony is always double in nature: it can be used in a positive or negative way, 
and part of the interpretive act lies in figuring this part out.  To take one example, an act of irony 
may work to form the “amiable communities” that Booth discusses.  For Hutcheon, however, this 
is only half of the story because irony may also be exclusionary, forming elitist “in-groups.”  
What makes Hutcheon's study unique is that she acknowledges both possibilities and the 
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importance that individual interpretation has on these.  Booth's “amiable community” hypothesis 
is correct, according to Hutcheon, because interpretation of irony does rely on shared knowledge.  
But the suspicion of ironic elitism is real as well.  Whereas Booth depends upon the goodwill of 
a benevolent author who expects readers to share similar knowledge and who has faith in the 
reader's ability to interpret irony, Hutcheon turns away from the author to the text and relies upon 
the reader's discretion: “the attributing of irony to a text or utterance is a complex intentional act 
on the part of the interpreter, one that has both semantic and evaluative dimensions, in addition 
to the possible inferring of ironist intent” (13). 
 This is a departure from Booth's work on amiable communities – Booth argues for the 
integrative ability of irony.  Readers who detect and correctly interpret the irony of a text form a 
community with the ironist.  For Hutcheon, the process works in reverse: the community exists 
prior to the instance of irony and is a necessary pre-condition for the irony to be shared.  The 
discursive community shapes the members' understanding or ability to detect irony: “it is less 
that irony creates communities, then, than discursive communities make irony possible in the 
first place” (18).  Hutcheon clarifies, “No theorist of irony would dispute the existence of a 
special relationship in ironic discourse between the ironist and the interpreter; but for most, it is 
irony itself that is said to create that relationship [. . .] it is the community that comes first and 
that, in fact, enables the irony to happen” (89).  Hutcheon argues that shared understanding is a 
necessary precondition that makes irony understandable to members of that community.   
 The application of these forms of irony – Booth's “amiable communities” and Hutcheon's 
“discursive communities” – is that they both reclaim irony as a rhetorical device that has a 
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positive and integrative potential.  This frees the encyclopedic novel from an all-encompassing 
irony through the acknowledgement that irony may be used in many registers, with varying 
degrees of stability, and with the realization that accurate interpretation of irony can happen 
some, if not most, of the time.   
  
 
2.4 The Contemporary Encyclopedic Novel 
 My claims stand in relation to these important recent studies of irony in terms of Booth's 
rhetorical approach and Hutcheon's discursive community.  For the contemporary encyclopedic 
novel, the most important aspects of literary irony are the communicative functions of irony, the 
diverse forms of irony, and the integrative potential that irony possesses.  This dissertation agrees 
with Frye, and critics such as Yeo, Swigger, and Arnar, who define Diderot's encyclopedic 
project, but it deviates from these approaches to define the encyclopedic novel as a novel that 
integrates multiple generic forms and is based upon a dialogic model of transhistoric 
communication.   
 In light of this research concerning the encyclopedic novel and irony, this dissertation on 
the encyclopedic novel in post-1960s literature thus has two aims.  First, it seeks to refine a 
definition for the encyclopedic novel that follows from and updates previous scholarship and 
recognizes the need for a fluid conception of the genre as it changes over time.  This redefinition 
draws a line of continuity between the contemporary encyclopedic novel and the encyclopedic 
form first discussed by Northrop Frye; I argue that (1) the post-war encyclopedic novel uses 
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multiple forms of irony to identify, diagnose, and critique contemporary culture, and (2) that at 
the heart of this ironic critique is a drive that is humanistic and seeks a lost or desired integration 
of individual to society.  I also argue (3) that  the contemporary encyclopedic novel engages in a 
self-aware, ironic mode of expression that turns critically against the accepted concepts of 
authority, order, logic, and knowledge-neutrality that have traditionally been associated with the 
encyclopedia.  This use of irony – in its manifold forms – functions primarily as a corrective and 
community-building apparatus. 
Secondly, I argue that the encyclopedic novel in the late twentieth century proposes and 
tests alternative epistemological logics that work in tandem with ideological critique in order to 
offer non-authoritative accounts of history, social reality, and structures of power.  By 
incorporating that alternative, or what I call heterological accounts, with ideological accounts, 
the encyclopedic novel demonstrates the latter's inability to accurately describe the world.  It is 
only by comparing the heterological, or non-authoritative, accounts of experience that the 
deficiencies of the ideological becomes apparent.  The heterological challenges and amends the 
ideological in such a way as to  discourage confidence in authoritative ideology.  Moreover, by 
placing the reconstructive heterologies next to deconstructive authoritative ones, the 
encyclopedic novel elevates the stature of the marginal.   
 There are three sources that I rely on in defining “heterology,” the first, Julian Pafanis' 
use of the term “heterology”in his Heterology and the Postmodern (1991) to describe the split of 
post-structuralism from structuralism (3); the second, Edith Wyschogrod's use of the term 
“heterology” in Ethics of Remembering (1998) to define an historiographic position in which the 
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historian attempts to recover lost voices and to speak for both the dead and the history that 
cannot speak on their own; and the third, Northrop Frye's concept of interpenetration – a concept 
that he writes about extensively in his posthumously published notebooks, but never developed 
in his published work.  These three concepts contribute to a concept that, as I shall define it, 
demonstrates the non- and sometimes anti-authoritative discourse in the encyclopedic novel. 
 The first line of thought that contributes to the concept of heterology is Julian Pefanis', 
who traces an epistemological split in continental philosophy that began with Kojéve's reading of 
Hegel that prefigured the critiques of totality prevalent in French postmodern and post-
structuralist though (1-5).  Pefanis uses the term to denote an alternate epistemological 
perspective that stems from the precursor it seeks to redefine or correct.  From this perspective, 
the concept of heterology denotes a step away from the accepted epistemology, specifically the 
way that totality had been considered up to that point.  Pefanis sought a way to refigure post-
structuralist thought, not as a new “school,” but as a way of refiguring continental philosophy 
that continued a tradition of clarifying that which had come before it.  In this way, Pefanis' 
conception of heterology initiates a new methodology of criticism that permits a substantive shift 
in focus that, instead of predicating itself upon a massive break from that which came before, 
shows a continuity from the old to the new that also allows for a major re-envisioning of 
approach.  Pefanis bridges the gap between the structuralist and post-structuralist by showing 
continuities between these epistemological imperatives.  This means that, first, there is a 
fundamental continuity between structuralism and post-structuralism – or between two 
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seemingly distinct epistemological methodologies – and that this continuity in-itself is 
significant.   
 The second line of thought that contributes to the concept of heterology in this study is 
Edith Wyschogrod's usage of the term heterology in Ethics of Remembering (1998) to define an 
historiographic position in which the historian attempts to recover lost voices and to speak for 
both the dead and past history.  She derives this term from what she describes as the false 
assumption that the correspondence between “the 'original' and the narrated event are 
homologous” (2).  Different narratives account for the same event and are “heterologous” or 
stemming from different roots.  Wsychogrod adds an ethical imperative to the term that I would 
like to adopt.  She demands that the “heterological historian” take into account the effects of 
time, language, and social existence on perceptions of history, include critiques of past attempts 
at history, and recover in the present what has been lost in the past (1-5).  Wyschogrod adopts 
Pefanis' use of “heterology” to mean a secondary, additive account, and expands upon this to 
include an ethical imperative to give voice to the unvoiced.  The two share the idea that there is 
an unrepresented account that is not being told: in Pefanis' case, the account is other than the 
post-structuralist and in Wyschogrod's it is that there is a story that has been suppressed.   
 Taken together, Pefanis' and Wyschogrod's rendering of the heterological both assert that 
the accepted, or authoritative, accounting of events is inadequate, is incomplete.  Both critics 
assert that a secondary accounting is necessary in order to have a truer understanding of the 
world.  However, the strength of both of these critics is that they insist that the truth of the 
“heterological” is dependent upon the authoritative rendering. Neither Pefanis nor Wyschogrod 
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demand that their version is the truth, but rather they contend that their renderings of history or 
the world are at least as valid as the authoritative versions that have been on offer to date.  
Wyschogrod makes the additional claim that the “heterological” position is inherently an ethical 
position, that this perspective is compelled to fill in gaps, to speak for the voiceless, and to 
amend authoritative history. 
 The third and most important line of thought that contributes to the concept of heterology 
as it relates to the encyclopedic novel is Northrop Frye's “interpenetration.”  Frye develops his 
concept of interpenetration piece-meal in his unpublished notebooks.  He writes, “I wish we 
could throw away the notion of 'reconciling,' and use instead some such conception as 
'interpenetration.' Literature itself is not a field of conflicting arguments but of interpenetrating 
visions” (Frye, Collected 27: 216)  Put simply, Frye's concept of interpenetration is a 
unresolvable dialectical tension between thesis and antithesis.  Rather than a Hegelian dialectic, 
in which the thesis and antithesis are resolved in a synthesis, interpenetration calls for seemingly 
mutually exclusive truth claims to co-exist and, what's more, to become mutually affective.
30
  
For Frye, interpenetration is both a presence and an absence – a unity and disunity – because 
opposed elements are co-present without reconciliation.  To use one of Frye's own examples 
from his notebooks, the Christian and the Jew might never convert one another, but both must 
realize that they “see the same things from different points of view” (qtd. in Denham, 
“Interpenetration” 141).  In other words, mutually exclusive truth-claims do not simply cancel 
                                                 
30
 In Notebook 53, Frye writes “Hegel showed how the thesis involved its own antithesis, although I think the 
'synthesis' has been foisted on him by his followers” (Frye, Collected 6: 616).  It is important to Frye that 
interpenetration is a static description of alternate visions, it is neither progressive nor teleological.  Robert 
Denham identifies interpenetration as Frye's attempt to “drive toward unity – an effort to get beyond dialectic” 
(33), in his work  Northrop Frye: Religious Visionary and Architect of the Spiritual World. 
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out one another but must continue to coexist, and this paradoxical co-presence of mutually 
exclusive claims colors each of the claims.  Frye's example is particularly illuminating because 
the perspective of the one is, in some ways, dependent upon the other.  Frye drives the 
paradoxical nature of interpenetration to show that not only must mutually exclusive claims 
coexist, but they may, in fact, be mutually dependent upon one another.   
 Interpenetration is an important element of heterology because it provides a model for the 
interaction of ideas, which can be extended to an interaction between epistemologies.  In the 
example quoted above, Frye's thoughts on religion demonstrate, for him, the importance of 
disrupting an authoritative ideology's tendency to create privileged accounts of reality.  Frye 
derives interpentration, or the idea that “things don't get reconciled, but everything is everywhere 
at once” from Spengler's Decline of the West (qtd in Denham “Frye Papers”).  Robert D. Denham 
writes that Frye developed the concept of interpenetration first from reading Spengler and then 
refined the idea following his reading of Alfred Whitehead's Science and the Modern World 
(“Interpenetration” 141).  Frye's concept is less concerned with the power imbalance of 
Wyschogrod's “heterological historian” and is more far-reaching than the post-structuralist 
heterology of Pefanis.  This is not to suggest that Frye was unconcerned with political 
implications of the term, for he still saw interpenetration as opposed to “centralizing and 
homogenizing” discourses (qtd. in Denham “Interpenetration” 149).  Because Frye is interested 
in the “double-vision” of an empirical reality's interaction with the religious, he desires a 
syncretic, non-dialectical means of reconciling the irreconcilable, which he finds in 
interpenetration.  Although one of Frye's goals in theorizing interpenetration is to reconcile 
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religious and secular belief, which is an interesting inversion of Diderot's attempt to divorce 
rationality from authoritative religiosity, both Frye and Diderot have a similar goal of disrupting 
the authoritative discourse, which each saw as dangerously short-sighted.  Interpenetration also 
provides the model for an alternative epistemology that amends and corrects an authoritative 
discourse, in much the way that Wyschogrod's heterology does, but does not replace that 
discourse.  Frye's concept of interpenetration is both more inclusive and more hopeful than 
Wyschogrod's model of heterology because Frye considers interpenetration a totalizing concept, 
“a sense of the universal here” (Collected 13: 162).  Whereas Wyschogrod hopes to fill in the 
unrepresented that has been omitted, Frye contends that these disparate elements influence the 
authoritative.  The key to the concept for Frye is that interpenetration is an integration of vision 
that simultaneously keeps both (all) concepts involved distinct from one another.   
The heterological is that which cannot be incorporated into the ideological but persists 
nonetheless.
31
  What is more, the heterological is that which has been excluded from 
authoritative ideology.  For the purposes of this study, I will define “heterology” as a non-
authoritative vision of the world that is unrepresented by authoritative ideology.  Heterological 
elements of a text indirectly challenge authoritative discourse by offering alternate explanations, 
alternate voices, alternate stories, or competing theories that are not accepted by the dominant 
ideology.  Heterology seeks to legitimate knowledge claims that fall outside of the domain of 
authoritative ideology.  For example, Diderot's championing of enlightened rationality 
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 John McGowan defines “ideology” from Marx and Engels' The German Ideology as describing two separate but 
related concepts.  First, ideology is the “ideas or beliefs possessed by any group by virtue of its social position” 
and second, ideology is the “legitimation of the prevailing social arrangements” (64, 65).   
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challenged the accepted authority of monarch and church by providing alternate claims to 
knowledge based upon empirical observation and individual cognition.   
  Heterology has further importance to the study of the novel in general because it reflects 
the non-correlation between event and representation in narrative.  As Michael Holquist suggests 
in his introduction to The Dialogic Imagination, the difference between a history and a novel is 
that the history “insist[s] on a homology between the sequence of their own telling . . . and the 
sequence of what they tell” (Holquist xxviii, emphasis in original).  In this case “heterology” 
takes on the added connotation of difference and non-coincidence that points to the 
constructedness of narrative.  Narrative heterogeneity, admittedly, is not unique to the 
encyclopedic novel but is an element of most, if not all novels.  However, this additional aspect 
of heterology, when taken with Frye's concept of interpenetration, gives new meaning to the 
formal definition of the encyclopedic form proposed by Frye in Anatomy of Criticism.
32
  The 
representation of heterologies within the encyclopedic novel more accurately reflects the 
inability of competing ideologies to either reconcile or eliminate the other(s).  
 Heterology is a key concept to understanding the contemporary encyclopedic novels 
because it draws together the recognition that an authoritative logic may not be adequate to 
accurately understanding the world.  It carries an ethical imperative to represent that which is not 
represented – or to point in the direction of the unrepresentable – and it also works to 
democratize knowledge by breaking the top-down model of knowledge that authoritative 
discourse depends upon.  Ultimately, the heterological points to gaps in explanation, biases, and 
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 See  Rereading Frye for more on interpenetration. 
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structural inadequacies in authoritative ideology, whether or not the given heterology actually 
corrects these elements; heterology provides the means by which to see the inadequacies.  
Finally, heterology is useful in understanding the contemporary encyclopedic model because it is 
an integrative, reconstructive trope.  One of the means by which the heterology exposes the 
inadequacies of authoritative ideology is by giving voice to that which falls outside of 
authoritative discourse.  Heterological readings are inclusive, allowing space for the discourse 
that is excluded by authority. 
 Taking Diderot's project as a model, we should see the encyclopedia as a radical genre, 
one that challenges authority as it attempts to create a usable taxonomy for knowledge.  One way 
that Diderot accomplishes this is simply to insist upon following reason wherever it might lead.  
This insistence on freedom of thought is, of course, a threat to established authority that often 
seeks to inscribe limitations on thought.  Thus properly used, the encyclopedia in Diderot's sense 
is a tool for democratizing knowledge and opening the possibility of transhistorical dialogue.  
The encyclopedia levels access to knowledge by providing a platform that is accessible to all 
while at the same time including the supplementary purpose of transhistorical communication.  
There are still remnants of this approach in the contemporary encyclopedia, but the potential for 
real critical work has been eroded by the hardening of the genre into a “reference” work 
connoting authority. 
 The genre of the encyclopedic novel thus has a much longer pre-history than many 
contemporary critics have allowed.  To sort out the complexities of the post-WWII encyclopedic 
novel, it may be useful to return to the Enlightenment model, epitomized by Diderot's 
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Encyclopédie, rather than to the contemporary encyclopedia, which has taken on a different, and 
more mundane, project.
33
  What other critics of the encyclopedic form, such as Mendelson and 
Swigger, read as radical and working against conventions, then, is really in line with this 
tradition of the Diderotian encyclopedia.  The encyclopedic novel engages in a discourse that, 
implicitly or explicitly, questions notions of authority, order, tradition, and most importantly, 
ideology.  As with any line of honest questioning, the conclusion is not foregone: the questioning 
may result in a challenge to authority, a reaffirmation of a given position, or even in a desire for a 
return to some previous position.   
 As discussed above, Frye locates the contemporary encyclopedic novel in the ironic 
mode, and seemingly at the cusp of a recursion to the mythic mode.  Frye's model, however, 
depends upon a theory of historical modes that creates a de facto periodization.  And yet, writing 
before the advent of literary postmodernism, Frye lacked the vocabulary to discuss the 
movements which might follow Modernism – which he believed worked in the ironic mode.  
Frye's system implies that after modernism, however, there may be a turn from irony back to 
myth, a return within his recursive modal system.  The problem with Frye's model, however, is 
that the historical modes are tied so closely to social values and consciousness that a shift in 
literary style would require a parallel shift in society.  When the shifts are subtle and gradual (as 
with the movement from Myth to Romance) the corresponding social shifts are as well.  But 
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 To provide one example, John Lough writes that Diderot “makes high claims for the originality of his work,” but 
that “Originality is not what the modern user of encyclopedias seeks in their articles; what he wants is an 
accurate and up-to-date account of the present state of knowledge on any given subject” (Encyclopédie 71) 
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when the shift is radical, as it must be from the ironic to mythic mode, we have difficulty 
imagining the sort of radical restart this movement seems to call for.
34
      
 I claim that the late-twentieth century encyclopedic novel employs irony primarily as a 
corrective, anti-authoritarian, and community-building device.  I draw my rationale for this from 
multiple sources: Frye's theory of historical modes and Booth's concept of “amiable 
communities” built by irony that Linda Hutcheon expands into her theory of “discursive 
communities” are foremost among them.  Frye's theory of historical modes (which I've discussed 
at length above) asserts that in literary history, irony will eventually blend back to myth.  The 
ironic hero (the protagonist who is inferior both to his environment and to society) becomes an 
outcast and begins to take on the mantle of the oracle, another figure on the fringe of society.  
The author of the ironic text, according to Frye, acts as a spokesperson for a disintegrated 
society.  However, because the author's central concern is the craft of the text, he will rely on 
shared elements and shared knowledge.  Frye writes that when the juxtaposition of images in the 
ironic work requires no explanation, the society shares a knowledge that places these images in 
the proper context.  This shared knowledge is the basis for a return to myth.  However, he 
refrains from analyzing how this happens, or what it would look like. 
 That irony is present in the encyclopedic novel is obvious and undeniable.  It is the use to 
which irony is bent that is in question.  When entering into the encyclopedic text, it is vital that 
the reader be equipped with a broad and pliable enough understanding of irony to interpret the 
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 In fairness, Frye does not predict a radical social upheaval in a return to a mythic mode.  The problem is that, 
although his theory of modes depends upon recursion, there is no indication of what this recursive movement 
might look like. 
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nuances, which in   Booth's terms might be understood as local and infinite irony, stable and 
unstable irony.  One of the characteristics of the late-twentieth century encyclopedic novel is an 
ironizing of encyclopedic hallmarks such as order, authority, comprehensiveness, and so on.  
This irony is not empty; its goal is to point to the presumptions that these concepts carry, such as 
bias, privilege, manipulation, deception.  Over the course of this dissertation I will address the 
concept of irony in each of the novels in order to demonstrate the specific usages of irony toward 
this goal of pointing to those abuses of the past.
35
 
 The claim that the contemporary encyclopedic novel is suspicious of the major operations 
of power is commonplace.  All of the works in this dissertation are critical of their societies.  
This may  seem an obvious point, given their postmodernist context in which nearly everything 
is challenged and  suspicion is pervasive.  However, it is the ways in which suspicion arises in 
conjunction with the – implicit or explicit –  encouragement of a suspicious manner of reading 
by the audience that has gone untheorized in criticism.  If we listen to Frye's views, ironic 
disintegration results from a fracturing of worldview and the mass questioning that seems to take 
place in postmodernist literature.  In the movement from ironic back to mythic, however, there 
must be a move back toward social and epistemological integration.  If Frye's theory is correct, 
then literature that began to work toward a re-integration could rework irony to shift away from 
the empty pastiche Jameson warned against and toward a different reconstructive view.   
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 Inasmuch as irony provokes thought, Søren Kierkegaard identifies a Socratic root of irony.  The sort of 
questioning Socrates engaged in, “not in the interest of obtaining an answer, but to suck out the apparent content 
… and leave only an emptiness remaining” hints at a secondary or absent meaning – questions the question – 
without overtly stating that meaning (73).  Kierkegaard also remarks that irony may act as a “goad for thought” 
(151), in this way making the claim that Socratic irony pushes the audience to fill the void left by the spoken 
irony and gain new knowledge. 
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 The late-twentieth century encyclopedic novel maintains an ambivalent relationship 
toward the alternate epistemologies that it presents, often failing ultimately to privilege one over 
the other.  This position falls in line with both Diderot's encyclopedic project and Frye's theory of 
recursive modes.  Even though Diderot worked to promote Enlightenment rationality with his 
Encyclopédie, the model of rationality presupposed a skeptical attitude that worked against prior 
notions of monarchical or religious authority.  To be sure, the juxtaposition of images that will 
become mythical archetypes have their root in the preceding ironic mode, but the full 
significance of the symbol cannot be apparent until social integration takes place.  In presenting 
these competing disintegrative and integrative epistemologies, the encyclopedic novel worries 
the edges of ideology and sets the stage for the competition, as it were. 
 By resuscitating the term “encyclopaedic novel” we come to understand a central 
aspiration of the novel itself: to understand the relationship between the narrative and 
knowledge.  In defining the term “encyclopaedic novel” we must take into consideration both 
form and content.  The sheer mass and diversity of content, along with (in many cases) multiple 
narrative threads, in the encyclopaedic novel often lacks generic organization (or may blend 
many generic organizations) and may evade the categories of formal analysis created by classic 
structural narratology.  However, examination of the encyclopaedic novel’s narrative rhetoric 
opens the possibility of interpreting the ethics and values of a novel in relation to knowledge by 
analyzing the stance of the implied author/narrator and the logical organization of the text.  The 
encyclopaedic novel warrants further study because of the unique perspective these works 
provide on understanding the world: because the central theme of the encyclopaedic novel is 
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knowledge and the potential for knowing, the novel implies a narrative concerning the 
acquisition of knowledge.  The encyclopaedic novel also represents a search for meaning and a 
desire for cohesion, which are expressed in the form of integrative irony and heterological 
discourse.  The encyclopedic novel is integrative and community-building because both the 
concepts of integrative irony and heterology depend upon a pre-existing community of like-
minded individuals.  Whether this cohesion is desirable, or even possible, is often revealed 
through the implied author's stance regarding nature of knowledge.  In any case, the integrative 
elements of the encyclopedic novel indicate a totalizing momentum in which the encyclopedic 
novel recognizes the communities already in existence rather than forming these communities ad 
hoc.   
 This dissertation examines three post-1960s texts in light of the encyclopedic novel 
genre.    Each text bears similarity to the others, but approaches the encyclopedic integration by a 
different means.  Additionally, each of these texts employs irony differently, yet the irony of 
these novels is bent toward the same goal.  Finally, a central trope in each of these novels is the 
conflict between opposing epistemological systems.  In each of these novels at least one, and 
sometimes several, marginal worldviews presents itself as a challenge to the culturally dominant 
ideology that reflects an authoritative position.   
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CHAPTER 3 
GRAVITY'S RAINBOW: ANARCHISTIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 
“There is a hiatus between the highest wisdom and the actual perplexities with which 
men must deal.  An encyclopedia of all that the prophets and philosophers have taught 
will not tell a man clearly and definitely how to make laws, how to govern a state, how to 
educate his children.” 
 -Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, 147 
 
“Whoever teaches without emancipating stultifies.” 
 -Jacques Rancière, The Ignorant Schoolmaster, 18 
3.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter, I traced two lines of influence for the contemporary encyclopedic 
novel.  The first tradition is the dialogic encyclopedic form, used by Denis Diderot in the 
Encyclopédie, which works to challenge authoritative discourse and engage in transhistoric 
dialogue.  The second tradition is the encyclopedic form, defined by Northrop Frye, that projects 
a recursive model for narrative in which the encyclopedic form blends genres and reintegrates 
the mythic.  I argue that the contemporary encyclopedia model does not return to the mythic, as 
Frye argues that it does in Finnegans Wake, but marks a progression toward this end.  I also 
argue that the interaction of these two influences in the contemporary encyclopedic novel spur an 
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engagement with irony that is at once critical of contemporary culture and integrative in its 
scope. 
 In the current chapter, I turn my attention to Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow, a text 
that is an example of what I am calling an “anarchistic encyclopedic novel.”  The anarchistic 
encyclopedic novel participates in the encyclopedic novel tradition but extends from it – 
participating in, while also challenging, the latter's dialogic model of communication and 
reinventing the Enlightenment model of democratic access to knowledge along new political 
lines.  The anarchistic encyclopedic novel works to disrupt a hierarchical structuring of 
knowledge, opting instead for a de-centered model of communication that relies upon 
interpersonal connection rather than appeals to authority. 
 Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow is an anarchistic encyclopedic novel, a postmodern 
version of the encyclopedic novel that has its politics based in the “dissensus equality” of 
Jacques Rancière and the postmodernist notion of the open form.  Rancière's political philosophy 
is closely aligned with contemporary post-structuralist anarchist thought and, thus, has a 
rhetorical as well as political dimension that tracks onto the “open work” as a hermeneutical 
model that defies rigid, hierarchical structures.  In this chapter I argue that this combination of 
characteristics revolutionizes the encyclopedic novel form in a way that later works will continue 
to build upon. 
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3.2 The Anarchistic Encyclopedia 
 Edward Mendelson sparked a veritable industry of criticism when he first called Gravity's 
Rainbow an “encyclopedic narrative” in his two essays of 1976.36  Mendelson defined the 
encyclopedic genre so that Gravity's Rainbow and a handful of other books took on a central 
significance to the cultures that produced them.  What Mendelson saw in Gravity's Rainbow that 
differed from the other works he defines as encyclopedic (such as Don Quixote, Moby-Dick, and 
The Divine Comedy) in that each of these other works defined a moment of cultural awakening 
within a particular national culture (“Gravity's Encyclopedia” 161).37  Each of these important 
works, Mendelson wrote, is connected to a national culture, but Pynchon's work heralds the 
emergence of a “new international culture, created by the technologies of instant communication 
and the economy of world markets” (165).  While Mendelson is correct in assessing that 
Gravity's Rainbow differs from these other encyclopedic narratives, he attributes its international 
scope to a shift in the culture.  However, I argue that the fundamental shift that takes place is not 
cultural but political, politicizing the relationship between the individual and authority in the face 
of a new multi-national industrial complex.  Pynchon calls for a redefinition of the relationship 
between the individual and authority because the autonomy of the individual is threatened by the 
“new international culture” in which the state-industry alliance conspires against the individual.   
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 “Gravity's Encyclopedia” (1976) and “Encyclopedic Narrative from Dante to Pynchon” (1976). 
37
 It would be onerous, at this point, to provide citations for the great number of critics who mention 
“encyclopedism” or the encyclopedia in conjunction with any of Thomas Pynchon's works.  At times, the 
reference is tossed off casually, but most often Mendelson is cited for his contribution to the body of work on 
Pynchon's encyclopedism.  I will make specific reference to critics who engage with the topic of encyclopedism 
in a substantive manner throughout the remainder of this chapter. 
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 Contrary to authoritative narratives of  World War II by the state that show democracy 
defeating fascism, the narrative of WWII in Gravity's Rainbow perceives the end of the war not 
as the victory of one form of government over another, but as the breakdown of government and, 
specifically, a breakdown in the individual's ability to trust governmental authority.
38
  As 
Slothrop, the erstwhile hero of the novel, deserts his military unit and travels into newly 
unoccupied Europe (called “the Zone”), he discovers that authority is nominal at best and chaos 
rules.  But rather than succumb to chaos, Slothrop claims his own authority for himself.  The 
replacement of governmental authority by the autonomous individual comprises a rudimentary 
form of anarchy.  This move to anarchism demonstrates a way out from under the hypocritical 
authority.   
 While other critics have identified the turn to political anarchy in Gravity's Rainbow, they 
have refused the tie between individualism and anarchy that both Pynchon and Rancière 
advocate.
39
  Anarchism provides a revolutionary political framework that returns authority to the 
individual, but the ways in which anarchist critics perceive this operating has changed over time.  
For example, in a now “classic” formulation, Emma Goldman defines anarchism simply as “The 
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 Gary Thompson argues that Pynchon's novels do not offer a “correct” version of history but “an account of the 
processes of knowing, so that readers will understand the necessity of forming critical interpretations of our 
own” (165).  This is important to understanding Gravity's Rainbow not as an alternate history but an individual 
perspective that is one of a multitude of histories.   
39
 Graham Benton and George Levine are two such critics who call attention to Pynchon's anarchist politics.  In 
“Riding the Interface: An Anarchist Reading of Gravity's Rainbow,” Benton argues that Pynchon's novels are 
anarchistic because they resist structures of knowledge.  Levine argues in “Risking the Moment: Anarchy and 
Possibility in Pynchon's Fiction” that anarchy is the central thematic element of the novel that works to tie 
together the seemingly-unrelated elements of the novel.  Levine's use of anarchy is more metaphorical than 
Benton's politically based anarchism because, for Levine, anarchistic style is thematic and based upon the notion 
of possibility, or contingency.  Jeffrey Baker counters both Benton's and Levine's anarchistic reading by 
highlighting the democratic nature of Pynchon's work.  I will take up Baker's argument more fully below because 
his interest in John Dewey's call for “dissensus” in a participatory democracy is similar to, but bears important 
differences from my interest in Jacques Rancière's notion of “dissensus.” 
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philosophy of a new social order based on liberty unrestricted by man-made law; the theory that 
all forms of government rest on violence, and are therefore wrong and harmful, as well as 
unnecessary”  (“Anarchism” ).  For Goldman, the political form of anarchy presupposes the 
restrictive nature of “man-made” institutions and it opts instead for organic interactions between 
individuals and ad hoc organization at anything higher than a very local level.  In effect, 
Goldman deems the structuring of human interaction in the political arena as necessarily limiting 
to the individual.  In the preface to her book of collected essays,  Goldman writes that anarchism 
“leaves posterity free to develop its own particular systems, in harmony with its needs.  Our most 
vivid imagination can not foresee the potentialities of a race set free from external restraints.  
How, then, can any one assume to map out a line of conduct for those to come?”  For Emma 
Goldman, anarchism is about possibility (as it will be for Pynchon).  Anticipatory long-range 
planning is disruptive to future happiness because it imposes the additional restraint of a past 
seeking to impress its own will on the future.  Goldman's insight on systems also reverberates in 
Gravity's Rainbow (while Goldman looks forward to a future that is free of external [ie, political] 
influence, Pynchon questions whether these influences really are external).   
 Drawing upon the political writings of Goldman, contemporary anarchist critics sought 
an additional basis for anarchistic freedom beyond the strictly political realm.  By renaming the 
movement (“postmodern anarchism,” “constructive anarchism,” etc.), contemporary anarchists 
hope to show the theoretical departures from classical definitions.  Theorists such as Francis 
Dupuis-Déri seek to rescue the concept of anarchism from all negative stereotypes, beginning 
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with those of Aristotle.
40
  Lewis Call suggests an expanded model of anarchism in his 2002 work 
Postmodern Anarchism that actually builds upon Goldman's definition of anarchism.  
Paraphrasing Murray Bookchin, Call notes that Marxism and classical anarchism both lack 
“meaningful revolutionary potential” and, instead, development of a broader critical method is 
necessary.
41
  The answer, according to Call, is to expand the critique of power “by making the 
concept of hierarchy itself into an object of analysis” (21).  Call's interest lies in the intersection 
between what he sees as the postmodern critique of hierarchy and the anti-statist position of the 
anarchist.  The postmodern anarchism that Call attributes to Foucault is one that “adamantly 
refuses to make itself into a totalizing theory,” refusing even to call itself “anarchist” (65).42  
What this model of anarchism has to offer criticism of Gravity's Rainbow is the Foucauldian 
concept of “micropolitics.”  Call describes micropolitics as power relations that are “capillary” in 
nature rather than top-down; that is, “[power] is everywhere, and it flows through every social 
relation” (66).  For Call as for Foucault, this means that everyone possesses power, which also 
means that every interaction between individuals is also an opportunity for resistance.
43
 
                                                 
40
 Dupuis-Déri challenges Aristotle's characterization of anarchy as a corrupted form of democracy by 
demonstrating the fallacy that anarchy implies a lack of politics, or a lack of authority.  Dupuis-Déri insists that 
anarchy, rather than implying a lack of authority, realizes the equal authority of each individual (18). 
41
   Thomas Martin agrees with Bookchin that contemporary anarchists must maintain a broader awareness of the 
world than the classical anarchists had because rejection of a particular government or hierarchy ignores the 
problems of concentration of power in hierarchical structures in general. 
42
 For more on Foucault's postmodern anarchism, see Call (2002), particularly 61-66 and 73-85. 
43
 Call somewhat simplifies Foucault's theory of power on the small scale.  In part one of Discipline and Punish, 
Foucault writes that the state enacts power on the individual through “political technology of the body.”  
Foucault uses “technology,” “economy,” and “physics” throughout the work as metaphors for the mechanisms 
and exercise of power.  Power operates on the small scale, between individuals, from “innumerable points of 
confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of struggles, and of an at least 
temporary inversion of the power relations” (27).  Furthermore, in “Body/Power,” Foucault argues that micro-
politics do not replace state power but that “power isn't localised in the State apparatus and that nothing in 
society will be changed if the mechanisms of power that function outside, below and alongside the State 
apparatuses, on a much more minute and everyday level, are not also changed” (60).  For Foucault, power is 
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 Call's work illustrates that perhaps the most forceful divergence of the contemporary 
anarchistic theory from classical anarchism is its adoption of cultural and semiotic theory.  Using 
post-structuralist philosophy, contemporary anarchists have found a way to broaden their critique 
of privileged hierarchies and political power.  For example, in Anarchism and the Crisis of 
Representation (2006), Jesse Cohn interprets Fredric Jameson's “crisis of representation” to 
include a critique of the (in)ability of one individual to represent, or speak for, another.
44
  Cohn 
extends this critique of representation to question the legitimacy of representative democracy, 
advocating for a politics of consensus and direct interaction rather than what he sees as a 
problematic mediation that takes place in parliamentary or Congressional systems.   
 The new anarchists discussed by Cohn and others articulate two aspects of contemporary 
anarchism that will become important to my definition of the anarchistic encyclopedia.  First, is 
the desire to extend the classical anarchist critique of governmental power structures to 
hierarchical structures in general.  This broader rejection of hierarchy generates the need to 
extend critique of power beyond the political to include other sources of authority.  Second, 
stemming from post-structuralism, is the rejection of a totalized representation of politics, 
humanism, or reality in general. 
 This reconsideration of poststructural anarchism requires one more step to bring it in line 
with my conception of the anarchistic encyclopedic novel.  So far, I have shown that new 
                                                                                                                                                             
neutral on its own and it is the exercise of power that determines whether it is harmful or helpful.  Call, and other 
anarchists who invoke “micro-politics,” depend upon this interpretation of power as neutral to create an 
imperative among anarchists to exercise power in a positive fashion with regard to other individuals, and to 
exercise it in a revolutionary fashion with regard to authoritative hierarchies. 
44
 Todd May approaches the problem of representation from a similar perspective as Cohn in his 2010 essay “Is 
Post-Structuralist Political Theory Anarchist?”  
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anarchism has expanded the classical anarchists' revolutionary desire to throw off state power to 
include broader critique of hierarchy itself.  The critique of hierarchy includes examination of all 
relationships of power, including the question of political representation.  Questioning 
representation in these theories of anarchism implies a re-evaluation of one's ability to speak for 
oneself.  Anarchism's extension of  individual autonomy to include the ability to speak for 
oneself, to represent oneself, merges the political with the rhetorical.   
 Jacques Rancière's political philosophy solidifies this relationship between the rhetorical 
and political in a concept he calls “dissensus equality.”  Rancière's revolutionary redefinition of 
equality and politics mirror the humanistic concerns that Pynchon displays throughout the novel.  
Both Rancière and Pynchon are suspicious of  social hierarchies and seek to disrupt them.  
Rancière's disdain for propriety likewise mirrors Pynchon's own desire to force a re-evaluation of 
morality (through, for instance, his inclusion of sexually explicit practices and drug use).  Most 
importantly, however, are the anarchistic undertones of Rancière's work, even though Rancière 
himself refuses to announce his political philosophy.
45  
Rancière's political thought shares with 
anarchism concerns over the use and abuse of authority while it relies on a strong, libertarian-
inflected sense of trust in the individual to be the best authority to govern his or her own affairs.  
This can be seen most clearly in Rancière's consideration of active equality, which I discuss 
below. 
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 Todd May makes a strong case for a connection between Rancière's philosophy and anarchism.  May writes in 
The Political Thought of Jacques Rancière, that anarchism “is a critique of domination and a practice of radical 
equality” (82), that fits the central themes of Rancière's work.  Samuel A. Chambers argues against Todd May's 
characterization of Rancière's politics as anarchistic in his “The Politics of the Police: From Neoliberalism to 
Anarchism, and Back to Democracy” (2011).  Chambers believes that May reads anarchism into Rancière's 
philosophy because May “inserts his own anarchistic politics” (19).   
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 My own interest in Rancière's philosophy, then,  is in the connections that his work 
makes possible among the disparate elements of paranoia, anarchy, and a refusal to operate 
within a dominant authoritative discourse.  In addition to this, Rancière draws an important 
connection between politics and aesthetics that cements the political anarchism in Pynchon's 
novel.  While Rancière's work derives from the continental philosophy of the late twentieth 
century and at times seems to carry on the tradition of marxist criticism,Rancière's approach to 
politics differs from both of these in providing a more direct interconnection between everyday 
life, art, and politics.
46
  For Rancière, the popular understanding of politics serves to alienate 
experience from itself.  Politics normalizes the everyday and drains it of significance.  However, 
the term “politics” has a special definition for Rancière.  Rancière sees politics as a division 
between the widely used term “politics,” that functions as a catch-all term to describe anything 
pertaining to the political process, and the police order (in his work simply referred to as 
“police”).  The division is important to Rancière because he does not perceive the catch-all 
“politics” as a true representation of what politics is.  For Rancière, politics is the process of 
gaining equality which must be separated from the structured and hierarchical politics of the 
police.
47
  Politics, for  Rancière, is improper by design, perpetually forcing a reconsideration of 
the terms of debate.  This impropriety is central to what some consider Rancière's anarchistic 
politics because the impropriety of politics is a disruption of the police – a disruption of 
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 Nick Hewlett in Badiou, Balibar, Rancière: Re-thinking Emancipation (1) and Charles Bingham and Gert Biesta 
in Jacques Rancière: Education, Truth, Emancipation (27-32) find the roots in of Rancière's emancipation in 
Enlightenment philosophy, particularly Immanuel Kant.   
47
 In this passage, I take Rancière's definitions of politics and police from “Ten Theses.”  However, Rancière's 
definitions do not seem to hold fast, for earlier in his career he defined politics differently, arguing that “[f]or a 
thing to be political, it must give rise to a meeting of police logic and egalitarian logic that is never set up in 
advance” (Dis-Agreement 32).  Rancière's definition of political is not always rendered in opposition to the 
police in this way. 
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hierarchies that serve to silence dissent.  Rancière bases his connection between art and politics 
on the notion that, properly executed, both art and politics must deal with the improper.
48
  True 
politics occurs when one who is not equal speaks out for him or herself, ignoring the 
conventional propriety of remaining silent and permitting others to speak as his or her 
representative.  “If there is a connection between art and politics,” Rancière writes in “The 
Paradoxes of Political Art,” “it should be cast in terms of dissensus” (140).  Dissensus is a 
particular kind of conflict that is necessarily irresolvable.  The aim of dissensus is to make voices 
heard – Rancière's argument being that consensus effaces voices considered to be not “proper” 
for political discourse.
49
  This idea meshes well with Jesse Cohn's conception of post-structuralist 
anarchism, which questions the possibility of one's ability to speak for, or represent, another.  
Rancière shares with post-structuralist anarchists a lack of faith in representation that lies at the 
heart of democracy.  Both call for a radical de-centering of authoritative voice, an expansion of 
discourses to allow some to speak for themselves. 
 The reason that Rancière is suspicious of consensus is that it makes the false assumption 
that one can speak for another.  The assumption made by the dominant order is that in a 
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 Although, the arts, like politics, can be emancipatory or repressive.  Rancière writes that “the arts only ever lend 
to projects of domination or emancipation what they are able to lend them . . . what they have in common with 
them” (Politics 19).  In other words, the contributions that the arts can make to politics, such as “the parcelling 
out of the visible and invisible,” must be present in the work itself.  This is an important consideration in this 
novel because paranoia, as I shall discuss below, is a parcelling of the sensible in much the way that Rancière 
suggests must be shared.  In this way, Pynchon also engages in a type of anarchistic aesthetic by engaging with 
the improper dimension of paranoid knowledge. 
49
 As I mentioned above, Jeffrey Baker's essay “A Democratic Pynchon: Counterculture, Counterforce, and 
Participatory Democracy” bears some striking similarities to elements of my own project.  Whereas I identify an 
anarchistic vein in Pynchon's politics, Baker identifies a democratic one.  Baker points to John Dewey's call for 
“dissensus” in a participatory democracy where dissensus is a disagreement that will lead resolution and is proof 
of progress (Baker 114).  Rancière's politics also calls for “dissensus,” but he means this differently.  Dewey is 
interested in coming to agreement and dissensus is a meaningful first step in ensuring that all voices are heard, 
but Rancière finds value in the act of disagreement and views dissensus as evidence of equality through self-
representation.   
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democracy all are equal and, therefore, one can speak for another or one may be empowered to 
speak for another.  However, the hierarchy that permits one to be heard and the many to be 
silenced is an arbitrary one: Rancière notes the “complete absence of any entitlement to govern” 
that leads to a government in which only those in power may speak (“Ten Theses” 31).  “The 
police” is the obverse of politics that protects the status quo.  Although the police protect social 
norms, Rancière does not consider the police to be equivalent with either police officers or the 
institution of the police.  Rather, “the police” is a generalized term, like politics, that defines at 
once a position regarding authority and social conventions that reinforce that authority.
50
  The 
police want individuals to think that politics is a rarefied event that takes place among the 
powerful and that everyday individuals cannot have access to it.  Thus, Rancière's disdain for 
propriety is a deeply political commitment: it is propriety that keeps the individual from making 
her voice heard.    
 The danger, then, lies in the police's assumption that “anyone” can speak, “anyone” may 
govern, when this simply is not true – Rancière calls this assumption “passive equality” because 
it is unclaimed political potential that mistakes complacency for equality.  This task is reserved 
for the “proper” people who can speak for (represent) the rest.  Rancière calls the rest who 
cannot speak “the poor”: “But the 'poor,' precisely, does not designate an economically 
disadvantaged part of the population, but simply the people who do not count, who have no 
entitlement to exercise the power . . . for which they might be counted” (“Ten Theses” 32).  It is 
the arbitrary nature of who may rule that gives lie to the police supposition of equality because it 
is not equality at all.  Rather, the hierarchy of who counts and who does not count determines 
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 For more on definition of “the police” see May 40-3. 
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who may exercise power in a political system.  It is notable that Rancière, who uses speech as a 
differentiating factor between politics and the police, notes that when politics and police run up 
against one another, “this encounter [is] a meeting of the heterogenous” (Dis-Agreement 32).  
This argument recalls my own supposition in my introducion that the encyclopedic novel is a 
testing ground for competing heterologies.  Where I have defined heterology as a non-
authoritative discourse vying for currency within a hegemonic system, Rancière sees the 
heterogenous factions of politics and police on a more fundamental plane: as a division of the 
sensible, a meeting of two logics. 
 Equality, for Rancière, is the point of politics.  Questions of freedom, self-determination 
and other expected rights in a liberal democracy dissolve into the large question of equality.  
What makes Rancière's philosophy of emancipation different from other philosophies is that he 
takes equality as a starting point rather than a utopian goal.  Rancière tries to move equality out 
of the categories of identity politics, race, gender, or class because these categories already draw 
attention away from the individual.  Instead, Rancière wants to discuss equality and politics as a 
specific relationship between individuals or between the individual and the social body.  To 
speak of a class of people already undermines the primacy of the individual, and it is this aspect 
of Rancière's thought that correlates with revolutionary anarchism.  Rancière believes that every 
society is built upon a hierarchy that determines a person's place in the world.  Sometimes the 
hierarchy is explicit and other times it is not.  To achieve equality is to expose the hypocrisies of 
the hierarchy, to show that the constructed hierarchies do not reflect reality.  Rancière believes 
that for true equality to exist, each person must be able to speak, to be taken seriously, and to 
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have a place in debate.  Rancière's politics differs from other revolutionary and emancipatory 
philosophies because, as Gabriel Rockhill puts it, “politics in its strict sense never presupposes a 
reified subject or predefined group of individuals such as the proletariat, the poor, or minorities” 
(The Politics of Aesthetics 3).  The difference between Rancière's politics and other radical 
politics is that Rancière returns the power for emancipation to the individual, rather than 
assigning it to a group.  In Rancière's emancipatory politics, the individual must take an active 
role and create truly political occurrences in which that individual claims his or her own equality 
from a normalizing police order that seeks to maintain the status quo.   
 That the individual must remain vigilant against the dominant order speaks directly to 
Pynchon's political project in Gravity's Rainbow.  The hierarchy that determines who counts 
parallels the division in Gravity's Rainbow between the elect and the preterite.  The preterite 
have no place within the proper order (for Rancière, proper order is the part of the police while 
politics are moments of disruption of order) and are therefore excluded.  However, William 
Slothrop's act of redefining the preterite is, in itself, a political move in Rancière's sense.  
Rancière argues that “[p]olitics exists because those who have no right to be counted as speaking 
beings make themselves of some account” (Dis-Agreement 27): likewise, Pynchon's preterite are 
those of no account who reclaim some account.  Yet Rancière  points to the essential paradox of 
this very division.  Those who stand up to be recognized as speaking beings, by the act of 
standing and forcing their own recognition, expose “the contradiction of two worlds in a single 
world: the world where they are and the world where they are not” (27).  The authoritative 
narrative of Puritanism in colonial America – or the police, to use Rancière's terminology – 
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excludes the preterite, cedes them no voice.  This narrative is shown to be a lie the moment that 
the preterite, or a member of the same, speaks.  
 The division between the elect and preterite represents a lack of parity among people that 
William Slothrop, Tyrone Slothrop's great-great-grandfather, argues against in his tract On 
Preterition and that the novel's protagonist, Tyrone Slothrop appears to sense but does not fully 
articulate.  This bottom-up attempt to throw off a damaging and arbitrary hierarchy of power is 
something that Rancière calls “active equality” – or equality that the individual claims for him or 
herself as those who do not count “make themselves of some account.”51   
 The struggle that William Slothrop initiated with his On Preterition is recapitulated in 
Tyrone Slothrop's quest through the Zone.  William put forward the heretical notion that the 
preterite and the elect were equals and Tyrone does similarly when he elevates the importance of 
the individuals he meets in the Zone.  Another example of this phenomenon is the split between 
Us and Them throughout the novel.  One of the failures of the Counterforce is that the members 
perpetually view themselves as apart from Them when, according to Rancierian politics they – 
The Counterforce – should be pushing for equality rather than reinforcing the disparity. 
 Pynchon establishes the importance of the divide between the elect and the preterite on 
the first page of the novel.  During Pirate's dream of the evacuation of London, the narrator refers 
to the “feeble ones, second sheep, all out of luck and time” (3).  “Second sheep” is a metaphor 
from Calvinist theology for those who are “predestined for abandonment at the moment of 
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 Perhaps Rancière's most straight-forward account of emancipation comes from The Ignorant Schoolmaster, in 
which he writes, “One need only learn how to be equal men in an unequal society.  This is what being 
emancipated means” (133, Rancière's emphasis).  In other words, learning how to be equal is the process of 
active equality.  Conversely, Rancière writes of those “republican hearts and minds” who desire to “make an 
equal society of unequal men” (133), which process invites passive equality. 
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Christ's apocalyptic return, in contrast to the elect who are predestined for redemption” (17, 
emphasis original), Steven C. Weisenburger notes.  Pynchon highlights the troubling arbitrariness 
of such a concept by listing those “second sheep”:  “drunks, old veterans still in shock from 
ordnance 20 years obsolete, hustlers in city clothes, derelicts, exhausted women with more 
children than it seems could belong to anyone, stacked about among the rest of the things to be 
carried out to salvation” (3).  Here, Pynchon identifies the same problem that plagued 
predestination: humans assume divine knowledge.  Materialistic and judgmental criteria are used 
to determine salvation or damnation without regard for what the true criteria may be.  Those 
deemed to be in some way wanting by a normative society – or by the police order, to use 
Rancière's term – are considered to be lesser in God's eyes as well.  Pynchon points to this 
central hypocrisy because part of his agenda in Gravity's Rainbow seems to be a desire to 
promote the kind of individualistic choice that Rancière also promotes.   
 More than 500 pages later in Gravity's Rainbow, the narrator describes the argument in 
William Slothrop's On Preterition.  Briefly, William Slothrop's story parallels Pynchon's own 
real-life ancestor, William Pynchon, rather closely.
52
  William Slothrop fled Boston and John 
Winthrop's church “convinced he could preach as well as anybody in the hierarchy even if he 
hadn't been officially ordained” (555).  This line is significant because it establishes Slothrop, Sr. 
as an unorthodox figure who rejects the authority of hierarchy.  He recognizes the division 
between the ordained and unordained as an arbitrary distinction and a poor criterion for 
determining who may speak.  Secondly, the line sets up the equally arbitrary division between 
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 Weisenburger provides a concise history of William Pynchon and his tract, The Meritorious Price of Our 
Redemption, on which On Preterition is modeled.  See Weisenburger 17, 131-2, and 287-8 for more on the 
preterite, Williams Slothrop and Pynchon, and John Winthrop.   
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the elect and the preterite that traditional Calvinist theology demands.  Slothrop, Sr. also wrote a 
book concerning the elect and the preterite that angered the elect (rather, those who consider 
themselves to be elect without evidence) and was banned and burned in Boston because, 
“Nobody wanted to hear about all the Preterite, the many God passes over when he chooses a 
few for salvation” (555).  This line demonstrates the normalizing momentum of the police which 
also exposes the privilege of the elect.  The “nobody” referred to above means the elect, 
obviously – the Preterite are effaced not just in a theological sense, but in a social sense as well.  
The myopic logic is quite stunning in its own right: Anybody who wants to read about the 
Preterite must be among the Preterite.  But the Preterite do not count.  Therefore, nobody wants 
to read about the Preterite.  The phrase, more properly rendered, would be “Nobody who counts 
wanted to hear about all the Preterite.” 
 Slothrop's revolutionary tract on the Preterite echoes Rancière's claim that equality is the 
result of those without a voice speaking for themselves.  It is quite obvious that the elect would 
not speak for the Preterite, could not speak for them because of the perceived differences 
between them.  Rather, the voice redeeming the Preterite had to come from one of their own.  To 
repeat an earlier point, this entire discussion about the division between the elect and the 
Preterite is predicated upon claiming knowledge that is impossible to know.  It is not that 
Slothrop, himself, is preterite, but he becomes preterite at the moment that he attempts to redeem 
that class of people.  The division between the saved and the damned relies on an arbitrary social 
convention. 
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 The power structures that Rancière and Pynchon each identify differ, but the end result is 
the same: the actions in which William and Tyrone Slothrop engage are heretical because they 
expose the hypocrisy of the power structure.  The hypocrisy lies in the collusion between 
industry and the state that comprises the conspiratorial “Them.”  For William, this hypocrisy lies 
in the church elders' arrogation of God's knowledge of the preterite and the elect.  For Tyrone, 
the hypocrisy is more subtle, because he himself lacks the knowledge the readers are afforded.   
 The hypocrisy of the collusion between industry and state that Tyrone Slothrop discovers 
over time is, of course, connected to the fact that surveillance and money politics are wielded by 
both entities while claiming different priorities: industry's priority is the profit-motive and the 
state's priority is claimed to be the well-being of the people but is actually in line with industry.  
This hypocrisy is strongly suggested through Pynchon's studied use of innuendo and false-leads 
that may or may not actually be false.  Pynchon encourages readers' searches for connections 
throughout Slothrop's quest to discover the truth of his infancy while also frustrating these 
searches.  Slothrop slowly uncovers evidence that seems to suggest that his uncle Lyle sold him 
to Dr. Laslo Jamf for use in the Imipolex G experimentation, but the evidence is garbled and 
incomplete.  Slothrop uncovers what seems to be a a vast interconnection of money and national 
interests that creates an artificial obstacle in his ability to represent himself.  The hidden 
collusion between state and industry erodes the individual's ability to act in full knowledge.  
Early in the novel, the reader learns that Dr. Laszlo Jamf, inspired by the conditioning of “Infant 
Albert,” believes that he could condition Infant Tyrone to respond sexually to a stimulus (84).  
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But it is not for another 200 pages that Slothrop begins to learn these things when he receives a 
dossier on the mysterious Imipolex G from the Swiss company Nordhausen (283).   
 Slothrop discovers that his uncle Lyle had been involved with both German and 
American companies at the time and that he had been, in effect, sold to IG Farben “like a side of 
beef” (286).  The specific connections between Bland and these other companies is not my focus 
here,
53
 but rather the hypocrisy of the split loyalties of both individuals and companies on the 
international scale.  Slothrop acts with partial knowledge based upon a betrayal of those who 
were meant to protect him: his uncle sold him to facilitate a different deal that would rook the 
victors of WWI and his country sold his interests out in order to determine what his “powers” 
were that stemmed from the Imipolex G experimentation.
54  
The central conspiracy of Slothrop's 
life, that he was used as a test subject for the substance Imipolex G, does not cohere because the 
substance was not invented until after Slothrop's infancy.  Whatever the state of this mystery, it is 
through Slothrop's investigations that he discovers a tangled web of collusion between national 
governments and international corporations.  It is difficult to supply a specific piece of evidence 
from the novel to support this hypocrisy because Pynchon is so adept at dropping breadcrumbs 
throughout the novel to indicate a connection.   
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 This exact relationship is difficult to chart because Pynchon writes it in such a circuitous fashion and because the 
relationships loop back upon themselves; this is a case where Pynchon's complex style of narration perfectly 
matches the confusing subject matter he wishes to express.  As nearly as I can make out, Lyle Bland had 
connections to the German company Stinnes while he sat on the board of the Slothrop Paper Company.  Lyle 
arranged to sell Tyrone to IG Farben, another German company, where Laszlo Jamf worked.  Jamf also sat on the 
board for the Grössli Chemical Corporation, which was also connected to Stinnes.   The connections get more 
complicated when Slothrop discovers that Stinnes conspired to ruin the mark in post WWI Germany in order to 
get out of paying reparations mandated by the treaty of Versailles.  The mark devalued, prompting massive 
printings of the paper money, the paper being supplied by the Slothrop Paper Company.   
54
 See Gravity's Rainbow, 85 for a list of some of the speculations into the coincidence between Slothrop's map and 
the rocket strikes. 
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3.3 Encyclopedic Logic: Systematic Logic vs. Associational Thinking 
 The primary difference between the anarchistic encyclopedic novel and the traditional 
encyclopedic novel is a shift from the highly systematized modes of logical thought encouraged 
by the Enlightenment-inspired Encyclopédie and the associational thinking the contemporary 
encyclopedic novel adopted from postmodernist literature.  I call this difference a shift because 
the anarchistic encyclopedic novel seeks to adopt and modify pre-existing modes of thought 
while retaining the same goals of leveling access to information and privileging individual 
thought over authoritative discourse.  The anarchistic encyclopedic novel calls the systematic 
logic of the traditional encyclopedic novel – and through it, certain aspects of Enlightenment 
philosophy – into question. 
 In this section, I argue that the Enlightenment model of progress, faith in rationality to 
solve problems, and systematization of knowledge that are represented in the Encyclopédie are 
no longer adequate to make sense of a postmodern world and that the anarchistic encyclopedic 
novel attempts to correct by utilizing associational thinking.  I will use Diderot's own thoughts 
on the purpose of the Encyclopédie to demonstrate these attributes.  Following this, I will show 
that Gravity's Rainbow works to disrupt and redirect the old Enlightenment model by exposing a 
naïve encyclopedism based on outdated premises, and that Pynchon rejects systematized 
thinking, in the form of binary logic, in favor of associational thinking. 
 The Enlightenment influence on the Encyclopédie is evident in the opening to Diderot's 
entry on the Encyclopédie that reveals the optimistic perspective that he held toward knowledge.  
Diderot writes: 
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In truth, the aim of an encyclopédie is to collect all the knowledge scattered over 
the face of the earth, to present its general outlines and structure to the men with 
whom we live, and to transmit this to those who will come after us, so that the 
work of past centuries may be useful to the following centuries, that our children, 
by becoming more educated, may at the same time become more virtuous and 
happier, and that we may not die without having deserved well of the human race 
(17-8). 
This quote reveals three elements of Diderot's thinking that bear investigation: collection, 
collation, and  transmission.  Diderot's goal is to collect all of the world's knowledge and collate 
this knowledge into categories that can then be recorded and transmitted to future generations.  
Each of these elements expresses aspects of French Enlightenment philosophy that can be, and 
have been, called into question in a postmodern context.   
 To begin, Diderot's belief that world knowledge can be collected together in a coherent 
fashion reveals a deeper belief in the project of Enlightenment.  Because Diderot saw the 
Encyclopédie as an ongoing project that would communicate with future scholars, a charitable 
reading of the above quote suggests that the work of scholars over centuries would realize his 
goal by continually contributing to the work.  Diderot's project relies on the belief that 
humankind will continue on the same trajectory of progression and that the record of history will 
keep account of the progress made, while “our weaknesses follow our mortal remains into the 
tomb and disappear with them” (18).  In other words, a rational society will retain that which 
contributes to progress and forget the rest.   
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 The collection of knowledge would be useless without a process to systematize this 
knowledge in order to present it: collation.  In presenting “general outlines and structures” in the 
work, Diderot reveals an ideal of categorization and systematization that is meant to provide a 
more “user-friendly” interface.  Alphabetizing entries creates a structure in which to present the 
knowledge collected.  In the context of the Encyclopédie, this structuring principle makes sense 
and helps the readers to jump directly to the entries they seek.  Because the system is 
alphabetical, the systematization appears neutral compared to the thematically organized 
encyclopedias before the Enlightenment.  However, Diderot also includes a system of cross-
references that serve as a secondary structure that does reveal a greater degree of editorial choice 
that may be limiting.  This is a subject that I will take up more fully in the next section.   
 Finally, Diderot is primarily concerned with transmitting this knowledge to his 
contemporaries and to scholars of the future.  His interest in creating dialogue is in keeping with 
his philosophy of democratized knowledge.  This final aspect of the Encyclopédie ties together 
these three activities because without the desire to share this knowledge, there would be no point 
to the project.  But this projection into the future again reveals Diderot's faith in rationality and 
progress while implying a further systematization that would help to perpetuate such an ongoing 
project.  None of these elements in themselves are bad or incorrect and it is only with the 
perspective of time that it is possible to view the limitations of such methods of thinking. 
 The Enlightenment perspective on knowledge influenced the traditional encyclopedic 
novel via Diderot's Encyclopédie by encouraging a categorization of knowledge and reinforcing 
the importance of empirical observation.  The most important revelation for the current project is 
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the way in which Diderot thinks about knowledge and the way that this does not work in the 
contemporary world.  His quote shows that he is unconcerned with epistemological questions 
such as what knowledge is, what the difference between information and knowledge is, and so 
on.  Based on the fact that he believes that it might one day be possible to collect all of the 
world's knowledge, he also seems to believe that knowledge is somehow limited or quantifiable.  
While the purpose of the current project is not to examine these epistemological questions, it is 
relevant that these questions do reveal the ways in which systematized thinking can be limiting 
and potentially destructive.   
 In contrast to the systematic rationality of the Encyclopédie and the traditional 
encyclopedic novel, the anarchistic encyclopedic novel seeks to utilize a method of associational 
thinking that represents an attempt to break free of structural limitations.  This method of 
associational thought is closely related to the critique of structure that the post-structural 
anarchists adopt.  That is, the anarchistic encyclopedia maintains a skepticism toward even the 
methods of thought and critique that Enlightenment philosophers used in breaking away from the 
authorities of Church and Crown.  The anarchistic encyclopedic novel does not seek to abandon 
systematic rationality completely, but rather to supplement this method of thought with different 
methods as a check against potential blind spots.   
 Associational thinking is a shorthand way of referring to a number of different models of 
thinking and logic that have emerged following scientific advancements and cultural shifts that 
alter or undermine older models of logical thought.  It offers a way around systematic thinking 
by making links that are not based upon logic but upon subjective experience and sense relations.  
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Many different models of what I am calling associational thought have been proposed by critics 
of the postmodern.  Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer write in “The Concept of the 
Enlightenment” that “enlightenment is totalitarian as only a system can be” because knowledge 
is proscribed (18).  They continue, “even what cannot be assimilated, the insoluble and irrational, 
is fenced in by mathematical theorems” (18).  The argument that they present, in part, is that the 
Enlightenment was a project of de-mythologizing by making the world into a knowable place but 
that in the process, the Enlightenment itself turned into a myth because we lost the ability to self-
reflect.  This amounts to an inability to examine the structures that shape our knowledge. But it is 
the “irrational and insoluble,” the mythic, that clashes with systematic logic and finally allows 
the self-reflection necessary to demystify the structures. 
 Although Horkheimer and Adorno conceive of a dialectical challenge to systematized 
thinking, critics such as Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari posit a way of thinking that rejects 
dualism in thinking, a topic that I will take up in regard to binary logic as it appears in Gravity's 
Rainbow.  In A Thousand Plateaus, Deleuze and Guattari propose the rhizome, an acentered 
system that erases hierarchy and authority by operating as a web of interconnection that is 
anarchic and open to communication between any of the elements within the complex (17).  This 
permits connections not based on logic, or even pre-Enlightenment notions of authority and 
tradition, but on association, sense, emotion, or even happenstance.  By operating outside of 
logical systems, they argue, it is possible to think outside of the capitalist system and provide a 
method of critique.   
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 Other critics such as Zygmunt Bauman point to the necessity of building contingency into 
our thinking in order to expose failures of the Enlightenment search for knowledge.  Bauman 
argues, “The order bound to be installed and made universal was a rational order; the truth 
bound to be made triumphant was the universal (hence apoditic and obligatory) truth.  Together, 
political order and true knowledge blended into a design for certainty.  The rational-universal 
world of order and truth would not know of no contingency and no ambivalence” (11).  
Contingency is an aspect of associational thinking because it does not demand the certainty that 
the Diderotian encyclopedia demands.   
 The model of associational thinking that I propose takes into account these elements of 
thought left out of the rational model of the encyclopedia and are associated with postmodern 
conceptions of the failure of the Enlightenment.  Associational thinking is irrational, non-
rational, and/or non-linear.  It is contingent and permits a blurred logic that recognizes states of 
being and scales of degree instead of dualistic states.  Most of all, associational thinking is 
metaphoric and metonymic; it relies on lateral connections between ideas not related by logic.  
By recognizing that there may not be a totality of knowledge to collect the postmodern subject is 
free from the need to collate and may understand the world in a different sense.   
 There are two connections between associational thinking and anarchism.  The first, 
mentioned above, lies in the ability to think outside of prescribed systems and therefore critique 
those systems.  The second connection is in the very nonhierarchical configuration of both 
elements.  While Enlightenment progress imagined a democratic world in which men are to be 
considered equals, associational thought opens the way for broad-scale individual emancipation.  
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Associational thinking is a central feature of the anarchistic encyclopedic novel because of the 
freedom of thought that it permits and, through this freedom of thought, the freedom to speak 
back to power.   
 Pynchon uses associational thought in Gravity's Rainbow in order to demonstrate the new 
ways in which an individual must act to wrest some measure of freedom from the emergent 
authority.  In the novel, the ending of World War II in the European theater reveals collusion 
between national states and international corporations.  What Pynchon reveals over the course of 
the novel is that it is only through chance and associational thinking that Slothrop is able to 
uncover some sense of the truth of the new world.  Pynchon demonstrates the futility of applying 
systematic logic in what I call an appeal to naïve encyclopedism.  Naïve encyclopedism is the 
extension of the Diderotian encyclopedic model into the postmodern world; it is a result of the 
attempt to resort to Enlightenment ideals in a post-Enlightenment world. 
 One of the primary flaws in some uses of the term “encyclopedic” when applied to a 
novel is that the novel simply contains everything.
55
  This is a view that Jorge Luis Borges 
lampoons at many points in his ficciones.
56
  Complete knowledge, in Borges' work, is equated 
with exhausting the inexhaustible which, in his absurdist universe, is possible.  In “The Library 
of Babel,” for example, Borges describes an infinite bank of knowledge containing every work 
ever written.  But every work containing every possible typographical error within each of those 
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 What I call “naïve encyclopedism” is a particular usage of the descriptive “encyclopedic” to mean that a novel is 
very large or that it is more inclusive than other novels. 
56
 I address the work of Jorge Luis Borges here and in my conclusion because, although his work cannot be 
considered encyclopedic according to the genre definition I have outlined thus far, his work does engage with 
many of the same  issues that the encyclopedic novel does.  In many ways, Borges' work can be considered to 
deal with many of the issues that will arise in postmodernism decades before that term became fashionable in the 
Western academy.  I will treat what I call Borges' “meta-encyclopedism” more fully in the conclusion. 
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works, and also every translation into every language of those works, also resides in the library – 
so that the expansion of knowledge serves ultimately to limit knowledge, to shut down the 
possibility of any kind of utility.  This endless opening of meaning clearly does not represent 
encyclopedism as I have defined it.  The reality of Borges' model of encyclopedism is inclusion 
leading to futility and frustration.  When insignificant variations (such as the typos marring a 
text) become equivalent to originary texts and when encyclopedism stops being an 
epistemological imperative and becomes instead a drive simply to accumulate, the text ceases to 
be encyclopedic and simply becomes exhaustive.
57
   
 Although Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow may, at times, seem to fit this exhaustive 
characterization of the encyclopedia, there is an underlying logic to the ideas and systems 
presented in the novel that are not immediately apparent on a first reading.  Pynchon works at 
one remove from the systems that he most clearly represents.  In adopting a philosophy that casts 
doubt on totalized structures, Pynchon effectively removes his fiction from the constraints of 
dealing within a singular system, whether that system be a structure of power, an epistemological 
approach to the world, or an overarching ideological logic.  In every case, Pynchon is careful to 
delineate the difference between a naively totalized conception of systems from his own broader, 
and more inclusive epistemological model that allows for an equally broad understanding of 
competing epistemological structures. 
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 This, unfortunately, is an error that Brian Stonehill makes in an otherwise meritous study of Gravity's Rainbow's 
self-reflexivity.  Stonehill reacts to Mendelson's characterization of Gravity's Rainbow as an encyclopedic 
narrative by asserting that  the “label implies only that Pynchon threw everything in” (156).  This reductive 
perspective of Mendelson's criticism, and of encyclopedism generally, ignores the long history of the 
encyclopedia. 
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 Pynchon introduces the difference between a simplistic all-inclusiveness and true 
encyclopedism early his text.  For instance, in  Major Pudding's Things That Can Happen in 
European Politics, Pudding attempts to record every contingency and possibility of events that 
might take place in 1931.  Pudding's project, though seemingly encyclopedic because of its urge 
to include everything, is ultimately useless in a practical sense because its “permutations 'n' 
combinations [. . .] don't give Hitler an outside chance” (275).  The implication here is that 
reality eludes the attempt to compile every possibility.  Pudding makes a mistake when he 
assumes that predictions can be extrapolated from any given point, and that possibility is not 
limited by perspective.  Pudding's book echos Borges' “The Garden of Forking Paths,” a story in 
which a Chinese foreign agent comes upon a book his grandfather wrote that contains every 
possible divergent story-line.  Both works, Pudding's and the grandfather's in Borges' story, seek 
to contain infinite variation in a finite space, expressing a futile desire for completion.  While 
Borges' grandfather's desire is to meditate on time and potential, Pudding's desire is to exhaust 
possibility and prevent a second World War, which he fails to do.   
 At another point later in Gravity's Rainbow, the image of a fork in the road arises again, 
but this time the fork is a limitation, denoting a lost opportunity.  Considering William Slothrop's 
despondent return to England, the narrator questions whether the ancestor Slothrop's interest in 
the preterite might have represented “the fork in the road America never took, the singular point 
she jumped the wrong way from” (556).  Whether it is because of the unusual politics of the 
Zone or due to his own naiveté,  the younger Slothrop believes that there may be a way back, to 
take the missed opportunity to recognize the importance of the preterite.  In the rarified space of 
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the Zone, “while all the fences are down [. . .] somewhere inside the waste of it a single set of 
coordinates from which to proceed, without elect, without preterite, without even nationality to 
fuck it up” (556).  This fork in the road represents for Slothrop a way to reimagine the world in 
which he lives.   
 The differing versions of the encyclopedic vision that Pudding and Slothrop subscribe to, 
in turn, work to limit or to open their own lines of sight.  While Pudding subscribes to the all-
inclusive vision of the encyclopedic, Slothrop realizes the limitations of the splitting off.  
Slothrop's vision of a split in the historical timeline, however, is the most inclusive, in the sense 
that he believes that whatever personal decisions have been made, the collective turning away 
from the preterite that took place centuries before has reverberated through history.  What lies 
behind Slothrop's desire to recover that splitting off point is his desire to do away with division, 
whether between the elect and preterite or amongst nations.  This desire clearly differs from 
either Pudding's desired splitting, because he views the historical split as a desired dividing line 
between groups of people.   
 What the novel illustrates in the metaphor of the forking path is a range of attitudes in 
response to limiting decisions.  Pudding's naïve encyclopedia, while the most “inclusive,” is also 
the most limiting because the project is firmly tied to an inability to admit either the influence of 
chance or the impossibility of an endpoint for knowledge.  Pudding's work is dedicated to a 
logical model of exhaustion, but the fault of the work is that one cannot accurately predict events 
that may take place.  It ignores the necessity of contingency.  Later in the novel, Pynchon 
explicitly refers to the encyclopedia, but in a way that highlights the limitations of this naïve 
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encyclopedism.  Describing the far-reaching influence of Slothrop's uncle, the narrator Lyle 
Bland describes “a silence the encyclopedia histories have blandly filled up with agencies, 
initials, spokesmen and deficits enough to keep us from finding them again . . .” (586; Pynchon's 
ellipses).  Pynchon refers to the exhaustive aspect of naïve encyclopedism, but in the sense that 
this exhaustion is purposefully engaged in order to veil the truth.  The adjectival “blandly” refers 
both to an inoffensive manner, and to a style in which Bland would act.  In this short reference 
Pynchon identifies the way that knowledge can be weaponized.  In his forking path, however, 
Slothrop correctly envisions himself – and everyone else – as participants within the struggle in 
which they all find themselves.  He is able to imagine a change in the world because he also 
acknowledges his place within that world. 
 The interest that Pynchon has in breaking away from the “all-inclusive” model of the 
encyclopedia is to disrupt the naïve presumption that all-inclusiveness is a useful characteristic 
for defining “encyclopedism.”  In this case the encyclopedia is a representation of totalized 
knowledge.  Borges satirizes this notion of the encyclopedia by equating total knowledge with 
zero knowledge.  Pynchon similarly satirizes this all-inclusive notion of the encyclopedia, but in 
a different way, by concluding  that there is no way for any one individual's projection of 
alternatives to actually be comprehensive.  Pudding's book makes the assumption that, given a 
finite set of variables (in this case, European inter-war politics), a well informed individual 
(Pudding) will be able to extrapolate all likely outcomes.  The fact that Pudding is unable to 
predict the rise of Hitler and the re-emergence of Germany as a super-power points to one of two 
conclusions: that Hitler's rise to power was so unexpected that it was literally impossible to 
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predict, or that even the most comprehensive application of individual, monadic logic is 
ultimately futile in merely practical terms.   
 While Pynchon engages with the encyclopedia and dispels naïve encyclopedism by 
showing the necessity of contingency in associational thinking, he also works to show the 
limitations of systematized logic.  He performs this by demonstrating the failure of binary logic 
to accurately represent the world.
58
 
 Pynchon uses the relationship between statistician Roger Mexico and Pavlovian Ned 
Pointsman to demonstrate the limitations of binary logic.  Early in the novel Pynchon puts the 
two into a seeming-opposition, calling Mexico the “Antipointsman” (55).  However, the 
opposition that Pynchon encourages the reader to see is within a limited domain: Mexico “is 
devoted to number and to method, not table-rapping or wishful thinking.  But in the domain of 
zero to one, not something to something.  Pointsman can only possess the zero and the one” (55).  
Locked within the system of binary logic, Pointsman is offered as exemplar of the faults of such 
either/or dichotomies.  The domain “between the one and the zero” is, for Pynchon, the preferred 
domain because it allows for possibility, for shades of grey that is a part of associative thinking.  
Pynchon demonstrates this difficulty of Mexico's position just a page later as the narrator 
wonders “What if Mexico's whole generation have turned out like this?  Will Postwar be nothing 
but 'events' newly created one moment to the next?  No links?  Is it the end of history?” (56; 
Pynchon's emphasis).  The shift in the narrator's sympathies from Mexico to Pointsman indicates 
the difficult position of choosing one model over the other: both Mexico and Pointsman become 
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 Scott Sanders also connects Pynchon's rejection of binary logic with anarchist politics, pointing to the structural 
limitations of dualism: “Experience belies the simplification of binary choices into which our logic and our 
language bind us” (117). 
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analogies for the type of thought they use.  In selecting either Pointsman or Mexico, the narrator 
implies, the reader must by extension select strict correlation or complete disconnect.  The 
former is rigidly hierarchical and admitting of no middle ground while the latter is limitless 
transition, a perpetual deferral of meaning in favor of “No link.  No memory.  No conditioning”  
(56).   
 Interestingly, the references to Pavlov also indicate a connection to Enlightened 
rationality.  Early in the novel Roger Mexico refers to Pointsman as a Pavlovian and a Royal 
Fellow (37).  As a Royal Fellow, Pointsman is a member of the Royal Society of London for 
Improving Natural Knowledge, a group founded in 1660 to forward the science of natural 
philosophy.  The Royal Society has long been associated with Enlightened rationality and 
empiricism.  Among the Fellows are Carl Linnaeus, the famed taxonomist, and Sir Isaac Newton, 
physicist and originator of the Laws of Motion that are central to Pynchon's conception of 
entropy.  When Pynchon places Mexico and Pointsman in opposition with one another he also, 
though by implication, places Mexico in opposition to the Royal Society and the focus on natural 
philosophy that this entails.  On the one hand, this may be a positive thing for Mexico because it 
means that he would fail to fall into the trap of privileging empiricism and naturalism.  On the 
other hand, however, it would be extremely limiting to discard the influence of the Royal Society 
and all of the advancements in knowledge for which its Fellows are responsible.  Any rejection 
of natural philosophy under these circumstances would be simply for the sake of rejecting a 
dominant discourse and not due to its own failings.  The connection between binary thinking – 
exemplified by Pointsman – and this Enlightenment institution provides evidence for my claim 
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that Pynchon seeks to distance the discourse of Gravity's Rainbow from the dominant discourse 
of Enlightened rationality.  However, this is not so much because the perspective itself is flawed 
as because the privileging of this one discourse necessarily marginalizes other discourses in 
much the way that Diderot's privileging to the same Enlightened rationality came at the expense 
of other forms of discourse. 
 The problem with binary logic, at least in this instance, is that the limitation of choices is 
never limited to a local, or single, selection.  Using binary logic, as Pointsman does in his work, 
colors the way that he views the world.  In contrast, Pynchon creates a world in which characters 
often refuse to make a choice between x and y, such as the choice between Religion and 
Enlightenment.  Among the most important messages that Gravity's Rainbow conveys is that 
binary logic is not false only because it excludes the middle.  Binary logic is fallacious because it 
limits the ability to think in shades, as Mexico does, and also because it limits the ability to make 
connections to other elements outside of the binary.  Breaking outside of binary logic in this 
novel represents a metaphorical break from the systematized logic that the Enlightenment 
philosophers encouraged and demonstrates the necessity of associational thinking.
59
  
  This line between the linear logic of the binary and spatial logic that allows for multiple 
possibilities distinguishes, I think, Diderot's democratic model and Pynchon's anarchistic one.
60
  
Perhaps the reason that Gravity's Rainbow may be unsettling to readers is the same as the reason 
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 Pynchon extends his critique of binary logic to also include dialecticism.  In a conversation Tchitcherine recalls 
from his younger years, he trots out the old Marxist maxim of  religion being an opiate of the masses to which 
Wimpe replies, Marxist dialectics?  That's not an opiate, eh?” (701; Pynchon's emphasis). 
60
 Pynchon may have derived this line of thinking from Vladimir Nabokov's lectures at Cornell.  Nabokov invokes 
a kind of “multi-level” thinking in his fiction and lectures.  In “Good Readers and Good Writers,” Nabokov blurs 
the line between fiction and science and writes that the best temperament for a reader to have is “a combination 
of the artistic and scientific one” (4-5).  My thanks to Stephen Blackwell for pointing this out to me. 
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that it is successful in re-energizing Diderot's encyclopedic discourse: because it uses the very 
nature of the dominant systematized logical discourse to explode itself.  Pynchon effectively 
plays upon a model of knowledge that depends upon a wide accessibility and the illusion of 
plurality to simulate a democratic leveling.  What this means in reality, however, is that there is a 
privileging of a certain kind of discourse, in this case the systematized, and often binary, logic.  
In its place, Pynchon would rather leave open all of the doors of possibility.   
 Pynchon demonstrates this most effectively in the “White Visitation,” a special ops group 
bent on exploring and enlisting the supernatural in the Allied war efforts.  The importance of the 
“White Visitation” to the war effort goes beyond the simple desire to win by any means 
necessary.  There is a kind of naïve pragmatism behind the idea that a technologically advanced 
superpower would invest energy and resources into researching supernatural weapons on the off-
chance that they might work.  Pynchon avoids this easy analogy by approaching the supernatural 
with the same gravity and intellectualism with which his characters approach rocket-building, 
psychological research, or any of the other scientific pursuits featured in the novel.  Pynchon 
works to erode the dividing line between the natural and supernatural from the opening pages of 
the novel.  Pirate Prentice's dream evacuation  serves to de-stabilize the reader's expectations of a 
fictive reality.  Prentice's dreams and the séance scene establish a thematic division between 
known and unknown that pervades the entire text.  Both the séance and the dreams serve to 
destabilize the strict divisions between the known and the unknown, a break from certainty that 
systematized logic cannot permit. 
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 Pynchon uses the ambiguity of words with multiple meanings to further destabilize 
readerly expectations, but also uses them to establish the analogy between the history, economy, 
and power relationships of the real world with the communication between the living and the 
dead.  This demonstrates the need for associational thinking by implying connections that both 
the characters and the reader must learn to interpret.  One example of this takes place during a 
séance during an attempt to make contact with the deceased Roland Feldspath.  The medium 
Caroll Eventyr (a member of the “White Visitation”) explains that “'It's control.  All these things 
arise from one difficulty: control.  For the first time it was inside, do you see.  The control is put 
inside.  No more need to suffer passively “outside forces” – to veer into any wind.  As if . . .” 
(30; Pynchon's emphasis and ellipses).  Playing with double meanings, Eventyr refers to  control 
as both a potentially coercive force and as a participant in a séance who assists the medium.  
Eventyr is interrupted by one of the other séance participants who says, 
“A market needed no longer be run by the Invisible Hand, but now could create itself – 
its own logic, momentum, style, from inside.  Putting the control inside was ratifying 
what de facto had happened – that you had dispensed with God.  But you had taken on a 
greater, and more harmful, illusion.  The illusion of control.  That A could do B.  But that 
was false.  Completely.  No one can do.  Things only happen, A and B are unreal, are 
names for parts that ought to be inseparable. . . .” (30; Pynchon's emphasis and ellipses) 
This passage attempts to explain the difference between control from inside versus outside of a 
system, but presents a contradiction.  This conception of a system's autopoeisis removes the need 
for outside control, whether it be an Invisible Hand or God, but at the same time, it claims that 
 97 
the control from inside is illusory.  Here again, Pynchon works to show that contingency is 
necessary by challenging causation, which is something that he does from the first pages of the 
novel. 
 This passage is also interesting in how it shows members of the “White Visitation” 
attempting to quantify the supernatural.  Such attempts to treat non-scientific phenomenon in a 
scientific manner are paradoxical.  The treatment of supernatural occurrences as though they 
were subject to the same rules of empirical observability as natural occurrences demonstrates a 
lack of awareness of the break between the spiritual and physical.  This is deceptive because the 
privileged discourse remains empirical and rational.  When Roger Mexico strenuously objects to 
the use of such unscientific elements, Prentice warns him “'Careful, Mexico, you're losing the old 
objectivity again – a man of science shouldn't want to do that, should he.  Hardly scientific, is it'” 
(33).  Prentice ironically demonstrates the logic of illogic by using objectivity, a standard of 
scientific knowledge, to bludgeon a skeptic into believing in the efficacy of the supernatural.   
 However, it is difficult to know where Pynchon's sympathy actually lies; on the surface it 
seems that Mexico should be praised for maintaining his skeptical position and that Prentice 
warps logic in order to support an illogical position.  However, Mexico's position maintains the 
same troubling binarism that Pynchon seeks to break down at every turn.  By promoting a model 
of associational thought, Pynchon does seek to undo the limitations that follow from highly-
systematized logic.  Pynchon stages many “impossible” events in the novel, such as Slothrop 
predicting rocket strikes, or a supersonic rocket reversing cause and effect, or traveling down a 
toilet, and to make sense of these events one must work outside of the logic that makes these 
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things impossible.  The ability to open up thought processes to account for these events requires 
considering contingency, scales, association, and resorting to arational thought.  This freedom to 
work outside of structure mirrors the anarchic freedom that Pynchon also advocates. 
 
 
3.4 Encyclopedic Politics: Closed (Totalized) Systems vs Open Forms 
 
 The second major difference between the traditional encyclopedic novel and the 
anarchistic encyclopedic novel is a political shift that parallels the logical shift described in the 
previous section.  Encyclopedias are closed systems that, similar to systematic logic, are 
inherently limited to the structures imposed on them.  The anarchistic encyclopedia adopts the 
general concept of the encyclopedia as a syncretic blending of information and perspectives but 
seeks an open form that is not limited by such constraints as systematized logic and highly 
structured organization.  This shift in politics parallels the shift in logic because the anarchistic 
encyclopedia attempts to continue traditions of the encyclopedic model but also desires to 
revolutionize the purpose of the work.  In the preceding section, I argued that associational 
thinking broadened the ways in which individuals can understand their world by avoiding 
artificial constraints.  The open nature of the anarchistic encyclopedia relies on associational 
thinking but adds a political dimension that seeks personal freedom from restrictive structures as 
well as freedom in thought.   
 In this section, I argue that the encyclopedia's structure is limiting in two ways that the 
anarchistic encyclopedia attempts to correct.  First, the two-tiered organizational structure 
(alphabetical and cross-referential) in some ways supports associational thinking but in a 
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constrained way that privileges the editors' choices.  Second, the focus on empiricism and 
systematized logic restricts content and forces a homogenization by privileging ideas and 
discourses that fit into this authoritative structure.  The anarchistic encyclopedia works to correct 
these limitations by providing an associational hermeneutic tool in paranoid thinking that resists 
totalizing impulses in the encyclopedia, thereby promoting anti-systems thinking and anarchic 
freedom.  In this way, paranoia serves two important functions.  First, paranoid thought parallels 
Rancière's model of active equality in that it is a process an individual may use to claim 
knowledge for oneself rather than relying on authority.  Second, paranoia works to disrupt the 
traditional hierarchies that determine who has authority over knowledge.  This disruption returns 
the ability to know to the individual rather than to the authoritative bodies.  
 One hallmark of the Enlightenment philosophy, and of Diderot's Encyclopédie, is the use 
of structuring elements to provide order.  Diderot's use of the alphabetical organization, as 
opposed to the thematic organization of earlier encyclopedias such as Pliny's, grants the reader a 
greater autonomy in using the text.  Rather than having to read through a thematically (and 
potentially arbitrarily) organized text to locate a particular topic, readers of the Encyclopédie 
have the option of skipping directly to the desired article.   
 The use of alphabetical organization makes sense in a printed text, but it is the second 
organizational system that begins to expose the influence of the editor.  The system of cross-
referencing in the Encyclopédie was a broad revelation for reference works, and Diderot was 
able to include some associational aspects in his work because of this.  The contemporary cross-
reference is much the same as the system of cross-references that Diderot developed as a part of 
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his Encyclopédie inasmuch as the systems consists of references at the ends of articles that 
redirect readers to other, related articles.
61
  While cross-referencing is primarily a research aid, 
the references may also be used ironically as a way to critique a topic through radical 
juxtaposition with a seemingly unrelated topic.
62
  Whether the cross-reference is used ironically 
or not, the role that it plays in the encyclopedia is that of a secondary ordering system that is 
based upon association.   
 One of the crucial distinctions that I drew between the pedagogical and dialogical models 
of the encyclopedia in the introduction was that of structure – ordering – and the varying 
influences that this has.  The secondary ordering  structure of the cross-reference recalls the 
pedagogical model in a way that still highlights accessibility but builds in the option to refuse the 
putative link offered by the editor.  The cross-reference blends the accessibility of the 
alphabetical ordering common in the dialogical model with the thematic ordering featured in the 
pedagogical model.  The arbitrary nature of these thematic connections remains somewhat 
obscured based on their paratextual status – relegated to the bottom of the entry where they must 
be specifically sought out by the reader.  Nevertheless, the system of cross-reference still 
represents an organizing structure that favors the interpretation of the editor over those of the 
authors or the readers, creating a de facto hierarchical relationship. 
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 Internet encyclopedias have picked up and expanded the cross-reference in the form of hyperlinks.  Wikipedia's 
use of hyperlinks between entries permit the reader to either gain more depth on a topic, read about a related 
topic, or link to a merely marginally related topic.  This system of hyperlinking is much more inclusive because 
(given a fast enough internet connection) switching from one topic to another is instantaneous and rather than 
listing a series of related article titles at the end of the entry, Wikipedia's hyperlinks are embedded in the main 
body of the text.  This broader inclusion, however, comes at the cost of the focus that more traditional cross-
references permit. 
62
 I briefly discuss Diderot's ironic use of the cross-reference in the introduction, where I note that Philipp Blom 
points to Diderot's cross-referencing “anthrophages,” or cannibals to “Eucharist, Communion.”   
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 In the passage quoted under the preceding sub-heading Diderot expresses a desire to 
collect the world's knowledge in his Encyclopédie.  But we can ask what constitutes such 
knowledge.  We must infer that Diderot and his editors recognized knowledge and made 
decisions about what should be included and what will be left out.  Editorial decisions would 
constitute a bias that would be invisible to the reader.  Diderot is clear about this and while the 
reader can correct for any potential bias that may be contained in the Encyclopédie, there is 
always the risk of influence when a text, like the Encyclopédie, claims a degree of authority.   
 But editorial authority can prove to be even more damaging if it encourages a 
homogenization of form and style.  The clearest example of this is in the body of the 
Encyclopédie itself, where Diderot forwards the project of Enlightenment.  This stance would 
cause the Encyclopédie to omit those ideas and topics that do not conform to the systematized 
logic of the Enlightenment.  While Diderot perceived this as necessary to combatting the Church 
authority, it also serves to shut off potentially advantageous avenues of discussion.   
 Diderot's editorial stance develops a new dominant discourse that privileges knowledge 
that conforms to Enlightenment values: it creates a new hierarchical structure that dictates what 
may be acknowledged.  An example of a conflict between dominant and marginal discourses 
occurs in a long narrative subplot in the middle of “In the Zone.”  The narrator relates the history 
of Tchitcherine, his origins, and his travels in the Soviet Republic Kazakhstan.  While much of 
this episode details the internal conflict of creating a written language for the region that is an 
interesting meditation on Western colonialism in its own right, Tchitcherine observes that an act 
of preservation – from the perspective of the Westerners – is actually an act of destruction.  For 
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example, Tchitcherine witnesses a singing duel between a boy and girl.  The duel is highly 
ritualized and the improvisations subject to a specific structure.
63
  As Tchithcerine watches the 
duel he “understands, abruptly, that soon someone will come out and begin to write some of 
these [duels] down in the New Turkish Alphabet he helped frame . . . and this is how they will be 
lost” (357 Pynchon's ellipsis).  This observation implies the importance of divergent 
epistemologies and exposes the imposition of the privileged discourse of Western empiricism.  
The import here is two-fold; first, there is the immediate destruction of the singing-duel tradition 
through transcription.  Second, the imposition of the New Turkish Alphabet that will have the 
same effect on the language that the transcription has on the song.  The written transcript of an 
improvised song can never be equivalent to the singing-duel because the duel itself is a cultural 
experience.  Translating an oral, communal experience into written form will render that form 
intelligible to outsiders, but may also, Tchitherine fears, replace the actual experience.  Thus, 
paradoxically, what is done in the name of preservation and study – namely, the transcription of 
the songs – may destroy the culturally specific experience.   
 The integrity of the singing-duel is subordinated to the dictates of rationality; the oral 
language is first codified and then the oral cultural experience is set in print, thus limiting access 
to the original discourse.  The democratic encyclopedic impulse of the West likewise calls for a 
standardization of discourse, an alignment of epistemological truth claims along a single, linear 
access or rationality.  The Enlightenment model of the encyclopedia demands a uniformity of 
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 “You have to be on your toes for this,” the narrator warns the reader, “you trade four-line stanzas, first, second, 
and last lines all have to rhyme though the lines don't have to be any special length, just breathable” (356).  The 
direct address to the reader is interesting in that it turns this narrative exposition into a set of instructions for a 
participant. 
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approach under the impetus of intelligibility to a common audience and editorial consistency in 
tone. Just as the transcription of the singing-duel democratizes that cultural event, simultaneously 
transposing it for intelligibility's sake into a medium more widely accessible to those outside of 
the culture, the leveling discourse of Enlightened rationality achieves its democratic accessibility 
at the expense of those discourses that must be reshaped in order to fit the correct logical 
system.
64
   
 While the encyclopedia operates according to a strictly systematized logic that is limiting 
and can be potentially damaging to the freedom of the individual, the anarchistic encyclopedia 
builds a political valence into associational thinking.  Paranoia is the key to this political 
dimension because it returns a type of agency to the individual.  For an author like Pynchon, the 
individual's interface with truth and knowledge is already proscribed and is always limited by the 
external structures in place, supposedly, to provide order.  Deborah Madsen notes in the 
introduction to her book The Postmodernist Allegories of Thomas Pynchon that  
by focusing upon the questing character's discovery of the constraints that are imposed 
upon social knowledge by the cultural construction of both social knowledge and the 
questioning self, [Pynchon's] postmodernist allegory is able to represent the mechanisms 
of ideological repression without pretending to occupy a position above or beyond this 
discursive system – a system in which no discourse is innocent. (5) 
Pynchon's rhetorical anarchism reflexively examines structures of knowledge and denies any 
privileged discourse.  Diderot's privileging of Enlightened rationality is, in the world of Gravity's 
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 Madsen continues, “Epistemology is corrupted as it becomes insulative, producing metaphors that disguise and 
obscure rather than reveal” (94). 
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Rainbow, a transgression against the spatial thinking that recognizes that science and religion not 
only do but must co-exist.
65
  Madsen further argues that Pynchon allegorically represents 
Enlightened rationality, the “totalizing logic of Reason,” as limiting discourse because it 
“radically circumscribes human freedom by limiting access to alternative discourses” (94).   
 Pynchon is skilled at giving the impression that seemingly unrelated things are related 
without actually showing the connection.  Whether it be the suggestion of a link between the 
Tristero, Pierce Inverarity, and the Inamorati Anonymous in The Crying of Lot 49, the 
coincidence of Telluric ley-lines and the travels of the airship in Against the Day, or the 
relationship between Dixon (a freemason) and Mason in Mason & Dixon, Pynchon tantalizes the 
reader with the sense of paranoia that his characters feel – the sense that there is or must be some 
connection in the absence of any evidence or explanation.  So intense is the sense of connection 
that the reader, too, is often inspired to speculate on the means of connection.  While Pynchon 
engages his reader with many such suggestions of connection in Gravity's Rainbow, it is the 
connection between power, structure, and epistemology that is central to understanding the work.   
 Pynchon often suggests connections between seemingly unrelated elements by invoking 
Austrian American mathematician Kurt Gödel's incompleteness theorem in conjunction with  
Murphy's Law.
66
  Pynchon's rephrasing of Murphy's Law is of a piece with his suspicion of 
totalized knowledge. 
                                                 
65
 The privileging of logical discourse is not original to Diderot.  Epictitus argued that anyone who would call logic 
useless must argue for its uselessness, but that arguing for the uselessness of logic requires the use of logic.  
Epictitus' syllogism appears to be sound, but only when logical discourse is privileged.   
66
 It is, perhaps, unsurprising given Pynchon's predilection for “coincidence” that both Pudding's  Things That Can 
Happen in European Politics and Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem appear in 1931, a fact that Pynchon points 
out (275). 
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 Douglas Hofstadter offers a concise paraphrase of Gödel's incompleteness theorem: “All 
consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory include undecidable propositions” (17).  
What this means is that no fixed mathematical system will contain all propositions necessary to 
define the rules of that system: external influence is always necessary.
67
 Pynchon adopts Gödel's 
theorem in order to expose the broader necessity of viewing systems as necessarily  incomplete; 
in Gravity's Rainbow, the incompleteness theorem works as a metaphor to explain social 
structures and the operations of power.  For Pynchon, Gödel's theorem represents the possibility 
of escape from a system of power that cannot control everything.  At the same time, he evokes 
Gödel's theorem as a metaphor for the idea that there is always knowledge that is outside of one's 
understanding.  The closed system of the encyclopedia is not enough in itself and must be 
accounted for by extra-textual reality.  Gödel's theorem is connected to paranoia because both 
promote the potential to think outside of systems and beyond perceived authority. 
 Pynchon offers another way around the totalizing discourse of the Enlightenment through 
a device that mimics the system of cross-references in modern encyclopedias.  Throughout 
Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon uses the interconnection of people and events as a way to call 
attention to the ways in which these connections can seem indeterminate, or random, but may 
actually have a design behind them.  Although Pynchon is careful never to reveal whether or not 
there is an actual design, these interconnections strongly suggest that there may be some shaping 
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 It is important to note that Hofstadter warns against the limitations of transposing Gödel's theorem into other 
disciplines.  He writes, “If one uses Gödel's Theorem as a metaphor, as a source of inspiration, rather than trying 
to translate it literally into the language of [another] discipline, then perhaps it can suggest new truths in . . . 
other areas.  But it is unjustifiable to translate it directly into a statement of another discipline and take that as 
equally valid” (696).  It seems clear that Pynchon invokes Gödel's theorem in just this metaphorical spirit.  In 
much the same way, Pynchon makes metaphorical use of paranoia, as I shall make clear in the next section. 
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influence, however ephemeral.  By drawing connections between disparate elements, sometimes 
separated by hundreds of pages of text, Pynchon illustrates either the prevalence of patterns or 
the propensity for humans to divine patterns that are not present.  The web of interconnections, 
referred to as an aspect of paranoia throughout the novel, parallels a figure that is common in 
today's encyclopedia: the cross-reference.  Drawing connections based upon associations and 
partially obscured motivations mirrors precisely the paranoid perspective as it is constructed in 
Gravity's Rainbow.  The map behind Slothrop's desk that marks his “conquests” and also 
happens to match the rocket strikes is certainly suggestive of connections that are interpreted 
differently by different characters in the book.  The implied connection between the rocket and 
Slothrop's penis. not Slothrop and the strikes, is a secondary association to the more direct 
connection that Pavlovian Ned Pointsman attempts to make.   
 However, the associations are often even more abstracted in Gravity's Rainbow and the 
interpretations are frequently left to the reader rather than being defined in the text.  That the 
associations are left to interpretation and are not made in the same formal way that cross-
references are in the encyclopedia portends two things: first, the system of cross-references in 
Gravity's Rainbow is necessarily virtual and, second, the connections between elements is, itself, 
paranoid in nature.  The cross-references in Gravity's Rainbow are virtual because they are not 
stated literally but left to inference by the reader, by which I mean that although Pynchon 
strongly suggests connections, these connections are never made explicit.  Take for example the 
repetition of figures that recurs throughout the novel: the benzene ring, the parabola, tumescence, 
the cross-roads.  Each of these figures is repeated over and over with a slightly different meaning 
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each time.  One of Pynchon's prime narrative devices is to slowly accrue meaning over the 
course of the novel so that terms like “paranoia” and “entropy” come to mean many different 
things by its end.  I argue, also, that the system of virtual cross-reference in Gravity's Rainbow is 
paranoid because, as I will show below, the connections are evocative of a particular kind of 
interpretive stance that relies upon a conception of the real within the novel that transcends 
typical narrative hermeneutics to encourage an extra-textual conception of the real that also 
values making connections that are outside of the authoritative discourse. 
  Pynchon's use of paranoia allows characters and the reader to make associative 
connections  that mirror associative thought at the same time that it requires that non-
systematized mode of thinking. Throughout Gravity's Rainbow there is an underlying assumption 
that paranoia is inevitable and potentially good.  Characters adopt paranoid ways of relating to 
the world, often using the term to mean “cautious.”  For example, after hijacking a Red Cross 
truck with Seaman Bodine, Slothtop imagines that the people chasing them are American GIs in 
the middle of the British sector.  Bodine guesses that their pursuers are just Shore Patrol and 
admonishes Slothrop not to “get any more paranoid than we have to. . . .” (601; Pynchon's 
emphasis and ellipses).  Bodine's language encourages the reader to regard the paranoia that they 
do have with a degree of legitimacy and that, in moderation, paranoia is a positive attribute.  The 
men are being chased, after all.  Bodine then tells Slothrop that “Everything is some kind of plot, 
man” (603; Pynchon's emphasis).  Through Bodine and other characters, Pynchon reclaims 
paranoia as a way to break free from authoritative discourse.   
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 Paranoia is a vital aspect of the anarchistic encyclopedia because it does encourage this 
new way of looking at the world.  Characters experience their interactions with institutions of 
power in a new, and more suspicious, light.  Slothrop's moments with Bodine in the zone are 
significant to his understanding of paranoia because it is with Bodine that he first sees 
confirmation that “the Zone can sustain many other plots besides those polarized upon himself” 
(603).  Paranoia's focus on the ego as a pole around which plots rotate must now be broken up at 
the realization that each individual may also be a pole around which plots focus.  The 
overlapping of plots must magnify paranoia at the same time that it solidifies the paranoid vision.  
Paranoia magnifies because those plots which had been considered “polarized” around a 
particular individual are actually elements of a matrix of plots.  This matrix of plots disrupts the 
orderly “Them” and “We” binary and forces the paranoid Slothrop to also accept that there is a 
range of systems to which one may belong.  There are shades of “Them-ness” which decenters 
the power of the plot.  The paranoid vision is solidified from the perspective of the individual 
once the individual recognizes that others may also possess a paranoid vision.  This recognition 
to some degree legitimates the paranoia, permits the individual – once isolated and hounded – a 
new solidarity amongst paranoids.  The solidarity felt amongst paranoids in the new “We” 
system serves to fragment the power that “They” possess.  Furthermore, as Linda Fisher argues, 
the paranoid distrust of official narratives reclaims the self as authority by seeking out the “true” 
meaning behind that official discourse (107-9).
68
 
                                                 
68
 See Fisher, “Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Postmodern Paranoia: Psychologies of Interpretation” for more on 
this subject. 
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 Although paranoid discourse seems to produce a new solidarity, it is one that is based in 
shared knowledge rather than in a true camaraderie.  Pynchon's project is to demonstrate the 
individual's ability to know outside of authoritative discourse, but this does not necessarily imply 
bonds of affiliation between individuals.  The irony of Pynchon's paranoia is that it is 
disintegrative at the same time that it gives individuals a sense of solidarity.  In fact, it is 
predicated on a need for integration.  Paranoia is an individual's access to a world that makes 
sense, independent of community. 
 Paranoia is necessary as a response to a new conception of power.  Pynchon both 
confirms and denies the efficacy of world-wide conspiracies by subjecting them to paranoid 
logic.  Because, from the perspective of authoritative discourse, paranoid discourse cannot be 
legitimate, it becomes impossible to ever confirm conspiracies.  Pynchon's recuperation of 
paranoia, however, redirects the energy of paranoia to examine the interactions between 
individuals rather than those of individuals to organizations.  In order to demonstrate the varying 
aspects of paranoia, Pynchon refers to its many manifestations, including “operational paranoia,” 
“office paranoia,” “early paranoia,” “anti-paranoia,” and “creative paranoia.”69  These different 
versions of paranoia largely depend upon context to derive their meaning.  For example, 
operational paranoia is a concept described by Tantivy Mucker-Maffick that is useful on combat.  
The individual pretends that rockets are aimed at him specifically, theoretically gaining the 
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 Charles Hohmann argues that “operational paranoia” is one of the characters' responses to primal anxieties, the 
other response being “mindless pleasure.”  For Hohmann, operational paranoia spreads and becomes mass 
paranoia, which is then routinized and may then become creative paranoia.  Hohmann further notes that “We” 
systems fight “Them” by “playing 'Their' game without having recourse to 'Their' systematization” and that 
“We” systems “will not interlock in a rational way such as 'They-systems' do” (97).   
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advantage of preparedness.  Office paranoia is less defined and refers to attitudes adopted in an 
office setting regarding the belief that others may be gossiping about one.   
 While Pynchon makes repeated reference to these aspects of paranoia, it is the series of 
“Proverbs for Paranoids” that draw the most attention.  The five proverbs, scattered through 
Book 2: “Un Perm' au Casino Hermann Goering,” vary between observations on the nature of 
the relationship between the paranoid individual and Them and warnings that can also double as 
imperatives.
70
  By offering these proverbs as a sort of practical guide for the paranoid, Pynchon 
works to recuperate the term, to redefine paranoia as a positive, and even necessary trait for 
survival.  It is obvious, based upon the examples from the text and from the Proverbs for 
Paranoids, that the term “paranoia” itself attempts to collapse many different concepts into a 
single word.  The multiple meanings of the word mirror the paranoid vision by multiplying 
meaning and leaving it to the readers to discern which meaning is the proper one, or if there is a 
proper meaning. 
 The general consensus in the criticism concerning paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow is that 
paranoia provides an alternate vision of the world that is supplemental or preferable to the 
normal view of things.  Paranoia in this sense is not pathological and, particularly from a 
postmodern perspective, may be a legitimate corrective to a seemingly fractured world.  
Paranoia, then, is not an individual condition but a cultural one – a reaction against the 
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 The Proverbs for Paranoids include:  
  1)  “You may never get to touch the Master, but you can tickle his creatures” (237); 
  2) “The innocence of the creatures is in inverse proportion to the immorality of the Master” (241);  
  3)  “If they can get you asking the wrong questions, they don't have to worry about answers” (251);  
  4)  “You hide, they seek” (262); and “Paranoids are not paranoids [. . .] because they're paranoid, but 
because they keep putting themselves, fucking idiots, deliberately into paranoid situations” (292). 
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dehumanizing aspects of contemporary, and particularly capitalist, culture.  This model of 
paranoia has its roots in Richard Hofstadter's landmark study “The Paranoid Style in American 
Politics.”  This essay, which spawned a broad reconsideration  of paranoia as a cultural 
phenomenon, defines paranoia along both political and cultural axes as a way to describe an 
American attitude toward the Communist other.  This method of viewing the other shares affinity 
with Freudian paranoia in that both externalize insecurities and project them onto an other.
71
 
 Critics of paranoia in Pynchon's fiction take two broad approaches: those who root 
paranoia in a longer cultural or psychological tradition and those who seek to refigure Pynchon's 
model of paranoia within the postmodern tradition.  Those of the former tend to argue that 
Pynchon's paranoia is primarily an ontological concern that then throws the reader into a position 
of questioning reality and paranoia, as well.  The latter tend to argue that Pynchon's paranoia is 
primarily a hermeneutic concern and, in turn, tend to interpret the novel as either neutral or 
hopeful.   
 Critics who perceive paranoia as ontological include Scott Sanders and Leo Bersani.  
This paranoia is primarily ontological in character because these critics argue that the paranoia of 
the novel infects the reader as well, making an ontological leap from the fiction of the novel to 
the flesh-and-blood world of the reader.  Ontological paranoia creates an uncertainty of what is 
real and what is not: what is seen and what is unseen.
72
  For example, Sanders argues that readers 
and characters “dance on the same ground” because the readers “rarely know much more than 
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 Amy J. Elias's “Paranoia, Theology, and Inductive Style” provides essential reading on the origins of postmodern 
paranoia and contains a concise listing of the characteristics of Hofstadter's “paranoid style.”  
72
 Sanders writes, “the paranoid intuition is, then, one of an invisible interconnectedness” (102).  Sanders' concern 
with interconnection  is common in the criticism about paranoia, as it is one of the tropes that Pynchon uses 
throughout the novel.   
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the characters, themselves, and they do not know much; and the narrator, if he knows more, 
rarely tells” (142).73  This narrative uncertainty, Sanders argues, replicates in the reader a sense 
of suspicion that mirrors the paranoia of the characters in the novel.  Bersani similarly argues that 
narrative uncertainty leads the reader to question whether or not Sothrop really exists in the 
novel.
74
  Bersani focuses on the difference between what is real and what is visible, arguing that 
paranoia is, essentially, a doubling of orders of existence.  The visible is an illusion over the 
invisible, which represents the connections that the paranoid person intuits behind the veil of the 
visible.  Sanders and Bersani both extend suspicion or paranoia onto the reader, but this seems to 
alter the nature of the paranoia from ontological to hermeneutic.  While the reader may question 
the reliability of the narrative or question its historical accuracy, the reader is not thrown into the 
same sort of existential crisis that characterizes the paranoia that the two discuss.   
 The lure of reading Pynchon's paranoia as an ontological question is that it allows a way 
of interpreting Slothrop's disintegration at the end of the novel, which is a difficult question to 
answer and one subject to critical disagreement.  For Bersani, Slothrop was never a character in 
the sense that we typically understand the concept, but a position, a concept.  A concept that 
disintegrates under its own illogic poses no metaphysical questions but does depend on a 
particular reading of Slothrop that is difficult to square with the rest of the novel.  Slothrop, after 
all, has a family and history in America. I contrast critics who approach paranoia primarily 
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 In “Pynchon's Paranoid History,” Sanders writes, “Paranoia offers the ideally suited hypothesis that the world is 
organized into a conspiracy, governed by shadowy figures whose powers approach omniscience and 
omnipotence, and whose manipulations of history may be detected in every chance gesture of their servants” 
(139-40). 
74
 See Leo Bersani, “Paranoia and Literature.”  Bersani extends this ontological uncertainty to the reader who, he 
writes, is forced to contend with the question: “What is Gravity's Rainbow?” (107). 
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as an ontological concern with those who approach it primarily as a hermeneutic concern 
because, as I stated above, those of the latter camp tend to judge Pynchon's texts in the light of 
various postmodern theorists, Fredric Jameson chief among them.  While not all of the critics of 
hermeneutic paranoia refer to Jameson's concepts of the postmodern sublime or cognitive 
mapping, they all do interpret paranoia as a distinct way of knowing the world that affects the 
individual's interactions with that world.  This approach differs from those critics mentioned 
above who consider paranoia an ontological concern because hermeneutic paranoia may produce 
uncertainty and suspicion in the mind of the paranoid individual, but it will not cause the 
existential anxiety that Bersani or Sanders describe as part of the novel.   
 Linda Fisher's “Hermeneutics of Suspicion and Postmodern Paranoia,” which does not 
directly reference Pynchon, is a valuable resource for understanding the interpretations that many 
of the critics of hermeneutic paranoia employ.  Fisher connects postmodern paranoia first with a 
“hermeneutics of suspicion,” theorized by Paul Riceour, and then to a longer tradition of what 
she calls “critique of suspicion.”  Critiques of suspicion, Fisher argues, is a suspicion of 
“official” narratives, fear of a loss of control, and fear of a loss of agency (107-8).  Fisher 
identifies these concerns with the postmodern suspicion of “anything that suggests authoritative, 
normative, totalizing, or essentialist tendencies” (108), arguing that both the paranoid and the 
postmodern critic claim the self as authority.  The importance of Fisher's claim is that it refocuses 
attention on the individual, in this case the paranoid, in a way that Pynchon's fiction does as well.   
 Mark Siegel offers the first full-length monograph on Pynchon and paranoia in his 
Pynchon: Creative Paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow.  Adopting the term “creative paranoia” from 
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Pynchon, Siegel writes that Gravity's Rainbow, “despite its frequent grimness . . . [is] not a novel 
of despair, but one of possibility” (4).  For Siegel, paranoia is an alternative reparative logic that 
can reassemble the fragmentary elements of a postmodern world.  The chaos of the Zone is the 
remains of a wrecked past from which a new culture can be born.  Siegel's book marks an 
important moment in criticism of Gravity's Rainbow in recognizing this positive aspect of 
paranoia.
75
  Siegel agrees with the cultural aspects of paranoia that Sanders develops, claiming 
that Gravity's Rainbow examines current cultural problems and their sources – always from 
within the confines of historical context – and that Pynchon is interested in the cultural reality 
around the characters, not in their mental processes (7-21).  Siegel's assertion that the destruction 
of the war in the Zone is necessary to clear room for a new culture recalls the anarchist dictum to 
“build a new society in the shell of the old.” 
 Four critics explain paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow using concepts drawn from the works 
of Fredric Jameson.  Elaine Safer's “Dreams and Nightmares: 'High-Tech Paranoia' and the 
Jamesonian Sublime–An Approach to Thomas Pynchon's Postmodernism” and Bran Nicol's 
“Reading Paranoia: Paranoia, Epistemophilia and the Postmodern Crisis of Interpretation” both 
refer to a new conception of the sublime that Jameson theorizes in Postmodernism and variously 
terms “postmodern or technological sublime” and “high-tech paranoia” (Jameson 37, 38).76   
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 Charles Hohmann also recognizes the potentially “positive” aspect of paranoia, see Hohmann (49-56). 
76
 Briefly stated, postmodern sublime continues the tradition of Edmund Burke, Emmanuel Kant, and others in 
conjunction with a three-stage model of capitalism in which, Jameson argues, we live in the third, or “late” stage 
that is characterized by postmodernism.  Jameson argues that postmodernist texts give the reader a sense of the 
technological sublime by “tap[ping] the networks of the reproductive process” which, in turn, “offer[s] some 
privileged representational shorthand for grasping a network of power and control even more difficult for our 
minds and imaginations to grasp: the whole new decentered global network of the third stage of capital itself” 
(37, 37-8).  What Jameson means by this is that an individual cannot comprehend the complex totality of the 
operations of power on a global scale but can only experience a sense of the interconnection.  This sense, 
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 Elaine Safer approaches Pynchon's fiction in a broad sense, arguing that the arc of 
Pynchon's work can most adequately be explained via “'high-tech paranoia' and its relation to the 
sublime” (Safer 280).  Safer's essay covers each of Pynchon's novels through Vineland, arguing 
that the characters'  “desire for understanding and unity in a disordered universe leads to absurd 
quests” (285).  The framework of her argument established, Safer proceeds to detail the quests of 
each of the novels to demonstrate high-tech paranoia's ability to explain the particular nature of 
Pynchon's postmodernism.  Nicol's approach differs slightly form Safer's in appeal to historical 
argument and, particularly, his interest in the movement from the modern to the postmodern.  
Nicol explores the overlap between paranoia and postmodern ‘technological persecution,’ 
arguing for the Lacanian view that paranoia is a crisis of interpretation.  Nicol attributes this 
crisis to “the epistemic shift from modernism to postmodernism” that parallels a Jamesonian 
crisis of representation characterized in the postmodern condition.  Nicol tracks the similarities 
between the postmodern condition and paranoia, pointing to postmodernism as an 
epistemological shift during which the Enlightenment Project ended.  For both Safer and Nicol, 
high-tech paranoia provides an alternate way of viewing the world.  It is a way of knowing that 
encourages what Amy J. Elias calls the inductive style of rationality.
77
 
 Using a different concept from Jameson's work, Steven Best and Jon Simons take up 
opposing arguments concerning the use of cognitive mapping as a way to understand paranoia in 
                                                                                                                                                             
because it can only be intuited, may result in “high-tech paranoia,” which forces the individual to attempt to 
make connections in the absence of empirical evidence.   
77
 Amy J. Elias makes the compelling argument that many theories of paranoia, and particularly postmodern 
theories, are incomplete because they do not properly account for the logical similarities with mystical theology 
in “Paranoia, Theology, and Inductive Style.”  Elias argues that postmodern theories of paranoia focus on the 
hermeneutics of paranoia but not on the logical underpinnings necessary to reaching paranoid conclusions.  Both 
paranoia and mystical theology “generalize about basic assumptions about the world”  (283). 
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Gravity's Rainbow.  Cognitive mapping is closely related to the postmodern sublime and high-
tech paranoia because it is a method to combat the unknowability of late capitalism.
78
  As 
opposed to the critics of ontological paranoia, Best reads Gravity's Rainbow as an optimistic text 
that offers a method for understanding late-capitalism.  Best's approach also differs from the 
ontological approach because he draws distinctions between kinds of paranoia, arguing that 
creative paranoia is not itself cognitive mapping but is “only a sensibility or pathos that guides 
and shapes cognitive mapping” (72).  The division of paranoia into different aspect falls in line 
with Pynchon's own differing characterizations of paranoia and permits a more nuanced reading 
of the role of paranoia in the text.   
 Jon Simons disagrees with Best's argument about cognitive mapping, taking up the 
position that a Jamesonian interpretation of Pynchon is inappropriate and calls cognitive 
mapping “deeply problematic” (207).  Simons argues that Jameson's cognitive mapping works 
against the very political project it is meant to progress because the “very possibility of total and 
untranscendable cognition of the world understood as a single system . . . unwittingly induces 
political helplessness” when the project fails (207).  Additionally, Simons provides a different 
interpretation of Slothrop's disintegration from the one Bersani gave.  That is, Slothrop's 
disintegration is not a result of an ontological paranoia but of anti-paranoia, the idea that nothing 
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 Jameson argues in “Cognitive Mapping,” that space and the object mutated in a way that the subject did not, 
which created a disjunction in understanding that he would later term a crisis of representation.  The “decentered 
global network of the third stage of capital itself” comprises a hyperspace, or totality of late capitalism, that 
requires a new method of navigation.  Cognitive mapping is this new method of mapping hyperspace.  Best 
argues that Gravity's Rainbow is a prime example of cognitive mapping that, “attempts to describe a crucial 
turning point in modern Western history, the transition to a new multinational, postmodern terrain of late-
capitalism that takes shape after the second World War” (62). 
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is connected to anything.  Ultimately, Simons argues that Jameson's postmodern sublime is, 
itself, paranoid and therefore inadequate to diagnosing paranoia.   
 What these four critics who use Jameson's theories to access (or not) Pynchon's work 
demonstrate is the importance of interpretation as the central aspect of paranoia that is in line 
with traditional, psychoanalytic conceptions of paranoia.  Each of these authors perceives 
paranoia as a hermeneutic exercise that permits the subject to read the existing world radically 
differently from others.  Secondly, paranoia comprises a particular hermeneutic approach that, as 
Linda Fisher argues, retains a suspicion of authority and seeks to re-inscribe the self as an 
authority.  One final critic, George B. Moore, also argues for the unifying vision of paranoia in  
“Paranoia and the Aesthetics of Chaos in Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow.”  Moore's 
approach to paranoia is similar to the four just discussed in his central thesis, which argues that, 
“Pynchon deconstructs the notion of science as absolute authority by showing how it reduces 
human experience to unresolvable contradiction” (204).79   
 Based upon my reading of Gravity's Rainbow and the attendant criticism, it is clear that 
“paranoia” means many different things and, as noted at the beginning of this section, has many 
different metaphorical meanings beyond critics' specific interpretations.  As Charles Hohmann 
recognizes in his structural study of Gravity's Rainbow, there are positive and negative paranoias 
– positions that differ based upon the belief that a conspiracy either harms or benefits the 
                                                 
79
 Moore does not perceive technology in the same way that Jameson does but approaches science in a much 
less suspicious way.  Instead of the technological sublime, Moore perceives science as an alternative discourse in 
itself, as one of many ways of perceiving the world.  It is this multiplied perspective – one may see the world 
politically, economically, scientifically, and so on – that comprises paranoia for Moore.  Moore writes, “If paranoia 
is an awareness of interconnectedness, it is not restricted to verifiable phenomena, but manifests itself in conscious 
and unconscious associations as well as on the level of empirical phenomena” (208). 
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individual.  In addition to the positive or negative attributes of paranoia, there is also an inward 
and outward trajectory to paranoia – a paranoia that is solipsistic in nature, or one that is 
integrative in nature. 
 There is a dual-trajectory to Pynchon's treatment of paranoia in Gravity's Rainbow that 
encapsulates the divergent tendencies of the broader logic of the novel.  Paranoia tends to either 
humanize or mystify, again depending on the context in which it is used.  The use of the 
capitalized pronoun “They” is effectively sinister because it is an intuited organization without 
identity and without a name.  The sheer unidentifiablility of Them provides adequate space for 
any fearful paranoid to project his/her worst fears onto Them.  This mystification of power is 
countered by a humanization of power as well.  The Counterforce, a “We system,” combats 
Them by recognizing the power of individual connections and the potential for collective action.   
 For Pynchon, the concept of paranoia is bound deeply with context: the particular 
meaning of paranoia shifts throughout the novel, carrying a different meaning when applied to 
different characters or different circumstances.  Because the connotations and even definition of 
the word shifts so consistently throughout the novel, varying interpretations of the importance of 
paranoia are possible.  A sharp delineation of these shifts is required in order to understand the 
complexity of the concept and its centrality to the anarchistic work of Thomas Pynchon.   
 Finally, the reader must consider whether or not such paranoia is justified.  Slothrop is, 
indeed, sought after by Pointsman, Marvy, and a number of other characters throughout the 
novel.  Marvy is even castrated because he is mistaken for Slothrop, which demonstrates the real 
bodily danger that Slothrop was in.  Slothrop's fears are justified, but the reader is left to wonder 
 119 
whether paranoia can even be legitimated.  The reality of Slothrop's danger is apparent 
throughout the third Book, “In the Zone,” but this danger is always revealed through narration of 
events that follow Slothrop's movements.  In the second episode of “The Counterforce,” the 
fourth and final Book of the novel, the danger Slothrop faces is confirmed by Roger Mexico.  In 
discussion with Jessica Swanlake, Mexico expresses his concern for the conflict that continues 
despite the official end of the war: 
“I just can't leave the poor twit out there, can I?  They're trying to destroy him--” 
But, “Roger,” she'd smile, “it's spring.  We're at peace.” 
“No, we're not.  It's another bit of propaganda.  Something the P.W.E. planted.” (627-8) 
Mexico acknowledges that the conspiracy to destroy Slothrop remains in place.  The clear 
implication of this is that, as Slothrop and others have suspected throughout the novel, the war 
itself was never the central conflict.  A separate, veiled purpose was always in play behind the 
rhetoric of nationalism and the fight against fascism.  However, it is also significant that Mexico 
must convince Jessica that the end of the war was not also the end of aggression.  Mexico's 
perspective is limited in the sense that, because it runs counter to the official ending of the war, 
he must perpetually fight an uphill battle against the dominant discourse that claims that 
hostilities have ended: 
There's something still on, don't call it a “war” if it makes you nervous, maybe the death 
rate's gone down a point or two, beer in cans is back at last and there were a lot of people 
in Trafalgar Square one night not so long ago . . . but Their enterprise goes on. (628; 
Pynchon's emphasis and ellipsis) 
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The episode continues on to provide free-indirect discourse of Jessica who thinks that Mexico 
cares more about Slothrop than about herself (629).  Despondent, Mexico then learns that 
Slothrop had been under surveillance since before the war, confirming what the reader has 
known for hundreds of pages (631).  At this point, however, the confirmation seems gratuitous – 
more of a formality than a narrative revelation – the narrator appears to reflect this position, 
offering “IG Farben, eh?” (631).  The narrative discourse here reflects the readers confusion at 
the exact nature of the plot: 
Mr. Pointsman has been chumming, almost exclusively these days, with upper echelon 
ICI.  ICI has cartel arrangements with Farben.  The bastard.  Why, he must have known 
about Slothrop all along.  The Jamf business was only a front for . . . well say what the 
hell is going on here?” (631; Pynchon's emphasis and ellipsis) 
The narrator's inability to follow the lines of the conspiratorial plot mimics the reader's inability 
to follow the narrative plot.  Pynchon likewise mimics the paranoid vision by keeping the 
answers to questions just beyond the reach of the reader.  The reader senses that the final answer 
will lie in the next twist, and narrative convention would encourage this view, but the answer 
never arrives, just more evidence.
80
 Mexico's rational mind bucks at the paranoid logic that he 
delves into in his attempt to discover the truth.   
 Mexico's growing frustration at the loops that paranoid logic runs him through wears 
away at his finely tuned statistical mind.  He lapses back into a sort of binary thinking at the 
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 Immediately following these not-quite revelations, Mexico tries to reason out how far Pointsman's influence 
extends, considering him “worse than old Pudding” (631).  However, even once Mexico realizes that his order 
have, indeed, come through Pointsman this only presents more questions than it answers.  Pointsman is just one 
more cog.  This piece of evidence simply points to other parts of the conspiracy.  It is the instability of paranoia 
that leads to Mexico's breakdown and his urination on his former colleagues in PISCES (636).  
 121 
encouragement of Pirate Prentice.  After informing Mexico that “For every They there ought to 
be a We,” Prentice informs Mexico that “Creative paranoia means developing at least as 
thorough a We-system as a They-system—” (638).  The logic of We and They-systems and 
creative paranoia takes on aspects of Pointsman's binary logic from early in the novel, but with 
an important difference.  Mexico comes to learn that he cannot puzzle out the intricacies of the 
systems because he treats them as symmetrical whereas he needs to recognize that they are 
opposed in more than ideology.  Osbie Feel screams at Mexico that “They're the rational ones.  
We piss on Their rational arrangements” (639; Pynchon's emphasis).   In rejecting the rationality 
of Them, the Counterforce escapes the pitfalls of the linear thinking that constrains Them.  
Irrationality and bodily protest establish We as more than a binary counterpart to Them, though, 
in true irrational fashion, what this “more than” is remains inexpressible.   
 In the course of this revelation, Prentice also tells Mexico about the concept of 
“delusional systems” developed by “They and Their hired psychiatrists” (638).  “'Delusions' are 
always officially defined,” Prentice tells Mexico.  What this means is that those in authority (or 
in the pay of those in authority) define what is delusional and, therefore, are in a position to deny 
the legitimacy paranoid logic as “delusional.”  Paranoid discourse may be so pathological that a 
paranoid suspicion proved true may no longer be recognized as paranoid.  The reader is left to 
question whether in the face of evidence to the contrary the struggle, Their enterprise, can still be 
said to continue if the mass of the population is unaware of it happening at all.  Gravity's 
Rainbow steadfastly refuses to permit this co-optation of paranoia.  As in the episode cited 
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above, the paranoid remains resolutely paranoid.  In other words, the authoritative discourse is 
unable to absorb the paranoid and make it conform. 
 Whether the paranoid perspective is correct or not is irrelevant to the paranoid 
perspective because the open potential to think outside of, and critically about, hierarchical 
systems is most important to the paranoid perspective.  That there may be some outside means of 
control that is beyond the paranoid's ability to confirm or deny is the insight of paranoia.  Later 
in the same subsection this analysis is confirmed: “What if there is no Vacuum?  Or if there is—
what if They're using it on you?  What if They find it convenient to preach an island surrounded 
by a void?  Not just the Earth in space, but your own individual life in time?  What if it's in Their 
interest to have you believing that?” (697; Pynchon's emphasis).  It is also at this line that the 
danger of the paranoid vision becomes most obvious: it may be impossible to distinguish 
between what one really thinks and what others want one to think.   
 For Pynchon, and for the anarchistic encyclopedia, the self-critical discourse of paranoid 
logic is central because it returns to the question of authoritative discourse and heterology.  
Paranoid discourse may never have a true place at the table and it may go unnoticed by a mass 
populace, but as a heterological discourse it receives at least some form of recognition.  This 
slight recognition is also a part of its allure.  Pynchon appeals to the counterculture and to a 
rebellious nature in limiting such non-authoritative knowledge to select individuals who take the 
time to see “outside” of what they may consider to be others' constrained perspectives.  Here 
again, Pynchon plays with system-breaking in the way that an “insider” or specialized 
knowledge can be gained by those “outside” of the system.  The perspective of the outsider, or of 
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one on the inside who is willing to adopt a self-reflective stance, permits for a different vision.  
The different vision may be as much a blessing as a curse in the end because those in the know 
must continue to fight a war that most believe to be over. 
 
 
 
3.5 Encyclopedic Pedagogy: Vertical vs Horizontal Knowledge Transmission 
 
 The third major difference between the traditional encyclopedic novel and the anarchistic 
encyclopedic novel is a shift in pedagogical methodology.  In the introduction, I discussed the 
difference between pedagogical and dialogical encyclopedias.  The pedagogical seeks simply to 
instruct  by providing a course of study while the dialogical model is based upon the idea of 
generations of scholars communicating with future scholars.  Although these different models 
differ in their intentions, they both operate from the top down, or use a vertical method of 
knowledge transmission.  This keeps the reader/student in an inferior position as one who does 
not know.  The anarchistic encyclopedic novel attempts to correct de facto hierarchy by using a 
horizontal method of knowledge transmission.  Horizontal knowledge transmission is peers 
teaching peers and, even more radically, one teaching another lessons that he, himself does not 
know.   
 In the previous two sections I have argued that the anarchistic encyclopedia engages in 
associational thinking and is an open form, both features meant to correct limitations of the 
traditional encyclopedia.  This section picks up this argument to extend from the logical and 
political to engage in what is the true purpose of the encyclopedia: pedagogy.  In this section, I 
argue that the anarchistic encyclopedic novel adopts a radical method of pedagogy that is 
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dialogic but is emancipated because it operates on knowledge transmission between peers.  To 
make this argument, I will refer to the universal teaching method that Jacques Rancière describes 
in his 1987 work The Ignorant Schoolmaster.   
 Rancière argues that particular knowledge is not necessary to teach another and goes so 
far as to suggest that it is possible to teach another what one does not know by making reference 
to what one does know.  In this work, Rancière retells the story of Joseph Jacotot, a French 
teacher who found himself appointed to a position to teach students with whom he did not share 
a common language.  While the book appears to deal with the pedagogical necessity of 
explication in the classroom, it is also a meditation on equality between students and teachers – 
and by extension, equality between the intellectual and “poor” classes.  Rancière argues that the 
method of teaching that depends upon a teacher imparting wisdom to students is flawed because 
it reinforces the hierarchical power roles in the classroom.  Rancière observes that “Intellectual 
emancipation was the overturning of the old hierarchy attached to instruction's privilege” (125).81  
Instead, Rancière proposes a pedagogical model based upon Jacotot’s method of universal 
teaching which posits that it is possible to teach something that one does not know.
82
  The 
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 Rancière continues: “instruction had been the monopoly of the managing classes justifying their hegemony, with 
the well-known consequence that an educated child of the people no longer wanted his parents' life.  The social 
logic of the system had to be overturned.  From now on instruction would no longer be a privilege; rather the 
lack of instruction would be an incapacity” (125, Rancière's emphasis). 
82
  Rancière suggests the following proposition: 
 Consider, for example, a book in the have of a student.  The book is made up of a series of reasonings 
designed to make a student understand some material.  But now the schoolmaster opens his mouth to 
explain the book.  He makes a series of reasonings in order to explain the series of reasonings that 
constitute the book.  But why should the book need such help?  Instead of paying for an explicator, couldn’t 
a father simply five the book to his sone and the child understand directly the reasonings of the book?  And 
if he doesn’t understand them, why would he be any more likely to understand the reasonings that would 
explain to him what he hasn’t understood?  Are those reasonings of a different nature?  And if so, wouldn’t 
it be necessary to explain the way in which to understand them?   So the logic of explication calls for the 
principle of a regression ad infinitum . . . (The Ignorant Schoolmaster 4). 
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implications of this work is that the disruption of the polarized flow of information from font to 
receptacle disrupts the hierarchical power relationship between the student and the teacher.   
 Rancière argues that the explication model of pedagogy – which he calls “the pedagogical 
myth” because it is the teacher who depends upon the students and not the other way around – 
splits intelligence into two: a superior intelligence possessed by the teacher and an inferior one 
possessed by the students who need the guidance of the teacher.  Thus, the teacher has an interest 
in convincing the students that they cannot learn on their own and that they must perpetually be 
led by another with superior intelligence to guide them.  The example of Jacotot disrupts this 
myth by showing that, with simple instruction, a student can learn for him or herself.  Rancière 
terms the process of a teacher reinforcing the student's “inferior” intellect as “enforced 
stultification” (7).   
 Somewhat counterintuitively, Rancière considers the Socratic method “a perfected form 
of stultification” because Socrates' questions direct the students' minds in a specific direction.  
This, Rancière argues, does not emancipate the student but makes the student depend upon the 
teacher for this subtle guidance.  True emancipated learning occurs when the master “has never 
made the voyage before him: the ignorant master” (30).  This point is crucial to understanding 
Slothrop's role at the end of Gravity's Rainbow because he becomes this ignorant master.  
Slothrop comes to only a partial understanding of the different mysteries in his life – the 
Imipolex G conspiracy of his infancy, the collusion of state and industry in the narrative present, 
and the identity and motivation of the frequent captors he must evade – and so comes to the 
teaching the subject of paranoia with the same knowledge as his students.   
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 The role of the ignorant schoolmaster is additionally attractive for Rancière because, as 
he writes: “there is no hierarchy in ignorance” (32).  This means that there is no superior/inferior 
relationship between student and teacher as there is in traditional, explicative pedagogy.  Rather, 
the student and teacher stand equal to one another and it is the will to learn here that is the active 
equality that I have discussed earlier in this chapter.  The act of learning, then, is a political and 
revolutionary act because it disrupts the propriety of the police order that dictates who may speak 
and who may not.  This also recalls William Slothrop's contention that he has as much right to 
preach as an ordained minister, for what is ministry but teaching?  To extend this thought, 
William also exposes the hypocrisy of pretending to know what God knows.  He, rightly, places 
himself among the ignorant because he recognizes the impossibility of knowing God's will on 
Earth.   
 Rancière frequently uses searching as a metaphor for emancipated learning.  He writes 
that the way that the ignorant master verifies the student's knowledge is “by verifying that he is 
always searching” (33).  For Rancière, the searcher will always find something, whether that 
something is what the searcher intended to find is another matter, “he finds something new to 
relate to the thing that he already knows” (33).  Thus, Slothrop's search for knowledge may not 
yield the truth that he desires to find but it does result in his eventual emancipation.  Over the 
course of the novel Slothrop perpetually questions his own history and, more importantly, the 
nature of the world.  His paranoia demonstrates, as the critics I mention above have noted, a 
desire to understand the world through an interpretation that makes sense to him rather than from 
an authoritative perspective.  Paranoia, then, becomes a method of learning and teaching, for as 
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Rancière notes, “To teach what one doesn't know is simply to ask questions about what one 
doesn't know” (30). 
 In Gravity's Rainbow, Slothrop is indeed an ignorant schoolmaster, because the topic that 
he teaches is one that he, himself, learns as he goes.  It is his own emancipation and it is the 
emancipation of the reader that Pynchon ultimately seeks to teach.  However, Pynchon must 
carefully avoid stultifying his audience by telling them what he wishes them to know.  
Emancipation depends upon a mutual recognition of intelligence: equality.  However, Pynchon 
complicates this by separating the schoolmaster from the student.  There is a metaphysical 
disconnect as the critics of ontological paranoia point out, but it is not in the way that they 
suppose.  The reader does not become paranoid in the manner of Slothrop but the ontological 
leap form character to flesh and blood reader does occur and this is the reason that Slothrop must 
disintegrate at the end of the novel.  Rancière writes that, “To emancipate someone else, one 
must be emancipated oneself.  One must know oneself to be a voyager of the mind, similar to all 
other voyagers: an intellectual subject participating in the power common to intellectual beings” 
(33).  Slothrop's exit from the text is presaged by Pynchon's reliance on Gödel's incompleteness 
theorem as a metaphor. 
 All of Rancière's argument on emancipatory pedagogy rests on his assumption of an 
equality of intelligence.  While this seems an unusual proposition, Rancière defines intelligence 
in such a way that it takes on a separate meaning from what would normally be considered 
“intelligence.”  The reason behind Rancière's disdain for the common understanding of 
“intelligence” is similar to the disdain that he has for a common understanding of “politics”: both 
 128 
imply a hierarchy and a proper order.  Just as he redefined politics to empty the concept of power 
inequality, he also redefines “intelligence” in such a way as to empty it of the necessity for a 
superior and inferior.  “Intelligence,” for Rancière, “is the power to make oneself understood 
through another's verification” (72-3).  Following this definition, intelligence is not a measure of 
one's capacity to reason or ability to learn, nor is it an abstract potential that one individual may 
fulfill to a greater extent than another.  Rather, intelligence requires a reflexiveness between 
individuals.  In order to properly engage in universal teaching, Slothrop must become the equal 
to the reader and this can only happen outside of the text.  The reader never knows what happens 
to Slothrop because his ultimate fate lies in his ability to bring emancipatory realizations to the 
reader.   
 Sltohrop's quest for knowledge and his role of ignorant schoolmaster highlights the need 
for equality between “teacher” and “student” because the reader only learns as he learns, though 
the lesson is different.  Rancière warns against the syllabi of progressives who do not adhere to 
the method of universal teaching but hope to explicate their revolutionary ideas: “They want to 
tear minds away from the old routine, from the control of priests and obscurantists of any kind.  
And for that, more rational explications and methods are necessary” (121).   But these 
explications serve not to educate, as the progressives intend, but to stultify: “The progressives [. . 
.] want to liberate minds and promote the abilities of the masses.  But what they propose is to 
perfect stultification by perfecting explications” (121).  The importance of this trap, this 
“progressives' circle,” as Rancière calls it, lies in the fact that, given these strictures to adhere to 
equality and to avoid stultifying explication, neither Pynchon nor Slothrop can explicate 
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disintegration and liberty.  Slothrop's disappearance from the novel and from his own materiality 
can serve to elevate him to a mythic status, which would be in keeping with the overall trend of 
the encyclopedic novel as I discussed in my introduction, but it also serves as an example of the 
universal teaching method in practice.  The observation of Slothrop sloughing identities and 
avoiding capture throughout the novel while on a quest of self-discovery and emancipation 
suggests the path to freedom that an individual reader might take.  But it is more than this: 
Rancière's philosophy, as I mentioned at the beginning of the previous section, draws the 
necessary connection between the individual and the structure, and it is Slothrop's continued 
resistance to hierarchical structures of power that provides the supreme learning experience for 
the reader.  Slothrop becomes the ignorant schoolmaster because he is unable to perceive the 
totality of his actions, because he is unable to control the effects that his actions have on the 
world.  The reader witnesses the effects of his actions and perceives the trouble that his actions 
cause for those who seek to do Slothrop harm.   
 Rancière neatly ties  equality with pedagogy at the end of The Ignorant Schoolmaster.  
The connection that he makes lies in the concept of active equality and the individual's ability to 
recognize for oneself what cannot be given: “Equality is not given, nor is it claimed; it is 
practiced, it is verified.  And proletarians couldn't verify it except by recognizing the equality of 
intelligence of their champions and their adversaries” (137).  Pynchon develops Gravity's 
Rainbow in such a way as to lay the potential for emancipation before the reader through the 
actions of Slothrop.  It is up to the individual to make good on that potential and to see it for the 
lesson that it may be.   
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 The anarchistic encyclopedic novel adopts this method of emancipated knowledge 
transmission that operates between equals.  This may partially account for the difficulty of 
Gravity's Rainbow: the lesson are not stated.  The anarchistic political perspective and the guide 
toward associational thinking are never outlined in the text for the reader to simply absorb.  That 
is, Gravity's Rainbow does not explicate.  By allowing the reader to come to realize the power of 
the voice in creating equality through Slothrop, Gravity's Rainbow succeeds in conveying 
important knowledge while also demonstrating how that knowledge can be applied. 
 
3.6 Conclusion 
 The contributions that Gravity's Rainbow has made to the encyclopedic novel tradition 
are difficult to overstate.  The novel disrupts Enlightenment ideals of progress and systems-
building and attempts to replace a broad democratic political drive with an individualistic, 
anarchistic politics of emancipation.  But at the same time, Pynchon seems bent on retaining 
portions of the old idealism.  Jean-Francois Lyotard argues that, in a postmodern era, knowledge 
acquires an exchange value – that it ceases to be an end in itself (The Postmodern Condition 15-
6).  A statement such as this would likely perplex a thinker such as Diderot who saw a different 
use-value for knowledge – namely human progress.  But in the text of Gravity's Rainbow,  
knowledge is at risk, it is at the cusp of being co-opted by the multi-national corporations that 
Lyotard specifically warns against.   
 Gravity's Rainbow proposes a model of the encyclopedia that retains the essential 
elements of the Enlightenment encyclopedia, yet alters them to stave off the ill-effects of a 
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postmodern, information-intensive world.  Lyotard predicts, “Data banks are the Encyclopedia of 
tomorrow.  They transcend the capacity of each of their users.  They are “nature” for postmodern 
man” (51).  Calling data banks “encyclopedias” degrades the notion of knowledge to a salable 
commodity.  Pynchon shows us, through Slothrop, that there is escape, or at least refuge, if we 
are willing to throw off the artificial limitations of hierarchical systems and claim power, 
equality, and knowledge for ourselves. 
 In case it seems I paint too bright a picture, Pynchon's work is pessimistic.  The option 
for escape comes at the cost of personal disintegration.  Slothrop's lessons come as a result of 
great hardship for him and it is unclear whether he learns the lessons himself or if he is just a 
conduit for the reader to learn.  Freedom, Pynchon wants us to know, is costly.  In this way, 
Gravity's Rainbow demonstrates what Frye predicts as a deepening irony as literature displaces 
from the mythic.  Frye writes that the ironic protagonist will be outside of his society and, thus, 
be able to critique it.  Slothrop does fulfill this role.  In the encyclopedic narrative of integration 
that Frye establishes, Slothrop and paranoid knowledge anticipate a reintegration that is 
necessary after a social dissolution.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
INFINITE JEST: RHETORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 
 
 
 “Irony is a disciplinarian feared only by those who do not know it but loved by those who 
  do.”     
  S. Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony (326) 
 
 “The idea is that the book [Infinite Jest] is structured as an entertainment that doesn't  
 work” 
  David Foster Wallace, Although of Course You End Up Becoming Yourself
83
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 In the previous chapter I argued that Gravity's Rainbow is an anarchistic encyclopedic 
novel that utilizes associational thought, the open form, and emancipatory pedagogy to 
revolutionize the encyclopedic form.  In particular, these elements in the text work against 
Enlightenment-influenced hierarchies and modes of thought.  In positing a non-systematized 
logic in the form of paranoia, Pynchon encourages thought that allows characters to make extra-
systemic connections that reveal the ideology of authoritative discourse.   
 In the current chapter, I turn my attention to David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest, a novel 
that develops key encyclopedic elements found in Gravity's Rainbow.  Infinite Jest, however, is 
                                                 
83
 In his recorded discussion with David Lipsky, Wallace makes this comment regarding Infinite Jest's original title, 
A Failed Entertainment (Lipsky 79). 
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not an anarchistic encyclopedic novel, but takes a rather different rhetorical approach.  Wallace's 
perspective, and the primary encyclopedic element in the novel, relies upon a careful interaction 
of various forms of irony with fallacies of cause and effect (particularly the fallacy of double-
negation, cum hoc ergo propter hoc, confirmation bias, and non causa pro causa).
84
  Wallace 
attributes many of these fallacies to his characters and also to the situations in which they find 
themselves.  Wallace collects these fallacies and others under the loose term “double-bind.”   
Irony and the double-bind stress the importance of maintaining multiple perspectives and 
including human experience and emotion in logical thought, ultimately to lead to an integrative 
irony that helps to combat what Wallace sees as postmodernism's dangerous drive to atomize and 
de-individuate society. 
 Since its publication in 1996, David Foster Wallace's mammoth Infinite Jest has 
fascinated both academics and popular readers.  Wallace's obvious erudition, down-to-earth 
humor and unmistakable style captivated audiences but also presented a host of difficulties that 
have proven difficult to resolve.  The novel presents a series of paradoxes that are irresolvable 
given the logic that it, itself, establishes.  Enthusiastically engaging in irony, the narrator 
encourages the reader to identify with the earnest members of Alcoholics Anonymous who 
despise irony and any form of pretense.  Similarly, Wallace lampoons academic writing and 
overly theoretical approaches to life and culture (termed “analysis paralysis” by the same AA 
denizens), but he relies heavily on the tropes of postmodernist fiction and includes examples of 
academic writing as well as citations in many of the book's copious endnotes.  Wallace 
                                                 
84
 It is not my intention to parse Infinite Jest according to specific logical fallacies, but rather to use the general 
form of the logical fallacy – and particularly fallacies of cause and effect – as a metaphorical representation for 
the many ways in which Wallace attempts to undermine systematized thought. 
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juxtaposes entertainment, obsession, and addiction, asking his readers to draw parallels amongst 
them.  He skillfully draws his readers into a trap of binary thinking by presenting two seemingly 
opposed options (irony or sincerity, addiction or abstinence), implicitly asking the reader to make 
a choice between them.  
 In this chapter I argue that Infinite Jest follows in the same encyclopedic novel tradition 
as Gravity's Rainbow but further innovates the form, building upon Gravity's Rainbow's own 
innovations.  Two key concepts emerge that echo the encyclopedic tropes in Gravity's Rainbow: 
irony and the double-bind.  In the first case, Wallace builds upon and challenges the ironic 
position of the subject in postmodern texts.  The double-bind, similar to Pynchon's associational 
thinking, covers a range of concepts that work against systematized thought.  At the heart of the 
double-bind is a conflict, paradox, or confusion that is irresolvable according to binary or 
systematized logic.  The double-bind layers in emotion, compulsion, and pathology to diagnose a 
trap in postmodern thinking that echoes Pynchon's rejection of either/or rationality.  Both irony 
and the double-bind tie Wallace's and Pynchon's texts while allowing Wallace to deviate from his 
mentor's influence.   
 For in many ways, Wallace's Infinite Jest follows in the footsteps of Pynchon's Gravity's 
Rainbow.  Both novels blur the lines between the individual and cultural; both novels revel in 
moments of absurdity embedded within realistic episodes (and vice versa); and both books self-
consciously engage in a knowing irony that leaves a lot of space open for readerly interpretation.  
This is to say nothing of the smaller similarities, such as the penchant for absurd character names 
(consider Pynchon's Ronald Cherrycoke, Pig Bodine, and Nora Dodson-Truck or Wallace's Emil 
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Minty, Mildred Bonk, and yrstruly), inventive organization names (Pynchon's “White Visitation” 
and Schwarzkommando or Wallace's O.N.A.N. [Organization of North American Nations] and 
Les Assassins des Fauteuils Rollents [Wheelchair Assassins]).  In addition, Wallace pays homage 
to Pynchon's work in smaller textual clues that most readers might easily to miss.  For example, 
Wallace draws the surname of Teddy Schacht from Hjalmar Schacht, a Weimar bureaucrat who 
helps to smuggle weapons into inter-war Germany and is mentioned only once in Gravity's 
Rainbow (285).  Likewise, the well-known phrase “howling fantods” that Wallace uses to 
describe an aversion or dread in his characters echoes the “urban fantods” Pynchon invokes 
(303).
85
   Certain narratorial colloquialisms pepper both novels as well: Pynchon's “a-and” and 
Wallace's “like.”  The thematic similarities and textual clues show the influence that Pynchon, 
among other postmodern authors, has had on Wallace.   
 There are also a series of textual and thematic clues that Wallace uses to indicate the 
continuity between Pynchon's work and his own.  Rather than repudiating his postmodernist 
forbears or arguing against self-conscious irony, as has been argued by some critics, Wallace 
adapts the concerns that Pynchon introduces to a turn-of-the-century context.  The international 
cartels that operate behind the scenes in Gravity's Rainbow operate in the open and in concert 
with governmental bodies in Infinite Jest.  The impending environmental destruction and 
disintegration of the populace in Gravity's Rainbow is realized in Wallace's novel in a North 
American union that effaces the boundaries between nations, destroys immense tracts of land in 
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 The phrase “howling fantods” appears several times in Infinite Jest, but its widespread recognition is due the 
website thehowlingfantods.com, a well-travelled fan webpage dedicated to the works of David Foster Wallace.  
D.T. Max provides an alternate origin of the word in his critical biography of Wallace, Every Love Story is a 
Ghost Story.  Max writes “[Wallace's mother] loved the word 'fantods,' meaning a feeling of deep fear or 
repulsion, and talked of 'the howling fantods,' this fear intensified” (2). 
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the name of cheap energy and “cleanliness,” and further atomizes individuals – cutting them off 
not only from one another but also from their own emotions.  Perhaps the most significant 
similarity between Wallace's and Pynchon's novels, however, is the way in which they each 
systematically present a dominant discourse that is then revealed to be flawed.  In the previous 
chapter I argued that Gravity's Rainbow exposes intellectually deceptive binary logic in favor of 
associative thought that does not depend on authoritative discourse to establish opposed binaries.  
In this chapter, I argue that Infinite Jest engages in a similar epistemological struggle by 
presenting a series of double-binds that seem to defy logic while also demanding resolution.     
 Aside from the similarities, however, there are also significant differences between 
Pynchon's and Wallace's approaches.  The mood of Infinite Jest is suffused with a melancholy 
that does not affect Gravity's Rainbow.  Although both novels boast massive casts of characters, 
Wallace is invested in his principal characters in a way that Pynchon does not seem to be; 
Wallace invests deeply in characterization, physical descriptions, and interpersonal relationships 
characters have with one another.  Similarly, Wallace's narrative is seemingly more conventional 
than Pynchon's.  Infinite Jest lacks many of the sudden narrative and focalization shifts that 
Gravity's Rainbow uses, Wallace preferring to signal his focalization shifts through page breaks, 
subheadings, or paratextual notes.  Perhaps one of the greatest differences between the two 
novels is the contrast between the chaos of Gravity's Rainbow and the incredible regimentation 
of Infinite Jest.  As western Europe attempts to regroup itself after WWII in Gravity's Rainbow, 
the America in Infinite Jest has already been reconfigured, its borders redrawn: Pynchon looks to 
the past while Wallace looks forward to the future.  The characters in Infinite Jest live very 
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regimented lives: the students of Enfield Tennis Academy (or ETA, the sports academy that the 
Incandenza family runs and livesin) eat, sleep, study, and play tennis to a strict schedule, while 
the residents of Ennet House Drug and Alcohol Recovery House [sic] work a minimum number 
of hours per week, must attend daily AA meetings, and are bound by a curfew.
86
  Even the 
E.W.D. catapults lob waste into the Concavity at mathematically regular intervals.
87
 
 Thus, in the chapter that follows, I suggest that Infinite Jest continues the encyclopedic 
novel tradition that Gravity's Rainbow revolutionized.  Infinite Jest continues Gravity's 
Rainbow's critique of contemporary culture and authoritative discourse, but seeks to provide, by 
way of both positive and negative examples, an alternative.  Wallace's novel also continues 
Pynchon's rejection of the extremes of binary thinking.  I argue, however, that Infinite Jest avoids 
the move to anarchistic dissensus that Pynchon makes in Gravity's Rainbow while remaining 
humanistic and highlighting the centrality of interpersonal connection as a way to escape 
postmodern alienation.  This move to a greater humanism contributes to Infinite Jest's 
progression toward mythic integration. 
 The sections that follow address the ways in which Infinite Jest continues in the 
encyclopedic tradition that had been altered by Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow and will show that 
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 Ennet House is located downhill from Enfield Tennis Academy in the Ennet Marine Public Health Hospital 
complex that also houses a methadone clinic and an in-patient mental facility.  Much of the action of the novel 
takes places in and around ETA and Ennet House. 
87
 Because Empire Waste Disposal (or E.W.D.) is responsible for toxifying the Concavity to prevent its overgrowth 
into the surrounding areas, the catapulting happens on prime numbered days (573).  This is necessary because 
annular fusion, the source of cheap and plentiful energy, operates as a process of linked energy production cycles 
in which the waste of one process becomes the fuel of another.  Catapulting waste is necessary because the 
fusion process draws toxins out of the surrounding environment so efficiently that the area around the reactor 
becomes massively over-fertile and must be kept in check.  This aspect of annular fusion brilliantly displays 
Wallace's theme of moderation and recursive checks.  Unchecked fertility, rather than the expected toxicity, 
render the Concavity uninhabitable.(570-4) 
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Wallace's work strives to re-invent the encyclopedic novel for the 21
st
 century in much the way 
that Pynchon's work re-invented the encyclopedic novel for the post-War era.  The first section 
examines Infinite Jest as an extension of the encyclopedic novel tradition.  The second section 
focuses more directly on Infinite Jest's contribution to the encyclopedic novel genre, and 
specifically the ways in which the novel builds upon the innovations of Gravity's Rainbow.  This 
section is divided into three sub-sections that examine the nature of irony in the novel.  I argue 
that Wallace uses solipsism in much the way that Pynchon uses paranoia, as a way to diagnose 
significant cultural problems and offer a way out of stultifying social dilemmas.  First, I examine 
the “double-bind” as Wallace introduces it in the novel and present this as an extension of 
Pynchon's both/and binary logic.  Next, I argue that Infinite Jest uses irony in many different, and 
contradictory ways, but that the overall role of irony in the novel is to point to the integrative  
rather than corrosive nature of irony, and that Infinite Jest establishes a “proper” usage of irony 
that is in line with the encyclopedic impulse.  Wallace's novel pursues a humanist agenda that 
stresses interpersonal relationships, self-reflection, integration, and works toward a modal 
reintegration of the mythic as defined by Northrop Frye. 
 
4.2 Infinite Jest in the Encyclopedic Tradition 
 Infinite Jest bears many of the characteristics of the encyclopedic novel identified in the 
introduction to this dissertation.  These include formal and thematic continuities with the 
theoretical models of Denis Diderot and Northrop Frye in addition to formal and thematic 
continuities with other encyclopedic novels.  In the section that follows, I will explore the 
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ideological and epistemological characteristics that Infinite Jest shares with Diderot's 
Enlightenment-influenced view of the encyclopedia.  I will also examine the formal 
characteristics of Infinite Jest that align the novel with Northrop Frye's conception of the 
encyclopedic form.  While the novel does share these characteristics, it also departs from them to 
reflect Wallace's historical and social context.  Thus, Infinite Jest's encyclopedism differs from 
that of Gravity's Rainbow.  It will become evident in this chapter that the deviations that 
Gravity's Rainbow made from older iterations of the encyclopedic form are multiplied in Infinite 
Jest, primarily in the rejection of what Wallace perceived as an empty postmodern perspective 
and in a redefinition of the terms of irony in a social context.
88
  Infinite Jest finds interest in the 
individual subject as a way to break the infinite cycle of lack/need and strives to reinvest the 
subject with a positive agency. 
  
  4.2.1 Enlightenment Influence 
 In The Enlightenment: An Interpretation, Peter Gay writes that Denis Diderot exemplified 
the dual nature of the Enlightenment: disdaining hierarchical authority while striving to retain 
authority,  skeptical while revering myth, and looking toward the future while invoking the past.  
Gay calls Diderot “a partisan of empiricism and scientific method, a skeptic, a tireless 
experimenter and innovator . . . possessed by the relentlessness of modern man” (47).  Diderot's 
formal innovations and subversive stance in the Encyclopédie reflect these characteristics in a 
bold way that does meld a respect for aspects of the past coupled with a desire to rebuild the 
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 Edward Mendelson notes that Gravity's Rainbow is a new kind of encyclopedic narrative because it shifts from 
an older, nationalistic context to a new international context.  I argue in the previous chapter that Gravity's 
Rainbow serves to revolutionize the encyclopedic novel in other ways as well, including the use of heterology. 
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nature of authority.  Similarly, David Foster Wallace invokes both classical and modern myth in 
order to challenge authoritative discourse in a postmodern society.  Also like Diderot, Wallace 
does not seek to do away with authority but to expose the hypocrisy of arbitrary, hierarchical 
authority.  David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest embodies many of the ideals of the Enlightenment 
philosophy but expressed through postmodern innovation, and, like Diderot, he seeks a mediated 
model of authority that recognizes positive elements while attempting to excise stultifying 
tradition. 
 Two elements within Infinite Jest demonstrate continuities with Diderot's Encyclopédie 
and thus the long encyclopedic tradition.  First, the use of endnotes parallels the cross-
referencing system of association employed by Diderot in his Encyclopédie.  Second, through the 
use of double-binds, Infinite Jest participates in the disruption of privileged discourse and the 
elevation of heterological epistemological modes by engaging a similar type of associational 
thinking that Pynchon uses in Gravity's Rainbow.  Wallace's use of endnotes, like Diderot's 
cross-references, creates a secondary organizational structure that operates parallel to the primary 
structure.  Wallace's primary organization centers on three intertwined plot lines and includes 
narrative digressions that either provide background information, follow minor characters, or 
narrate parallel activity that may affect the main plot lines.  In this way, Wallace's overall 
structure employs many metafictional, postmodern narrative tropes.
89
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 Edward J. Maloney's Footnotes in Fiction: A Rhetorical Approach provides a useful taxonomy for notes in 
fiction.  He divides notes in fiction into three types: (1) “factual” notes that provide definitions, translations, and 
the like for terms in the main text; (2) “interpretive” notes that provide commentary or perspective on an element 
in the main text; and (3) “discursive” notes that are separate narratives from the main text but that may 
interconnect (28-57).  Infinite Jest uses each of these types and often blends them.  From here, I will use 
Maloney's terms to describe the functions of notes in the novel. 
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 However, the use of endnotes complicates this structure in much the way that Diderot's 
cross-references complicate the structure of his Encyclopédie.  The system of cross-references 
that Diderot adopted from Chamber's 'Cyclopedia served as a secondary, non-hierarchical 
organizational system.  A network of cross-references built on association formed a secondary 
organizational system that is reminiscent of the rhizome that overlays the alphabetical 
organization that is more evident in the Encyclopédie.  The two methods of organization neither 
conflict nor supplement each other, but operate according to different logics – linear and 
hierarchical versus associative and rhizomatic – the end result being that these separate 
organizational structures supplement the content of the encyclopedia by providing the reader 
multiple routes through which to locate information.  The primary, alphabetical structure 
provides the reader a route to specific entries while the secondary cross-reference structure 
provides the opportunity for the reader to seek depth in understanding by following references to 
related entries.  Endnotes in Infinite Jest serve a similar purpose: they supplement the main body 
of the text while providing paratextual connections.  While Wallace is certainly not the first 
author to incorporate notes into a novel, his use of the endnote is one of the most highly 
remarked-upon features of the text, aside from its length.  The narrative purpose of the notes 
varies greatly.  Many of the notes function similarly to academic footnotes, providing technical 
explanations, presenting digressions that are related to the main text but are not essential to 
understanding it, and providing clarifying information.  Where the use of endnotes diverges from 
this more academic usage is in providing additional narration that directly affects the reader's 
understanding of the main text.  This second feature is important because this element of 
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Wallace's novel contributes to the tension between the necessary and the unnecessary that is one 
of the primary thematic motifs in the text.   
 Two studies of textual notes from the 1990s bears out this distinction – Anthony Grafton's 
The Footnote: A Curious History and Kevin Jackson's Invisible Forms: A Guide to Literary 
Curiosities.  Grafton's diachronic study of footnotes lingers over its usage in historical texts, 
arguing that the note is separate from but provides commentary on the primary text.  The 
footnote, Grafton observes, not only comments on the main text; it also conveys other messages 
on its own, such as bearing evidence of additional work done by the author, indicating that the 
claims made in the main text may be contested by others or that the claims of the main text 
conflict with prior claims made by others (10-13).  Jackson makes a similar point in his chapter 
on the footnote, writing that authors make “claims about reality in the big print on the upper part 
of the page” and then use the note to “display  . . . grounds for such claims in the small print” 
(140).  Although Grafton limits his study to non-fictional usages and Jackson only briefly 
mentions fiction, their points about the secondary messages that notes convey to readers remains 
valid for fictional notes as well.  Both Grafton and Jackson acknowledge that the main text and 
the paratext do different things.   
 Wallace's use of notes contrasts with the models that Grafton and Jackson present 
because fairly often the notes in Infinite Jest perform the same narrative function as does the 
main text.  A brief examination of two endnotes will illustrate the difference between them and 
show the narrative uses to which they are put.  Note 234 (1038-1044), for instance, features the 
transcript of an interview of Orin Incandenza performed by Helen/Hugh Steeply.  Orin had 
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previously discussed the magazine feature article on himself with Hal, foreshadowing the full 
text for the reader.  The content of the note conforms to the academic note that Grafton discusses 
because it is of some interest to the reader, but is unessential to understanding the plot.  This 
would qualify as a “discursive” note according to Maloney because it provides a narrative that 
supplements the main text but is unessential.  The format of the transcript mimics the journalistic 
style of the non-fictional interview; questions are omitted (marked with just a Q.), leaving the 
reader with just the responses from the interview subject.  There is no clear indication of how the 
information from the note fits in with the novel, or how the reader should incorporate the 
transcript into the general reading, and it is left to the reader to make these decisions.   
 In contrast, note 110 (1004-1022) is a tiny reproduction of the novel itself.  The 
discursive note leads with an academic-looking “Q.v.” (for quo vadis, a frequent refrain in the 
novel) and then begins with a description of Hal sitting alone, attempting to exercise his injured 
ankle (another frequent image in the novel).  However, this note also includes a sample 
epistolary exchange between Orin and Avril Incandenza, and a telephone discussion between 
Orin and Hal.
90
  This conversation differs from the transcript in that it reveals both sides of the 
conversation, although it does not contain the narrative descriptions of the characters' activities 
as they talk.  Unlike note 234, this note does contain vital information concerning the 
relationship between Orin and his mother and also about the politics of radical Quebecois 
separatism.  This long note even has eight notes of its own.  Note 110  thus more closely mirrors 
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 Wallace may be playing with his use of “Q.v.” to mean quo vadis and the more traditional footnote usage of 
“q.v.” (meaning quod vide) to direct a reader to more information on the given subject in the same volume.  The 
latter usage of “q.v.” appears throughout the index section of Vladimir Nabokov's Pale Fire, which may indicate 
Nabokov's influence on Wallace.  My thanks to Stephen Blackwell for pointing this out. 
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the narrative make-up of the main text by utilizing several different generic conventions, 
including narrated elements and its own notes.  This difference is significant because of the way 
that it blurs the distinction between the main text and the paratext.  Notes 234 and 110 possess 
ambiguous relationships to the main text in terms of narrative continuity but both make 
associative connections to elements in the main text, the significance of which the reader is left 
to determine. 
 Infinite Jest's discursive endnotes are an encyclopedic characteristic of the novel because 
they disrupt the primacy of the narrative in the main text by providing opportunities to digress 
into the paratext, while factual notes permit Wallace to explain complicated technological 
elements of the text.  This sense of the encyclopedic is enhanced during the reading experience 
when the reader must flip back and forth between text and paratext, mimicking the activity of 
flipping between various encyclopedia entries as the reader seeks a broader understanding.  
Secondly, many endnotes serve as bridges between narrative events in the main text, and the 
notes occasionally cross-reference other notes.  The nature of the connections mirror the cross-
references' purpose of connecting elements in the main text of the encyclopedia.   
 The second line of continuity between Diderot's Encyclopédie and Infinite Jest is the 
presence of “double binds” throughout the novel.  Wallace relies heavily on the theme and 
narrative dilemmas of the “double-bind” to signal an arrested position between two seemingly 
opposed positions.  (I will define the double bind and introduce the topic here in the way that 
relates it to Diderot's Encyclopédie but will pick up the topic more fully in the third section of 
this chapter, where I will show the relationship between the double bind and integrative irony.)  
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Wallace does not mean “double bind” in the current academic sense of mutually-effacing options 
in a single image, but rather presents the double-bind as any situation in which a character must 
decide between two equally repellent choices.  Wallace also presents ambiguous states that are 
nearly indistinguishable, one positive and one negative, as a double bind.   
 The double-bind in Infinite Jest works to expose the kinds of tensions that color logical 
thought but are either rationalized or ignored.  It forces the individual to mediate  between 
competing urges and identities.  This is an extension of tensions within Enlightenment thought.  
Peter Gay calls these tensions a “dialectical interplay,” noting the “appeal to antiquity” coupled 
with a “pursuit of modernity” (8).91   Gay goes on to argue that the philosophes “found it 
convenient to simplify the welter of their experience, to see their adversaries too starkly, and to 
dramatize their age as an age of unremitting warfare between the forces of unbelief and the 
forces of credulity – that is, between good and evil” (23).92  Such internal tensions do not mark 
the undoing of Enlightened rationality but reveal blind spots in the rational perspective. 
 One example of the first kind of double bind comes from the second episode of the novel 
in which Erdedy waits in his apartment for a friend to deliver some marijuana he has asked her to 
buy.  He does not want to try to call her because he is afraid that he will miss another incoming 
call.  In the extended scene, Erdedy is torn between his desire to seem indifferent to getting the 
drug and his  actual overwhelming desire for it.  This bind is realized when, at the close of the 
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 Gay labels Enlightenment philosophes “modern pagans” due the varied nature of their beliefs and “a volatile 
mixture of classicism, impiety, and science” (8).   
92
 Gay's The Enlightenment: An Interpretation seeks  to synthesize a liberal veneration of the Enlightenment with a 
conservative view of the Enlightenment's “superficial rationalism” and “foolish optimism” (ix).  In doing so, he 
is often critical of Enlightenment thinkers but Gay is motivated by the desire to render the Enlightenment in what 
he sees as a more accurate way. 
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scene, his doorbell and phone ring simultaneously, leaving Erdedy unable to decide which to 
answer.  Fearing that answering one will cause him to miss the other, he cannot solve the 
problem and, thus, is unable to act.  This scene also serves to demonstrate the second kind of 
double bind.  Erdedy's predicament is so vexing for him because of his mental state.  He engages 
in a cycle of abstinence from marijuana during which he will throw away all of his paraphernalia 
and swear off the drug completely; however, he then shifts back to addiction and justifies 
purchasing the drug “one more time” so that he can smoke copious amounts in a short time and 
make himself sick on it, thereby helping him to quit.  This, of course, just kickstarts the next 
phase in the cycle that will lead him back to purchasing and using. 
 The significance of the double bind is that it is a non-logical thought process that reflects 
the injection of human desire and human failings into the rational world.  Erdedy perpetually 
defeats his own attempts to quit smoking marijuana by developing a system that allows him to 
repeatedly buy marijuana “one last time” that is part of his quitting.  He creates a logical vortex 
that reinforces the very behavior that it is meant to curtail.  It is through the use of the double 
bind that Wallace breaks from the logical mode of thought represented by the authority figures in 
the novel.  The double-bind continues the encyclopedic tradition of disrupting authoritative 
discourse in much the way that Pynchon challenges authoritative discourse through the use of 
paranoia as a model of associational thought.  Whereas Pynchon sought to introduce a horizontal 
dimension to the transmission of knowledge, Wallace seeks to reinsert the human element by 
showing that emotion and irrational thinking come to bear on decisions and may pose impossible 
situations. 
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  4.2.2 Encyclopedic Form 
 In addition to the encyclopedism derived from Diderot, Infinite Jest also conforms to 
generic conventions of the encyclopedic form defined by Northrop Frye.  In this section, I will 
demonstrate Infinite Jest's blending of genre, a convention that characterize the novel as 
encyclopedic.  This is a topic to which I will return in the other two sections of this chapter, 
where I will identify another of the generic conventions that Infinite Jest adopts: integrative 
irony.  That is, Frye describes the encyclopedic form as one that blends four continuous fictional 
forms: romance, confession, anatomy, and novel.  Frye's genres of the continuous prose forms, 
however, are needlessly limiting in a discussion of postmodern fiction in which the lines between 
genre and even the very nature of representation is blurred.  While Frye's idea and methodology 
are sound, I propose a reading of Infinite Jest that considers genre more broadly.  To that end, I 
argue that Infinite Jest also blends genre but rather than the four fictional genres that Frye 
defines, Wallace blends non-fictional conventions that I will call the “rhetorical genre” with more 
conventional fictional forms.
93
  The most prominent example of the rhetorical genre in the novel 
is Wallace's extensive use of endnotes. 
 Form in Infinite Jest must first be divided into fictional and non-fictional genre.  Nicely 
following from Frye's formulation, Infinite Jest actually contains examples of, or variations 
upon, the confession, the novel, and the romance – all of which are fictional prose forms.  
Infinite Jest  also contains varying examples of dialogue and transcripts – which are fictional 
though not continuous prose forms.  Infinite Jest includes academic writing and technical 
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 I do not contend that any part of Infinite Jest is actually non-fictional but for the sake of brevity I will refer to all 
conventions typically used in non-fictional writing that are adopted by Wallace in Infinite Jest as non-fictional. 
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references, the latter tending to appear in numbered endnotes (endnotes themselves point to a 
blending of a non-fictional convention into a fictional text).  In total, there are five main forms 
within Infinite Jest: confession, novel, romance, dialogue, and rhetorical.  The first three of these 
overlap with the continuous prose forms Frye's includes in the encyclopedic form, the fourth is 
an addition to the fictional form, and the last is an extension of the anatomy form, also taken 
from Frye.  For Frye, the blending of genre in the encyclopedic text comprises an apocalyptic 
vision, a totalized vision that captures the ethos of the text's culture.   
 Wallace uses the blending of genre to create tension via the radical juxtaposition of 
generic modes.  This tension encourages a blending of disparate elements of the text and shows 
the interaction between the individual and the collective that is demonstrated rather than 
narrated.  One extended example of this radical juxtaposition splices together a description of 
Mario Incandenza's film chronicling North American Interdependence and the creation of 
O.N.A.N., the governing organization that binds together Mexico, Canada, and the United 
States.
94
  Rather than describe the plot of the movie, as he does for many of James Incandenza's 
films, Wallace conveys the events of the film as transcribed dialogue.  This dialogue is then cut 
with narration of events around E.T.A.  By blending the fictional narration with the rhetorical 
dialogue, Wallace demonstrates the connection between the individual mentality of the students 
and the national ethos espoused by President Gentle and C.U.S.P. (the Clean United States 
Party).  In one such transition, the inaugural meeting of the Canadian, American, and Mexican 
heads of state, during which President Gentle describes the new future of Interdependence, is 
                                                 
94
 While O.N.A.N. is presented as an equal partnership between the three member countries, the “interdependence” 
is only nominal and American President Gentle is de facto head of the nations.   
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followed by the guru Lyle's order from a different story line: “Do not underestimate objects!” 
(394).  This transition from dialogue to narration is significant because Gentle's election platform 
centered on cleaning up the nation, or degrading the status of objects.  Gentle, compulsive about 
cleanliness, is shown to be germ-phobic many times throughout the novel and goes to extreme 
measures to keep his body clean.  Gentle also displaces (“cleanses”) the population of a large 
area in New England that he then cedes to Canada, again showing his disregard for the physical 
land and the property of the displaced population.  In the second, juxtaposed story line, Lyle, 
who is a generation older than the students of E.T.A., must remind the students that objects carry 
meaning and that they are not always expendable.  The juxtaposition of these messages serves to 
underscore the associative connections between the national and the individual.  By interspersing 
the two generic forms, Wallace demonstrates a tension between the authoritative discourse of the 
state and the real lives of the students. 
 The rhetorical genre, aligned with non-fiction prose, enters the text in the use of 
endnotes.  In addition to the secondary ordering system mentioned above, they are also a non-
fictional convention that is a prominent feature of Infinite Jest.  While the endnotes serve many 
narrative functions in the novel, it is the mere presence of these notes that most disrupts the 
“fictional” mode of Infinite Jest.  If, as Grafton and Jackson argue, the note performs a different 
function than does the main text in non-fiction, the reader could expect the endnotes of a novel to 
follow similar guidelines.  Gerard Gennette comments on the presence of notes in fictional texts 
in his Paratexts: Thresholds of Interpretation, describing the note (like any paratext) as a 
threshold, a possible point of entry into the text.  In Gennette's model, the reader is “outside” of 
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the text and the main text is “inside,” placing the note in a liminal space neither inside nor 
outside of the text.  The note as a threshold is, at once, a part of the text and not.  The very 
appearance of notes in fictional works, Gennette writes, denotes a text “whose fictionality is very 
'impure'” (332), meaning that the generic conventions of fiction are being transgressed.  
However, the significance of the notes in Infinite Jest does not lie in their transgression of 
fictionality, but in the inclusion of non-fictional rhetorical genres into a fictional form.  Wallace 
incorporates the endnotes in such a way that they are essential to understanding the novel.  This 
works against the notion that non-fictional notes are supplementary to the main text.  The non-
fictional convention of the endnote is enfolded entirely into the fiction of the novel that also 
enhances the novel: this is the essence of the blending of genre in the encyclopedic form.  
Supplementing Frye's theory of the encyclopedic form is necessary for a full consideration of 
postmodern encyclopedic novels because of the changing nature of the literature.  The four 
continuous fictional forms that Frye identifies as making up the encyclopedic form are no longer 
adequate to defining the encyclopedic and must take literary innovations into account.   
 Wallace's use of notes serves a third important role in helping to differentiate it from the 
use of notes in other works of fiction.  The history of notes in fiction is longer than many 
suspect, dating back to the origins of the novel genre.
95
  The uses of these notes have varied 
greatly, but critics of postmodernist works that employ the device point to the problems of 
authorship and representation that more contemporary instances present.  Manuel Puig's Kiss of 
the Spider Woman uses footnotes to supplement the main text with the work of figures such as 
Sigmund Freud and Herbert Marcuse in order to complicate the primary narrative by forcing the 
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 See Maloney, 12-4 for a short history of notes in fiction and 23-7 on the development of scholarly notes. 
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reader to rethink the relationship of the “factual” note with the fictional text.96  Mark Z. 
Danielewski uses a complicated, and often confusing, system of notes in House of Leaves to 
erode the concepts of authorship and representation.
97
  While Wallace does work with these 
conventions in the novel, his purpose is different.
98
  The use of notes in many other postmodern 
texts works to distance the reader from the text, to remind the reader of the constructed nature of 
narrative and representation.  Wallace's use of notes works to integrate the larger, untold story.  
He uses notes to explore characters' backstories and to show connections between characters, 
even if the connection is fleeting.   
 Wallace's use of notes to build upon and also complete the main text's narrative 
contributes to the overall integrative nature of the text.  Rather than questioning the nature of 
construction or authorship, Wallace's notes pose a larger question about the nature of narrative 
and the role that minor characters play in plot lines.  Using notes to show broader connections 
that are not immediately apparent in the main text, Wallace reveals the humanism that sets him 
apart from Pynchon and other postmodernists: Wallace reminds us that narrative lines are 
supported by rarely-seen, or even unseen, characters just as our own lives are filled with – 
supplemented by – those who are overlooked. 
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 See Dunne 127-8 for his discussion on the role that footnotes play in constructing a dialogic novel.  For Dunne, 
the notes in Kiss of the Spider Woman contribute to the overall polyphony of the text because the writing style in 
the notes differs greatly from the style in the main text (127). 
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 Caroline Hagood argues that the role of layered footnotes in Mark Z. Danielewski's House of Leaves serve to 
reflect the "difficulty of chronicling life and assessing that record," to ultimately reflect the postmodern crisis of 
representation.  Beata Marczynska-Fedorowicz writes that the notes “not only . . . divide the page visually to 
mirror the stratification of narrative voices, but also partition the body  of the text into interlinked chunks” (244). 
98
 Wallace includes “factual” notes the way that Puig does, to much the same effect.  In addition, Wallace and 
Danielewski also employ similar techniques in their notes (notes within notes, confusion over authorship of some 
notes, notes that double back onto preceding notes to create cycles, among others), employing “factual,” 
“interpretive,” and “discursive” notes as well as hybrids of these. 
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4.3 Infinite Jest updates Pynchon's Encyclopedic Form 
 
 In defining Gravity's Rainbow as an “anarchistic encyclopedia” in the previous chapter, I 
wrote that Northrop Frye depicts the encyclopedic text as an accretion of meaning culminating in 
a totalizing, apocalyptic vision.  Pynchon's text reveals a tension between the totalizing tendency 
of the encyclopedic text and the drive to destabilize hierarchical structures.  Wallace's Infinite 
Jest similarly seeks to destabilize hierarchical structures of order, but to that he adds a third 
dimension: rather than simply rejecting the dominant discourse or rationality, Wallace must 
contend with both an authoritative discourse (the same Enlightened rationality that Pynchon 
identifies) and the counter-discourse of postmodernism espoused by Pynchon and others.
99
  
Wallace negotiates the difference between these discourses in a way that necessarily differs from 
Pynchon's rejection of dominant discourse.   
 That is, Infinite Jest participates in an encyclopedic discourse that, like Gravity's 
Rainbow, draws upon the long encyclopedic tradition of heterological disruption of authoritative 
discourse.  Wallace's important contribution to the encyclopedic tradition, also like that of 
Gravity's Rainbow, lies in reinventing the model of encyclopedic discourse to fit its historical 
moment.  Infinite Jest continues the encyclopedic tradition that Gravity's Rainbow itself re-
shaped by reworking two key themes from Gravity's Rainbow: a broad cultural malaise that is 
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 Many recent critics have labeled David Foster Wallace's works as “post-postmodern” in that they extend from 
postmodernism but deviate in some particular way.  Nicole Timmer argues that Wallace and other late-twentieth 
century authors engage in a re-humanizing aesthetic that turns away from the postmodernism and post-
structuralism that came before them.  While I do not think that it is right to categorize Wallace's work as post-
postmodern, I do believe that Wallace maintains a conflicted relationship with his postmodern forebears and that 
the obvious anxiety that is evident in Wallace's work warrants more attention.  In the current project, I am more 
interested in Wallace's participation in the encyclopedic novel tradition than his position vis-a-vis 
postmodernism.   
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ambiguous in nature and the power of irony to speak back to power.  In Wallace's text, as in 
Pynchon's, these concepts are deeply intertwined.  For Pynchon, paranoia and irony offer 
alternatives to authoritative discourse.  Wallace reinvents these two concepts in the forms of 
solipsism and a new, integrative form of irony.  In addition to these two key concepts, Wallace 
also presents the double-bind as a form of entrapped thinking that echoes Pynchon's binary logic.  
In this section I define the continuities between these concepts in the two novels and will return 
to each of these elements in the following section of this chapter. 
  
  4.3.1 Irony and Paranoia vs. Irony and Solipsism 
 In Gravity's Rainbow, as in many postmodernist novels, irony takes center stage as a way 
of making over or rethinking modernist novelistic conventions; in the encyclopedic novel, this 
irony also works to highlight tension between heterological, marginal discourse and authoritative 
discourse.  However, the instability of irony that Pynchon engages in Gravity's Rainbow as a 
method of resistance troubles David Foster Wallace because of the instability of interpretation.  
But even more troubling is the prospect of a subversive, ironic discourse that has been re-co-
opted by “Them” and used as a weapon against the very public that once leveled it at “Them.”  
This prospect is dangerous to the individual for the same reason that it is dangerous to the 
authorities: it is possible to speak one thing and mean another, to define groups based upon who 
understands the irony, and to subvert one meaning to another.  In other words, irony has the 
potential to destabilize any meaning and, as Linda Hutcheon argues, may be wielded by anyone.  
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If used by those in power, irony may have the power to deceive on a massive scale and can be 
used to silence voices of protest. 
 Wallace contends with this very nature of irony in his previous work.  In “E Unibus 
Pluram,” he considers the ways self-conscious television “metawatching” and ironic metafiction 
influence one another.  Specifically, Wallace argues that the younger generation of fiction writers 
(born after 1950 who grew up with a television in the house) incorporate the “voyeuristic” 
tendency to view pop cultural representation as mimetic in nature, leading to such “slick” 
fictions as Bright Lights, Big City by Bret Easton Ellis.  Wallace argues that television has 
adopted the irony of postmodern fiction and incorporated it into a mainstream mode of 
communication.  He contends that television adopted the metafictional techniques popular in 
1960s fiction.  But television overused irony so that the trope, in itself, came to signify only a hip 
kind of self-awareness of the televisual medium.  Wallace writes, “TV . . . has become able to 
capture and neutralize any attempt to change or even protest the attitudes of passive unease and 
cynicism TV requires of Audience in order to be commercially and psychologically viable at 
doses of several hours per day” (171).    The problem that Wallace has with all of this is that just 
as 1960s metafiction influenced television of the 1980s, television of the 1990s has influenced 
contemporary fiction.  This led, as Wallace saw it, to a generation of “slick,” young writers who 
could write equally slick fiction that he feared had no content behind the flash. 
 This has diluted the critical power of irony, on the one hand, and emptied it of meaning, 
on the other.  Wallace sees critical potential in the postmodern irony of Pynchon or Barth, but 
brilliantly draws a parallel between the reflective self-knowledge displayed in this kind of 
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writing and the sort of intuitive self-knowledge required of television viewers.  The viewer must 
be willing to believe simultaneously in the ironic and non-ironic aspects of television and its 
characters.  Wallace's concern is that television has created a new audience that is quick to pick 
up on irony (and then to affect it), but does not understand the meaning of irony. 
 Wallace demonstrates this isolating trend in advertising.  He identifies a trend that, on the 
surface, encourages viewers to “be themselves” and to stand out from the crowd.  This results in 
stultifying spectacle.  In other words, television advertisers learned to use irony in such a way as 
to make the irony completely obvious so that the viewer would be invited to laugh at television 
along with the advertisers.  This use of irony, itself being used cynically by advertisers, makes 
viewers feel as though they are actually on the same side because everybody gets the joke.  Such 
use of irony encourages the viewers to believe that they both know more than the group and are 
part of the group.  But the true aim is to veil motivations behind a cool irony.  Wallace argues 
that this move actually isolates viewers while making them feel a part of a broad audience.  Thus, 
Wallace's “Them” is only marginally different than Pynchon's.  Corporations and international 
political groups still exert power in Wallace's world, but in this world paranoia is no longer an 
effective tool against this power because corporations, in the form of advertising, no longer have 
to hide their intentions.  Instead, “They” invite Us to join them in their cynicism.   
 This transition from a subversive irony to a co-opted irony used by “Them” signifies a 
shift from the use of a trope to a General Irony that pervades the culture.  Wallace worries that 
interpersonal relationships suffer from this pervasive, general irony.  Another way to frame this 
shift in irony is to use the terms that Fredric Jameson outlines in Postmodernism.  Jameson 
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argues that the emergence of postmodernism is characterized by a decentering and fragmentation 
of the individual subject.  “The disappearance of the individual subject,” Jameson writes, “along 
with its formal consequence, the increasing unavailability of the personal style, engender the 
well-nigh universal practice today of what may be called pastiche” (16).  Jameson describes 
pastiche as a blank irony that mimics parody but lacks “parody's ulterior motives, amputated of 
the satiric impulse, devoid of laughter and of any conviction that alongside the abnormal tongue 
you have momentarily borrowed, some healthy linguistic normality still exists” (17).  According 
to Jameson's definition, postmodern irony is indistinguishable from irony because it takes the 
same form, but it works to efface the subversive power that irony once had.   
 It is this irony that Wallace fears, because it is accompanied by the loss of individual 
subjectivity.  For Wallace, general or cultural irony isolates individuals at the same time that it 
convinces them that they are part of a social group; it therefore provides a false self-awareness.  
To correctly read Wallace's perspective on irony, the reader needs to keep two things in mind.  
First, Wallace does not fear all irony, or even the kind of irony that Pynchon employs, but what 
irony has become after “Their” co-optation of it.  Second, he sees postmodern irony as intimately 
related to the destruction of the individual through its viral promotion of false self-awareness.   
 “Solipsism” is the term that Wallace uses frequently throughout Infinite Jest to refer to 
the kind of loss-within-self that comes from de-individuating, cultural irony.  Wallace is centrally 
interested in the ways in which individuals interact with one another and also in the ways that 
individuals are affected by their environments.  Because of this Wallace invests time in 
developing the psychology of his characters.  This move to interiority is one of the primary 
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differences between Wallace's approach to the encyclopedic novel and Pynchon's.  The young of 
Wallace's 1990s face a bombardment of cynical irony and adopt this stance as their own.  As a 
result, individuals will dehumanize themselves and adopt a mass cultural stance rather than a 
considered, individualistic one because they have absorbed a nihilistic cultural perspective.  Just 
one example of this is Mario's fear that the E.T.A. students do not know how to talk about real 
feelings without cringing or joking about them.   
 Solipsism shows a break from Pynchon's paranoia by shifting the focus of the threat.  
Paranoia is a projected, external threat about the world affecting the individual, while solipsism 
internalizes the threat so that, to the individual, it feels as though danger arises from within.  
However, the two bear the similarity of ambiguity.  Since Pynchon uses paranoia in multiple 
contexts, it sometimes carries negative attributes that are damaging to the individual rather than 
liberating.  Conversely, solipsism is negative in Infinite Jest, but it is closely related to more 
positive attributes such as self-awareness and self-consciousness.   
  4.3.2 The “Double-Bind” 
 The second key concept that Infinite Jest shares with Gravity's Rainbow is the drive to 
expose the illegitimacy of strict binary logic.  Wallace's double-bind and Pynchon's associational 
thinking share a similar goal but differ in execution.  In Gravity's Rainbow, Pynchon counters 
Pointsman's strict “either/or” thinking with Roger Mexico's “both/and” logic to recognize 
gradation between poles.  The “both/and” alternative pits the statistician Mexico against the 
Pavlovian Pointsman – both are men of science and both derive their findings from their chosen 
methods.  Both depend upon abstractions of everyday common-sense reasoning as they pit one 
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scientific paradigm against another.  The difference between associational thinking and Wallace's 
“double-bind” is that the double-bind returns the thinking to everyday life and includes a degree 
of uncertainty, or illogic.  Those who experience the double-bind may not have the capacity to 
think logically about their predicament or may not have complete knowledge of it.  This 
difference between associational thinking and the “double-bind” is key to Wallace's humanism.  
For Wallace, liberation is not a matter of systems or groups (such as “We” and “Them”); rather, 
the double-bind is centrally important to individuals' everyday lives.   
 A second major difference between Pynchon's and Wallace's alternatives to systematized 
logic is that Wallace's double-binds are ambiguous.  Much like the subtle divide between 
solipsism and self-awareness, the double-bind may affect an individual positively or negatively, 
and it is largely a matter of the individual's interpretation or use of the double-bind that 
determines its valence.  The double-bind, like Pynchon's associational thinking, covers a range of 
concepts that work against systematized thought.  At the heart of the double-bind is a conflict, 
paradox, or confusion that is irresolvable according to binary or systematized logic.  The double-
bind also layers in emotion, compulsion, and pathology.   
 An example from the novel will most clearly demonstrate Wallace's concept of the 
double-bind.  Wallace demonstrates that  the logical answer to a problem or question is not 
always the right answer and that double-binds, like the fallacy of either/or logic in Gravity's 
Rainbow, may require a different kind of thinking to solve – if “solving” the problem is even a 
possibility.  Wallace writes explicitly about the double-bind as a central feature of a class taught 
at ETA called “The Personal Is the Political Is the Psychopathological: the Politics of 
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Contemporary Psychopathological Double-Binds,” taught by prorector Marty Esther Thode 
(306-7).  The class, ostensibly meant to point out the ways in which personal pathologies may be 
at odds with one another, is framed in highly academic language.  The class encourages students 
to consider glib answers to unlikely double-binds.  For example, in a question on a midterm 
about what an agoraphobic kleptomaniac is to do for relief, the student Ted Schacht simply 
writes “mail fraud” (307-8).100  Thode creates a question that trivializes actual double-binds 
because her students recognize that her “exams were notorious no-brainers and automatic A's if 
you were careful with your third-person pronouns” (308-9).  She falls victim to systematized 
thought  by failing to recognize that logical thought cannot answer some questions.  This only 
multiplies the double-bind because, as the title of the course suggests, her purpose is to guide her 
students away from systematized thought into a personal, mindful way of thinking.  This 
question also reveals the potentially damaging nature of the double-bind by trivializing 
pathological compulsions and reducing them to a logically “solvable” problem.  
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 The full question is a thing of convoluted beauty: 
 ITEM 1 
 (1a) You are an individual who, is pathologically kleptomaniacal.  As a kloptomaniac, you are pathologically 
driven to steal, steal, steal.  You must steal. 
 (1b) But, you are also an individual who, is pathologically agoraphobic.  As an agoraphobic, you cannot so much 
as step off your front step of the porth of your home, without undergoing palpitations, drenching sweats, and 
feelings of impending doom.  An an agoraphobic, you are driven to pathologically stay home and not leave.  You 
cannot leave home. 
 (1c)  But, from (1a) you are pathologically driven to go out and steal, steal, steal.  But, from (1b) you are 
pathologically driven to not ever leave home.  You live alone.  Meaning, there is no one else in your home to 
steal from.  Meaning, you must go out, into the marketplace to satisfy your overwhelming compulsion to steal, 
steal, steal.  But, such is your fear of the marketplace that you cannot under any circumstances, leave home.  
Whether your problem is true personal psychopathology, or merely marginalization by a political definition of 
'psychopathological,' nevertheless, it is a Double-Bind. 
 (1d)  Thus, respond to the question of, what do you do?  (sic 307-8) 
 From the convoluted logic presented in the form of a warped syllogism, to the second-person positioning of 
the student as the afflicted, to the various repetitions, and amateurish understanding of psychology, this question 
undermines whatever political point Thode wants to make.   
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 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is a correlation between the double-bind and irony because 
both depend upon simultaneously accepting potentially mutually-exclusive, or at least conflicting 
concepts.  Another example from Wallace's novel illustrates this.  In one case, a resident of the 
Enfield Marine Public Health Hospital complex is functionally catatonic because she deeply 
fears being catatonic:  
the lady is not catatonic in the strict sense of catatonic but rather a 'D.P.,' which is 
mental-health-facility slang for Debilitatingly Phobic.  Her deal is apparently that 
she's almost psychotically terrified of the possibility that she might be either blind 
or paralyzed or both.  So e.g. she keeps her eyes shut tight 24/7/365 out of the 
reasoning that as long as she keeps her eyes shut tight she can find hope in the 
possibility that if she was to open them she'd be able to see (997n67).   
The non-catatonic woman has reasoned herself into acting catatonic in order to avoid being 
actually catatonic although this “reasoning” is itself born of her phobia.  She is stuck with the 
thing that she fears most as a means of avoiding that very thing.  The double-bind here functions 
as a mental block that results in a paradox: inaction is the result of a fear of inaction.   
 The double-bind also arises from situations when knowledge is purposefully obscured or 
impossible to determine.  Although this is not technically a double-bind in the way that Wallace 
means it, because for him the double-bind is always linked to irony, it is reasonable to consider 
this a variation on the double-bind because the result is the same: competing urges, thoughts, or 
inclinations tie up an individual's thought process.  This point is illustrated by considerations of 
where Rémy Marathe's true allegiances lie.  Marathe, a member of the Wheelchair Assassins and 
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(potential) traitor to his cause, spends much of the novel atop a mountain outside of Tuscon, 
meeting with his OUS
101
 contact Hugh Steeply.  Marathe initially agrees to pose as a mole to 
feed erroneous information to the O.N.A.N. Intelligence agency but has actually crossed over 
(and is now effectively a triple-agent) in order to “secure advanced medical care” for his severely 
disabled wife, but his true loyalties are in question (89).  While Marathe does seem to give 
Steeply information, he is also very cagey about revealing too much.  Sorting out Marathe's 
loyalty quickly becomes complicated.  He pretends “only to M. Fortier and his A.F.R. Superiors 
that he was merely pretending to feed some betraying information to B.S.S.” (89).102  The 
passage is studded with endnotes, some of which clarify abbreviations, but none that help to 
clarify Marathe's position.  A particularly daunting note reads in part, “M. Foriter and the A.F.R. 
(as far as Marathe knew) believed that Marathe was functioning as a kind of 'triple agent' or 
duplicitous 'double agent' . . . only (as far as Marathe can know) Marathe and very few B.S.S. 
Operatives know that Marathe is now only pretending to pretend to betray, that M. Steeply is 
fully aware that Marathe responds to B.S.S.'s summonses with . . . full knowledge” (995n40).  
The result of this is that Steeply and his superiors in O.U.S. believe that Marathe works for them, 
but the fact that he has betrayed his original loyalties continues to taint his credibility.  In these 
segments, Wallace's obscure prose matches the theme of uncertainty.  The note that is meant to 
help to clarify, and is written in a deceptively conversational tone, works to obscure meaning as 
readily as Marathe himself obscures his true loyalties.   
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 Office of Unspecified Services, a post-Reconfiguration spy agency similar to the CIA under O.N.A.N.  The name 
is most likely a play on Office of Strategic Services, the WWII precursor to the modern day CIA.   
102
 B.S.S. also refers to O.U.S. in French the “Bureau des Services sans Spédificité” (89). 
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 The uncertainty in the text about where Marathe's loyalties lie reveals a double-bind for 
Steeply and his superiors that mimics rhetorical irony: Steeply's orders depend upon both trusting 
and not trusting Marathe.  The spy must remain ever-vigilant to the possibility that he has been 
discovered and what he considers to be accurate information may, in fact, be misinformation.  In 
effect, Steeply's inability to read Marathe echoes the position of the television audience Wallace 
describes in “E Unibus Pluram” because, like the television viewer, there is a great deal of 
uncertainty about the individual's position.  Steeply's unstable position in regard to Marathe's 
loyalty echoes the television viewer's ability to accurately read an unstable irony. 
 Double-binds also appear as paradoxes throughout the novel as parts of sports philosophy 
and as elements of Alcoholics Anonymous.  Don Gately prays to a God he does not believe in, 
while Teddy Schacht realizes that “to win enough of the time to be considered successful you 
have to both care a great deal about it and also not care about it at all” (269).  Dr. Charles Tavis 
changes the school motto to “THE MAN WHO KNOWS HIS LIMITATIONS HAS NONE,” 
upon his replacing James Incandenza as ETA headmaster (81).  Many of the characters come to 
realize that it is impossible to logically parse these binds.  AA confronts this head-on by down-
playing the importance of logic and elevating the importance of experience, personal history, and 
gut-feeling.  Gately has no difficulty praying to a God he does not believe in because he believes 
in the efficacy of AA.  Likewise, Schacht recognizes the impossibility of both caring a great deal 
and not caring at all because his own life  experience shows him that this kind of paradox 
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actually can be true.
103
  The role that double-binds play for the characters parallels the role that 
they play in the novel overall and is, I would argue, an extension of the disruption of either/or 
logic that occurs in Gravity's Rainbow and serves a similar purpose.    
 
4.4 Integrative Irony 
 Irony in Infinite Jest  is complex and multi-layered because Wallace engages the topic 
directly throughout the novel: many characters appear to take a negative stand on irony.  These 
characters' attitudes are colored by their experiences and their culture.  As an encyclopedic 
novelist, Wallace engages many of the cultural problems of his day, and one that Wallace was 
very aware of is the empty irony of postmodern pastiche and the degenerative effects that this 
can have on culture.  Wallace was particularly concerned with the way that irony can be used as a 
tool to alienate people from one another.
104
  Wallace critiques irony at the same time that he 
reinvents it in a new context in order to reclaim it as a critical tool and to reverse its 
disintegrative postmodern force.  He does this by challenging the nature of irony in character 
dialogue about irony and in the way that he employs irony in AA meetings to underscore the 
connection and community among the members.  The result is an encyclopedic novel that 
advances Infinite Jest in Frye's modal cycle further in the direction of the mythic, challenges the 
rhetorical purpose of local irony in the text, and seeks to reclaim the critical edge of general 
irony.   
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 Teddy Schacht suffers from Crohn's disease and a persistent knee injury and only wants to play tennis 
competitively enough to go to dental school.  However, since he stopped caring about playing tennis 
professionally he has improved his game (266-7). 
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 However, Wallace's stance on irony was not straightforward and changed over the course of his career.   
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 Critics of Infinite Jest have read irony in three primary ways: Wallace is critical of 
disintegrative irony by creating an anti-ironic text, Wallace is critical of irony and reappropriates 
irony in some way, and Wallace engages in a post-ironic discourse.  Critics such as Heather 
Houser, Marshall Boswell, and Iannis Goerlandt read irony in Infinite Jest as a form of 
detachment, or alienation of the author from the reader.
105
  Houser, Boswell, and Goerlandt 
interpret this ironic detachment as Wallace's commentary on the disintegrating power of irony – 
Goerlandt deems Infinite Jest “highly anti-ironic” (2).  Each of these critics is correct, to a 
degree, about Wallace's use of irony in Infinite Jest.  I would argue, however, that Wallace's 
perspective on irony is more complex, for he attempts to mediate between the negative aspects of 
postmodern irony, the trope of irony, and a broader use of irony that works as a commentary 
upon irony itself.  It is this last usage of irony that challenges a reading of Infinite Jest as “anti-
ironic” because Wallace engages copiously in a variety of forms of irony.   
 Alcoholics Anonymous presents a model of ironic instability that leads to varied 
interpretations of the role of irony in the novel.  Iannis Goerlandt accepts AA as “highly anti-
ironic” (2) and  Petrus van Ewijk agrees with Goerlandt that the AA model is a solution to both 
addiction and solipsism.
106
  However,  Timothy Aubry also comments on the role of AA in the 
novel, arguing that Infinite Jest actually requires a mediation between irony and AA-style 
sincerity.  This balance of irony must be determined by the reader because there is no one 
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 See Houser,  “Infinite Jest's Environmental Case for Disgust.”  Houser argues that the narrative irony of Infinite 
Jest reflects themes of detachment and disgust.  Houser draws a parallel between the ironic detachment in the 
novel with disgust over destruction of the environment (geo-politically in the form of Reconfiguration as well as 
ecologically).  See also, Boswell (14). 
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 See Van Ewjik, “'I' and 'Other': the Relevance of Wittgenstein, Buber, and Levinas for an Understanding of AA's 
Recovery Program in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest.”  
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character in the novel who maintains a healthy balance, all of the primary characters tending 
toward one extreme or the other.  Aubry's essay is important because he identifies the necessity 
for a balance between self-awareness, sincerity, and irony.
107   
 Two recent pieces by Emily Russell and Josh Roiland argue a different form of irony in 
Wallace's writing, staking out the position that Wallace's use of irony is multifaceted and heavily 
dependent on context.  These critics either perceive Wallace's use of irony in a positive light or 
argue that he does successfully use irony as a tool to combat alienation.  Emily Russell analyzes 
the role that irony plays in the formation of discursive communities in her book Reading 
Embodied Citizenship.  The chapter, entitled “Some Assembly Required: The Disability Politics 
of Infinite Jest,” argues that body and disability are perceived as separate from the self.108  
Russell notes that viewers of Mario's Interdependence Day movie share in an ironic enjoyment 
that is at the expense of the political landscape (not at Mario's expense).  She writes, “the 
viewers' shared ironic experience nevertheless achieves the purpose of Interdependence Day by 
illustrating a collective relation to the state” (185).  Russell's observations clearly distinguish 
between modes of irony (the carefree parody of recent political events) that Infinite Jest contains.  
Josh Roiland's essay takes a slightly different approach to Wallace's writing by examining the 
structure of notes in his non-fiction writing and acknowledging the use of ironic tropes.  He 
addresses the question of irony in Wallace's writing, although it examines Wallace's non-fiction 
rather than his fiction.  Roiland's essay is useful in examining Wallace's use of irony because the 
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 See Aubrey, “Selfless Cravings: Addiction and Recovery in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest.” 
108
 See also Elizabeth Freudenthal's essay “Anti-Interiority: Compulsiveness, Objectification, and Identity in Infinite 
Jest” for more on separation of self and body.  Freudenthal's perspective focuses more on the individual than 
Russell's, whose focus is on the broader cultural landscape.  
 166 
essay is about the interpretation of irony in Wallace's work rather than Wallace writing about his 
own process.  Roiland writes that Wallace's notes express his “excess of consciousness,” 
meaning that Wallace used the notes as a way to represent formally his own hyper-awareness and 
exuberance (33).  Roiland also writes that “Critics who label Wallace an ironist privilege his 
writing style and ignore his ideology” (36).  Roiland recognizes that Wallace's irony is both a 
subject and a rhetorical device.  This is important, because despite the fact that Wallace writes 
against irony in his non-fiction, he writes about a very specific self-negating, consciousness-
effacing irony that obviates connection and empathy.  In using irony as a weapon against irony, 
Wallace assumes the position of meta-ironist.   
 To date, the most comprehensive study of irony in Infinite Jest is Lee Konstantinou's “No 
Bull: David Foster Wallace and Postironic Belief.”  Konstantinou's view of Wallace's irony 
departs dramatically from the accounts of other critics because he not only notes the complexity 
of Wallace's irony (recognizing both the overarching narrative and structural irony, but also 
addressing the smaller instances of irony as well) but attempts to redefine the context in which 
Wallace writes.  Konstantinou reads Wallace in the context of Fukuyama's “end of history,” 
presenting the argument that  because Wallace writes in a dramatically shifted context from 
previous postmodernist writers, his use of irony is likewise dramatically shifted.  Wallace uses 
“metafictional form as a way of reconnecting form and content, as a way of strengthening belief” 
(90-1).  The irony that Wallace engages in is, for Konstantinou, “post-ironic” in the sense that it 
is opposed to the negativity of Kierkegaardian irony which is negative because it counteracts 
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belief as such.  Post-irony, Konstantinou argues, advocates a belief in “the ethos of belief in and 
of itself” (90).   
 While Konstantinou's critique of irony in Infinite Jest makes sense in the context of 
Fukuyama's Hegelian dialecticism that stresses synthesis and teleology, my understanding of 
Infinite Jest in the context of the encyclopedic novel follows more closely the Blakean dialectic 
that Frye theorizes in many of his works and the cyclical modal progression that Frye also 
presents.
109
  I do agree that there is a shift in the context of the use of irony from writers like 
Pynchon to Wallace, but I argue that this is the result of Wallace's interactions with postmodern 
irony, and not an extension of the same sort of irony or even the result of a shift to “post-irony.”  
The synthesis of postmodern irony and Wallace's integrative irony does not efface postmodern 
irony, but continues to contend with it and combat it from a position beyond the instability of 
postmodern irony. 
  4.4.1 Local Irony 
 The first step, then, in clarifying irony's role in Infinite Jest is to separate ironic tropes 
from the general irony that imbues the text and to contextualize these within the broader sweep 
of modal irony.  Ironic tropes are instances of what Booth calls “local irony,” or specific uses of 
ironic figurative language (literally saying one thing but meaning another).  Irony is applied to 
different things and has different meanings in Infinite Jest.  For example, students at ETA crack 
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 Brian Russell Graham writes in The Necessary Unity of Opposites: The Dialectical Thinking of Northrop Frye 
that, when faced with conflicting concepts, Frye's thought “moves dialectically beyond the level of opposition 
onto a higher level where seemingly antithetical modes of thought prose to be complementary” (6).  I have 
written else where that “this spatial metaphor of resolution on a 'higher' level also aligns with Frye's invocation 
of the Apocalyptic world as the space of revelation” (Raese 267).  For Frye, the Apocalyptic is the syncretic 
anagogy that permits what he called “interpenetration,” or the mutual-effectiveness of competing ideas. 
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ironic jokes about one another that do not extend beyond that specific utterance.  Modal irony, 
according to Frye's model, marks the novel's position on the cycle that moves from myth through 
the romantic, high mimetic, and low mimetic before arriving as irony.  As I described in the 
introduction to this dissertation, the cyclical movement from myth to irony represents a 
displacement from the cultural integration of myth to the cultural disintegration of irony.  While 
Infinite Jest remains in the ironic mode, it does represent a movement closer to a reintegration 
into the mythic than did Gravity's Rainbow.  
 Likewise, despite their declarations to be “irony-free,” AA members indulge liberally in 
this kind of irony.
110
  AA in fact actively engages in its own brand of irony.  For example, 
members of AA groups in Boston frequently share in-jokes, and maintain a double awareness 
about the effectiveness of the program.  Thus, AA does not so much discourage irony per se as it 
discourages the wrong kind of irony.  AA members' rejection of irony stems comes from the 
mistaken notion that irony always undercuts sincerity.  In the context of the novel, this means 
that members are not to speak deprecatingly about the program, must not use irony to mask their 
true desire to become sober, and must not use irony in any other way that might detract from 
their ability to become and remain sober.  However, the daily interactions of the residents of 
Ennet house and AA members undercuts this point.  Sponsors and counselors actively engage in 
irony to tell jokes and express kinship with new members.  This use of irony does what Booth 
terms “the building of amiable communities” (28).  Booth writes that these ironic utterances 
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 Van Ewijk writes, “At Ennet House, Wallace presents an audience that is not receptive to irony.  AA consciously 
tries to alter the context so as to take away any relevance of the ironic pose.  It does not entirely do away with the 
possibility of such an attitude emerging, but it certainly discourages it” (140).  While van Ewijk's point has merit 
in terms of general irony, it too makes the mistake of positioning AA and irony opposite one another rather than 
along a range. 
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work because the speaker “assumes that he does not have to spell out the shared and secret truths 
on which [the] reconstruction is to be built” (28).  Irony, in this case, strengthens interpersonal 
bonds by revealing shared knowledge and developing trust between the speaker and interlocutor.   
 Not only does irony have this integrative function, but AA actively encourages some 
kinds of irony amongst its members, albeit calling it something else.  Gately cannot puzzle out 
how it is that AA works, but by putting faith into the program, he has been able to see the 
success.  It is participation in this improbable program, “this unromantic, unhip, clichéd AA 
thing,” that seems to get results in spite of itself that draws group members together in a moment 
of shared understanding.  A long-standing joke among the Crocodiles111 is that remaining active 
is “only a suggestion” (356; Wallace's emphasis).  The irony of course, is that this “choice” is 
presented as something that is compulsory to staying sober.  The alternative to following this 
suggestion is going back to the habit to “die in slime” (356).  This, the narrator explains, is “your 
classic in-type joke” (356).  This “in joke” depends upon the knowledge that AA members of any 
tenure share with one another at the expense of the new members who do not want to follow the 
“suggestions.”  The reason that this irony works is twofold.  First, it distinguishes those who are 
“in” from those who are “out.”  Those who are “in” continue to share their experiences, to “pay it 
forward,” and remain sober.  They gain solidarity through this shared experience.  Secondly, this 
irony negates the “common sense” that incoming members believe that they possess.  Rather 
than degrading the program or one's own sincerity, this type of joke degrades the kind of person 
an addict once was.  Gately, who is now “in,” gets to laugh at the person he used to be – the 
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 Long-time AA members whom Wallace describes as having “geological” amounts of sober time under their 
belts. 
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person who rejected AA logic.  This ability to look back at the past also contributes to the 
recovery narrative to show the personal growth that an individual has undergone.
112
 
 In another episode, new Ennet house resident Geoffrey Day disputes the logic of AA with 
Don Gately.  Day's rejection of AA appears to be based upon his inability to see past AA's logical 
inconsistencies.  Gately reads this as Day's searching for a reason to redirect blame from himself 
for lapsing into addiction.  Geoffrey Day's path to rehab began when he fell asleep while driving 
and drove his car through a storefront, “and then got out and proceeded to browse until the Finest 
came and got him” (272).  After this, Day was taken to Dimock Detox, a legendarily seedy 
detoxification center, before arriving at Ennet House.  According to Day, however, this did not 
happen: “his story is he just strolled into Ennet House on a lark one day . . . and found the place 
too hilariously egregulous
113
 to want to ever leave” (272). 
 However, the ironic stance that Day takes to AA is what allows him to continue to 
participate in a program that he finds illogical and anti-intellectual.  Gately has already made 
peace with the inconsistencies of AA and made the decision to continue with the program (eg. to 
continue to pray to a God he does not believe exists), but Day has not reached that point of 
letting go of his intellectual inhibitions.  If he can do so, the ironic stance will serve Day's 
purpose of getting clean.  By maintaining an ironic distance from the real reason that he arrived 
at Ennet House, Day retains a portion of his dignity by pretending that he is at the house for 
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 See Timothy Aubry's “Selfless Cravings: Addiction and Recovery in David Foster Wallace's Infinite Jest” for 
more on the role of irony in AA and the recovery narrative.   
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 This is likely not Day's word choice but is a misunderstanding by Gately, through whom this episode is 
focalized.  On the blog “Infinite Detox,” the blogger interprets this word as a blending of “egregious” and 
“ridiculous.”  However, this term might also derive from the Latin “regulus,” a diminutive for “rex,” which the 
OED defines as “a petty king or ruler; a sub-king.”  Since Day does become something of a petty tyrant in 
lording his education over Gately and the other residents, this possible derivation seem apropos. 
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reasons other than his substance abuse.  Ultimately, if Day is sincere in his effort to get clean, he 
will need to alter his approach, but this is clearly a tactic that he uses to permit himself to remain 
in a place where he feels he does not belong but also knows that he needs to be.  Thus, Day can 
maintain an ironic distance as an excuse (for himself? for those around him?  for his colleagues?) 
to stay in rehab while pursuing a sincere desire for change.  Thus, far from being simply a 
disintegrative force, irony can promote community and a helpful “double-perspective.”  Day can 
look haughtily at rehab and also participate in rehab; the ability to have two perspectives propels 
Gately and others to continue to participate in a program that their logic tells them will not work.    
 The importance of integrative irony is underscored by examples of disintegrative irony in 
the text.  The notion that irony will undercut sincerity is not unique to Infinite Jest, or to 
postmodern irony.  One of the dangers of irony that Wayne Booth points out is that irony can be 
difficult to interpret, which can lead to difficultly in determining where irony begins and ends.  
Booth notes that a single word or phrase at the end of a passage can be enough to cast doubt on 
the entire passage.  Likewise, in Infinite Jest, because AA is built upon the structure of openness 
and sharing, the fear is that an ironic slip may cast doubt on an individual's sincerity in desiring 
sobriety.   Thus, members are encouraged to “Get Active With Your Group,” meaning they 
should attend meetings, go on Commitments, and also “share their experience, strength, and 
hope” with others (343).  The instability of irony can morph into Jamesonian pastiche.  Irony, in 
this sense, can be a danger to communities such as AA or ETA because the instabilities may 
remain local – one is uncertain of what a particular utterance means – or it may be symptomatic 
of a general irony – one is uncertain of broader meaning.  An ironic joke that exposes shared 
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knowledge builds community, but a speaker who jokes about the efficacy of the program casts 
doubt on the whole enterprise and the value of remaining sober.  
  4.4.2 General Irony 
 The general irony of Infinite Jest presents more of a challenge than does the use of irony 
as a trope.  General irony expands the scope of instability of local irony.
114
  Rather than limiting 
the instability – or doubling of meaning – to a phrase or exchange, general irony characterizes a 
cultural attitude toward truth and representation, like Romantic  or postmodern irony 
(Jamesonian pastiche).
115
   As seen from my examples above, the trope of irony tends to take 
place in discussions between characters and thus its limitations are more clear.  General irony in 
the novel is expressed through its narration, tone, juxtaposition of episodes, and the like.  It is 
this general irony that many critics interpret in a negative light, and Wallace seems to encourage 
this view through the discussions between AA members and Mario's observations that irony 
masks true feelings.  Because Infinite Jest stems from the postmodern tradition and adopts many 
postmodern techniques and tropes, it seems logical to presume that it partakes of general irony, 
but it is local irony in the text that indicates the proper way to read irony overall in Infinite Jest.  
The subject of many of these local ironies focus on the “amiable community” is a clue to the 
interpretation of general irony as a move away from disintegrative Jamesonian pastiche and 
toward an integrative model of irony. 
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 For Wayne C. Booth, general irony would be equivalent to “unstable-covert-infinite” irony in literature.  For 
Booth, this kind of irony “leav[es] us to infer the depths of their ironies from superficial and deliberately 
ambiguous signs” (257).   
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 Claire Colebrook describes Romantic irony as “a style of existence rather than a rhetorical figure” (52). 
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  However, Wallace never seems easy with methods by which one combats postmodern 
irony.  The liberating power of irony that Pynchon unleashes in Gravity's Rainbow is not 
available to Wallace: in his world, that form of irony has been co-opted by “Them,” and Wallace 
must struggle with developing a way to combat irony with irony.  This is apparent in an earlier 
work, Wallace's novella Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way from the 1989 collection 
Girl with Curious Hair.  In this piece, creative writing students Mark Nechtr and Drew-Lynn 
Eberhardt study under Professor Ambrose, a John Barth stand-in.  Wallace plays with Barthian 
metafictional form and seeks to find a way for the young Nechtr to emerge from under what 
Wallace clearly considers to be Ambrose's destructive influence.  The interaction between the 
two authors is less interesting than the metafictional choices that Wallace makes as the author of 
the piece.  In addition to making multiple allusions to Barth's Lost in the Funhouse, Wallace 
adopts certain metafictional tropes while claiming that the story itself is not metafictional.  For 
example, Wallace writes,  
if this were a piece of metafiction, which it's NOT, the exact number of typeset 
lines between this reference and the prenominate referent would very probably be 
mentioned, which would be a princely pain in the ass, not to mention cocky, since 
it would assume that a straightforward and anti-embellished account of a slow 
and hot and sleep-deprived and basically clotted and frustrating day in the lives of 
three kids, none of whom are all that sympathetic, could actually get published, 
which these days good luck, but in metafiction it would, nay needs be mentioned, 
a required postmodern convention aimed at drawing the poor old reader's 
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emotional attention to the fact that the narrative bought and paid for and now 
under time-consuming scrutiny is not in fact a barely-there window . . . (264-5) 
and this continues for another half page, describing the difference between such a facile 
postmodern approach and a more traditional realistic vein.  The narrator comments that “this 
self-conscious explicitness and deconstructed disclosure supposedly  mak[es] said metafiction 
'realer' than a piece of pre-postmodern 'Realism'” (265).  In this novella, Wallace does seem to 
take an anti-ironic stance, but he uses a disintegrative irony in an attempt to destroy a 
disintegrative irony.  Rather than actually combatting the destructive postmodern irony as he 
intends, Wallace doubles down on the irony.  Westward the Course of Empire Takes Its Way is not 
less self-conscious nor less metafictional than Lost in the Funhouse, but neither is it more.  It is 
as self-referential and metafictional as Barth's work, which undermines Wallace's purpose in 
writing it. 
 Wallace's critique of such postmodern conventions is clear, but the problem lies in the 
execution:  he must posit a way out.  I believe that it is his realization that disintegrative irony 
cannot combat destructive irony that leads Wallace to make the dire claims about irony that he 
does in “E  Unibus Pluram,” as mentioned above.  The impulse of using irony to combat irony is 
correct, but this is an impulse that Wallace will not redeem until Infinite Jest.  It is in Infinite Jest 
that Wallace identifies and utilizes integrative irony, though he refrains from explicitly pointing 
to the integrative irony in Infinite Jest.  What is more, in the “E Unibus Pluram” essay, Wallace 
characterizes integrative irony as a lack of irony.  This is Wallace's strongest point because 
integrative irony depends upon a pre-existing understanding among individuals – like the in-joke 
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– while disintegrative irony plays on ironic instability – the individual's ability to accurately 
interpret irony – that is necessarily alienating.  Unlike the irony of Westward the Course of 
Empire Makes Its Way, that is irony that metafictionally points out irony, Infinite Jest trusts the 
reader to understand the context of the irony and to be able to identify the ironic without 
guidance from the narrator.
116
  
 Just as meta-fiction provides a useful tool for examining the fictional nature of fiction, 
irony provides a useful tool for examining irony.  This is the ultimate legacy that Wallace 
receives from the postmodernist authors of a generation before: a redirection of ironic discourse 
back at itself.  Wallace demonstrates the drama of this recursive self-returning in human terms by 
making his characters face their own ironic detachment. For example, throughout the novel, Hal 
faces extreme bouts of self-awareness and self-doubt that alienate him from his peer group.  Hal 
suffers from “anhedonia,” a lack of the ability to enjoy his successes and his life.  He feels a loss 
of identity in the midst of the pressures that he faces both from his mother and from the weight 
of his dead father's influence.
117
  One expression of this is Hal's narration of an instructional 
video made by his brother Mario in which Hal gives the advice: “If you are an adolescent, here is 
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 Herman Paul argues that Hayden White's Metahistory seeks to pit irony against irony in a way that is similar to 
my discussion of Wallace's use of irony.  Noticing that White does not use the word “irony” uniformly, Paul 
posits two versions of irony White uses: epistemological and ideological.  The former refers to a skeptical 
historical position that recognizes there is no objective founding to history.  The latter form of irony refers to 
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debate.  White found this position to be constraining and a misunderstanding of the historian's role.  Paul argues 
that White's use of irony to fight irony works because of irony's unique ability to point beyond itself (this is the 
point that Konstantinou and others take from Kierkegaard) to a sincere meaning: “In other words, it is an 
understanding of pluralism that opens the door to a non-ironic comprehension of reality” (43).  While I agree that 
irony can be used as a tool against itself, I do not believe that it must lead to a non-ironic comprehension. 
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 In another striking example of a double-bind in the novel, Hal's mother Avril Incandenza pressures her son by 
refusing to influence his decisions and letting him make his own choices.  The freedom that Avril believes she is 
granting her son ends up constraining his ability to make decisions because he needs guidance from an interested 
adult. 
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the trick to being neither quite a nerd nor quite a jock: be no one.  It is easier than you think” 
(175).  Hal's plight is so painful because every reflection spirals back upon itself as he examines 
and reexamines his motivations.  This is a process of reflection that is absent from characters 
such as Orin, who practices “sincerity with a motive” and regales Hal with his deceitful pick-up 
strategies.  Hal's ability to interpret Orin's techniques locates the ethical failings that Orin seems 
completely oblivious to.  One of Orin's strategies – “Speedy Seduction Strategy Number 7,” to 
be precise – involves making up a fake spouse so that he can approach a woman, tell her how 
much he loves his “wife” and then confess that the woman's beauty and charms are severely 
tempting him away from the wife he holds so dear.  Orin presents this simply as a strategy, a 
dishonest one, he owns, but a way of gaining what he wants: there is no real infidelity and the 
other women will never know.  Hal, however, points the worst of it out to him: “The fake ring 
and fictional spouse.  It's like you 're inventing somebody you love just to seduce somebody else 
into helping you betray her.  What's it like.  It's like suborning somebody into helping you 
desecrate a tomb they don't know is empty” (1009n110).  Hal's sense of ethics is highly evolved 
for a seventeen year old and this is due, in large part, to his ability to bend irony to this larger 
ethical purpose.  In similar fashion, Gately is able to access the ritualistic (or religious) aspects of 
AA due to ironic stance regarding it.   
 Taken in a broader sense, irony's ability to “point beyond itself” is also a continuation of 
the encyclopedic disruption of authoritative discourse.  Irony, in pointing beyond itself, disrupts 
hierarchies of discourse.  A similar disruption of authoritative discourse occurs throughout 
Gravity's Rainbow in the form of paranoia and the metaphorical appeal to Gödel's 
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Incompleteness theorem.  The role of irony in the novel parallels the ironic function of the novel 
as a whole: the key to combating empty postmodern irony is not to veer off into unbounded 
sentimentality but to mediate the use of irony so that it can regain its critical edge.  And so, the 
key to the novel is not to read it as completely ironic or against irony, but as mediation that 
makes careful use of irony.  Infinite Jest addresses the topic of integration in several ways: as a 
reacquaintanceship of the self with the self, as a relationship between the artist and the work,  as 
an integration of the individual into society, and as a nation struggling to find its place in the 
world.  
 Many characters share their expression of alienation through irony, and this shared 
experience leads to a mutual understanding.  Recognition of this shared experience is an 
important first step in characters' realization of their participation with discursive communities 
and the beginning of a cultural re-integration.  But irony is a binding agent not just between 
characters but also between conflicting or even contradictory states of mind.  AA requires 
members to be both rational and non-rational creatures.  As noted above, Geoffrey Day's problem 
with AA is its banality.  He knows, rationally, that the program should not work but it somehow 
does.  This is the same hurdle that Gately had to clear in order to stick with the program.  But 
despite Gately's acceptance of AA principles, he remains a rational character able to articulate the 
value of the program even as he fails to completely understand it.  The irony of the situation here 
is not verbal but mental.  Gately and the other members of AA must constantly work to integrate 
their desires to be rational creatures with the irrational program.  It is in this way that the general 
irony of the novel tracks onto the figure of the double-bind.  The double-bind depends on a 
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model of general irony that integrates multi-layered “binaries” that move beyond the both/and 
logic of Gravity's Rainbow to something that is not recognizable as a binary at all.  
 Addiction, like habit formation, is not a rational process but the repetition of certain 
actions over a period of time that becomes a habit.  “No one action establishes a habit” (9), 
David Morris writes.
118
  Morris argues that Gately is able to address his problem of addiction in a 
more appropriate way than Day because Gately does not try to rationalize the recovery process.  
AA, as Morris rightly argues, defies rationality through a reliance on ritual: “Gately 
acknowledges that something beyond his rational capacity is integral to his reform to the extent 
that he realizes that his own time of action is not what enables his reform . . . it is the ritual 
communal life of A.A.” (16).  Morris ties Gately's success to his association with AA and Day's 
lack of success to his too secular, too rational mindset that rejects the ritualized aspects of the 
program.  Gately's activities, Morris writes, “force Gately to dwell in patterns that are alien to his 
rational attempts to change . . . and why he has to go on faith where A.A. is concerned” (16). 
 It does not seem a coincidence, then, that Hal writes about the role of the hero in the 
midst of such cultural upheaval.  Hal performs a comparative analysis of the protagonists from 
Hawaii Five-0 and Hill Street Blues, describing the former as “a classically modern hero of 
action” who is always on the move and solves cases himself (140).  The latter protagonist is a 
“'post'-modern hero . . . a hero of reaction,”  who delegates responsibility and manages his 
station (141; Wallace's emphasis).  Hal argues that the television audience has grown to prefer 
the latter protagonist but posits a move to “the hero of non-action, the catatonic hero” who 
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 Morris' essay originally appeard in Clio vol.30.4 (2001), though the version that I cite is a downloadable PDF 
available from Concordia University's Spectrum Research Repository and is paginated differently.   
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simply exists “divorced from all stimulus” (142).  Hal considers this “'post-post'-modern” hero in 
the light of a new shift in the “North American audience” (142).119  What Hal might be 
inadvertently advocating is a new reaction to culture in which the viewer refuses the stimuli of 
substances, entertainments, and the ever present specter of Too Much Fun.  Meaning is retained 
by maintaining a knowing distance from Entertainment and from a culture suffused in empty 
irony.  The ironic stance, in this case, is the rejection of a detrimental aspect of culture that the 
young students at ETA and many in the broader society cannot articulate.   
 The inability to articulate a sense of unease about the culture that they are growing into 
pervades the seemingly cynical ironic stance that the students of ETA adopt.  For example, Mario 
mourns other students' inability to talk about “really real stuff” without hiding their 
embarrassment or “roll[ing] their eyes or laugh[ing] in a way that isn't happy” (592).  What 
Mario sees in his fellow ETA residents may be an inability to break away from that ironic 
position, or it could be the marker of a deeper unease.  It is important to keep in mind that what 
is “really real stuff” for Mario is markedly different than it is for the other students who face the 
pressures of high level competition, bodily stress, familial stress, and uncertainty of their future.  
However, that Mario can detect the sadness behind the eye-rolling and uneasy laughing is an 
indication of the students real emotional state beneath the pose.  After all, the characters most 
featured in this atmosphere are adolescent males in a hyper-masculinzed environment that is not 
                                                 
119
 It is suggestive (and seems oddly prescient on Hal's part), that Hal suggests a catatonic hero who seems to be cut 
off from the world because he ends up becoming cut off from the world and because the Entertainment transfixes 
the viewer into a kind of catatonia.  To the first point, Hal cannot be said to be “divorced from all stimulus” 
because he does apprehend stimulus, he just cannot respond to it.  To the second point, this reading would 
position the viewer as the hero of the Entertainment, but this falls into the same problem as above.  The viewer is 
not cut off from stimulus because the stimulus is what keeps the viewer transfixed. 
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conducive to showing emotions, let alone sharing fears.
120
  Mario's openness is a counter-point to 
the affectations of young ETA students, but just as AA is presented as a counter-point to irony, 
these are not true oppositions.  Rather, it is Mario's concern for Hal that is more clearly indicative 
of the danger of the ironic stance.  The difference is that Hal lacks even that emotional tell of 
eye-rolling and uneasy laughing.  Hal affects a completely normal appearance in order to hide his 
fears that he is empty inside. 
 Hal's “post-post-modern” hero more accurately describes himself than it does his peers at 
ETA.  Mario's concern for the ironic pose that ETA students affect is an imperfect one that still 
reveals their discomfort.  In other words, these students are reactive in the way that Hal describes 
the “post-modern” hero.  The truly dangerous form of irony lies in that inability to react or to 
emote.  This is where Hal seems to get heroism wrong.
121
  Hal may even recognize this error in a 
late night discussion about lying with his older brother Mario: 
 'I think at seventeen now I believe the only real monsters might be the type of liar 
where there's simply no way to tell.  The ones who give nothing away.' 
 'But then how do you know they're the monsters, then?' 
 'That's the monstrosity right there, Boo, I'm starting to think.' 
 'Golly Ned.' 
 'That they walk among us.  Teach our children.  Inscrutable.  Brass-faced.' (774). 
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 Mario's reliability is somewhat questionable due to his inability to accurately interpret conversations that he has.  
In one conversation, an exasperated Hal exclaims “Jesus, Mario, it's like trying to talk to a rock with you 
sometimes,” to which Mario replies “This is going very well!” (759).  Mario's primary intelligence seems to lie 
in detecting others' emotional states, sometimes even before they are aware of them.   
121
 Hal calls the “post-post-modern” hero one of non-action, which I read as static and unchanging in regard to a 
toxic culture.  This inaction should not be considered a form of passive-resistance, which might be seen as 
reactive to coercive threats from elements of culture.   
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Earlier in the novel, Hal identified that distance as an heroic trait.  If this is heroic, it is due to a 
fractured reality from which Hal is learning to distance himself.  The ironic distancing to the 
point of catatonia has a hyperbolic Romantic quality to it.  However, by the time of the 
conversation quoted above, Hal is ready to recognize that a person who is impossible to read is 
one who can hide anything and is indistinguishable from everyone else.   
 The irony of all of this is that irony is the adopted stance that distances the individual 
from others and from affect, but it is also a tool for the individual to recognize these failings in 
the self.  Hal, without the proper ability to distance himself, is just one of those unfeeling 
monsters who can lie effortlessly and blend in with others.  It is the very mechanism that 
distances him that also permits himself to see that distance.  Although for Wallace this is a 
double-bind that plagues Hal and others in the text, it is also the way back out of all of this.  
Gately, again, provides an ideal example of this process: he enters Ennet House and AA 
completely disingenuously, as a way to escape prosecution, quickly revolts against the inanities 
and illogic of the program, but grows to find its value.  Gately had to first realize that there was a 
gap between who he was and who he wanted to be before he could begin his transformation. 
 Irony in Infinite Jest is a method of integrating competing ideas and of developing 
interpersonal relationships.  Irony does still carry some of the negative connotations associated 
with Jamesonian pastiche, but this is a novel of conflict over the meaning of irony.  As shown in 
the progression of Wallace's stance toward irony through his career, this is not a settled topic.  
Infinite Jest must present irony in a variety of ways to demonstrate the conflict and the need for a 
reconsideration of the concept. 
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  4.4.3 Modal Irony 
 My considerations of local and general irony in Infinite Jest ultimately are in the service 
of transitioning from a thematic consideration of irony to a modal one.  My contention in this 
chapter is that Infinite Jest fulfills two aspects of the encyclopedic novel as I have presented it: 
the Enlightenment tradition of Diderot's encyclopedia and Northrop Frye's argument in the 
“Theory of Modes” that the encyclopedic form occupies a position in a cycle that begins with 
mythic integration and displaces into “increasingly human analogies of mythical or scriptural 
revelation” (56).  While much of the chapter to this point has concentrated on the first aspect, it 
is to this second aspect that I now turn fully.  What this means is that the mythic encyclopedia 
represents a unified field of vision that unites the divine with the human but that, as the cycle 
progresses, the vision begins to separate into the divine and the human.  These “visions” overlap 
to varying degrees until the ironic mode is reached and there is a complete separation of the 
divine from the human.  In the ironic mode we are able to recognize the divine in an anagogic 
sense,  but recognize this as a strict analogy of – and not experience of – the divine.  Frye uses 
the trope of irony as a metaphor for this separated vision because it comprises a disassociation of 
the individual from group experience and from the “total body of vision” that is the mythic (55).  
I argue that Infinite Jest presents the ironic vision, the double-knowledge of the ironic and the 
mythic.  The return to the mythic is presaged by the self-awareness of separation from the mythic 
that only the ironic can afford.  Whereas Gravity's Rainbow is bound in establishing the position 
of the individual, its ironic perspective does not yet permit a vision of the horizon of the mythic.   
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 Wallace's double-bind and his struggles to re-conceive irony as an integrative force is in 
line with the progression of modes that Frye theorizes.  The double-bind is an attempt to regain 
the anagogic double-vision that moves back toward the mythic.  In “Theory of Modes,” Frye 
writes that “the return of irony to myth . . . is paralleled by some tendencies of the ironic 
craftsman to return to the oracular.  This tendency is often accompanied by cyclical theories of 
history which help to rationalize the idea of a return” (62).  It may be an overstatement to 
consider Wallace as an oracle, even a postmodern, ironic oracle, but in “E Unibus Pluram” as in 
Infinite Jest, Wallace acts as a guide to defining the postmodern, ironic malaise that he sees as 
having affected the youth of his generation.  Though he does not explicitly present predictions of 
the future, his work does provide a signpost to those struggling with the kind of disconnection 
that many of his characters experience. 
 While Wallace may not be an oracle, his work does contain cyclical theories of history, 
and in precisely the way that Frye means it.  Again, in the “Theory of Modes” essay, Frye 
introduces another element of the double vision: the episodic history of “the aesthetic or timeless 
moment” compared to the “vast panorama unrolled by history” (61), or the episodic and 
encyclopedic historical tendencies brought together.  Frye introduces Marcel Proust's 
Remembrance of Times Past and James Joyce's Finnegans Wake as exemplars of these concepts, 
respectively.  Frye notes that Proust creates “timeless moments” through his repetition of 
experience and that Joyce reveals that “vast panorama” with his “Viconian theory  of history 
which sees our own age as a frustrated apocalypse” (62).   
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 Wallace represents both episodic and encyclopedic historical tendencies in Infinite Jest.  
The  postmodern “timeless moment” is a cycle of addiction and recovery in which the individual 
experiences a repetition of use and abstinence.  Erdedy's failed attempt to break his marijuana 
addiction mentioned earlier in this chapter is a prime example of this.  He repeats his attempts to 
score his drug for “one last time” before he quits until he must finally make a break, go into 
treatment and recognize his union with the divine.  On the other hand, the narrative structure of 
the novel itself replays the cyclical nature of Finnegans Wake.  The opening scene of the novel is 
the last to occur, chronologically.  This means that the narration begins in media res and the 
scene only makes sense in light of the rest of the novel.  Because of the length of the novel, it is 
necessary for the reader to return to the first episode in order to reach a sense of completion.   
 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 Infinite Jest's contributions to the encyclopedic novel from are very similar to those of 
Gravity's Rainbow.  Both are products of their times written by authors very aware of their 
cultural context.  The two greatest contributions that David Foster Wallace makes with this novel 
are his move toward an ethics of integration and his reinvention (or perhaps rediscovery) of irony 
as an integrative force.  Wallace's humanistic drive demands a turn away from the alienation of 
Pynchon.  At the end of Gravity's Rainbow, there is little trust among individuals or of the 
communities that they create.  Wallace rejects this vision and creates a world that is still 
 185 
fragmented but is beginning to turn the corner on radical individualism.  Wallace creates 
communities that have the potential to create true connection between individuals.   
 It is no coincidence that the two major communities that Wallace includes – AA and ETA 
– encompass the members' entire lives.  AA is an integrative community that focuses on 
branching out and making further connections, staying involved, and forging personal 
relationships with other members.  Ennet House requires its residents to attend meetings daily 
and the house itself is an expansion of this community.  ETA encourages a team mentality while 
also encouraging a healthy model of competition that focuses on improving the self.  The 
students practice daily, attend class together, travel together and live together.  Despite all of the 
ills that befall characters while in these groups and the ills that AA members faced before 
becoming members, both present models of community that shape the interactions these 
characters will face in the future.   
 Wallace's use of irony is likewise hopeful and offers a path to greater mutual 
understanding.  Interpretations of irony will always be disputed and the nature of general irony is 
fluid over time.  But for this moment when irony connotes something particularly dark or empty 
or apathetic, Wallace saw a need to investigate the nature of irony and reclaim it as a critical tool.  
This is not to say that he has reinvented irony as a wholly positive force, but he has uncovered 
what should have been obvious to us all along: we are steeped in irony everyday and irony 
comes in many forms.  It is naïve to accept a single definition or interpretation of irony.  
Jamesonian pastiche and the “hip” irony of apathy still plague our culture, but Wallace wants to 
offer another way.  We can differentiate between the irony of cynicism and the irony of sincerity.  
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One alienates us from each other and purposefully obfuscates meaning.  The other binds us in 
communities and revels in shared understanding.   
 Thus, as an encyclopedic novel, Infinite Jest engages in a new discourse of mutual 
understanding through irony and shared knowledge that seeks to replace a dominant discourse 
steeped in a disintegrative irony.  This marks an important progression toward the mythic as 
irony shades further into common understanding and cultural integration.  Wallace also expands 
the boundaries of the encyclopedic form by including rhetorical elements derived from non-
fiction.  Thus, the integration of genre into the encyclopedic form is likewise expanded.  Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly to this project, Wallace's humanism marks a dramatic shift from 
Gravity's Rainbow and the threat of individual disintegration.  This encyclopedic novel notes the 
glimmer of hope that Pynchon withholds in his novel.  
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CHAPTER 5 
DIVINE DAYS: THE INTERPENETRATIVE ENCYCLOPEDIA 
 
 “History moves in a cyclical rhythm which never forms a complete or closed cycle.  A 
 new movement begins, works itself out to exhaustion, and something of the original state 
 then reappears, though in a quite new context presenting new conditions.” 
  -Northrop Frye, The Double Vision, 3 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 In the previous chapters, I presented the argument that David Foster Wallace's novel 
Infinite Jest built upon the postmodern model of the anarchistic encyclopedic novel that is 
Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow.  I pointed to continuities between the novels and, more 
importantly, the points at which Wallace's encyclopedic text diverges from Pynchon's.  Keeping 
with the conceptual and formal traditions of the encyclopedic that I traced from Diderot's 
Encyclopédie and that Northrop Frye outlines in Anatomy of Criticism, I argued that Pynchon 
develops a critique of Enlightenment-influenced systematized thinking by introducing the 
postmodern concept of “associational thought” in the form of paranoia that relies upon horizontal 
transmission of information and contingency, and that Wallace continued this critique by, in 
effect, multiplying the role of contingency through his creation of the double-bind.  In addition to 
this, I argued that the novels' use of irony showed a modal progression toward a re-integration 
with the mythic, as Frye predicts in his “Theory of Modes.”   
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 In the current chapter, I turn my attention to Leon Forrest's little-read Divine Days.  The 
novel is the first-person narration of six days in the life of aspiring playwright, Joubert Antoine 
Jones, that layers the characters' histories with local lore and the history of a town to create an 
encyclopedic text that challenges tradition, heritage, and art at the same time that it reinforces 
each of these in a new context.  Rather than attempting to replace an authoritative discourse with 
a marginal one, as the novels in the previous two chapters have done, Divine Days attempts to 
blend traditions, to uncover hidden similarities between them and expose the mutual 
interconnection of seemingly opposed ways of thought.   
 Divine Days carries on the tradition of the encyclopedic novel established by Gravity's 
Rainbow and echoed in Infinite Jest but diverges from these novels in an important way.  
Although Forrest's work appeared in 1992, four years prior to Wallace's work, Wallace's and 
Pynchon's works share a much stronger continuity in tone and theme.  Whereas those novels are 
desperate and ironic, Divine Days is hopeful and grounded in a much stronger sense of 
community.  Rhetorically, both Infinite Jest and Gravity's Rainbow are diagnostic in approach in 
that they both attempt to demonstrate the damaging effects of authoritative discourse first by 
labeling the problems (“Them” in Pynchon's book and either solipsism or cynical irony in 
Wallace's) and then proposing an alternative discourse to cure these symptoms (paranoia and 
associational thought in Pynchon's novel and the double-bind in Wallace's).  Divine Days adopts 
the differing rhetorical approach of explication, meaning that it aims to show explain or describe 
a current state of culture.  The important difference between the two approaches is that the 
diagnostic approach assumes a conflict that must be proactively corrected while the explicative 
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approach demonstrates that the conflict of discourses is the discourse and one needs only 
recognize the mutual necessity of heterological discourses.  I take up Divine Days last to also 
reflect its position further along the turn toward the mythic than either of the two previous novels 
addressed. 
 In this chapter, in addition to Frye's definition of the encyclopedic form already 
presented, I argue that Leon Forrest's Divine Days represents an evolution of the encyclopedic 
form that I call the “interpenetrative encyclopedia” based upon Northrop Frye's concept of 
interpenetration.
122
  Divine Days represents a tonal and rhetorical shift from the encyclopedic 
tradition in which both Infinite Jest and Gravity's Rainbow participate and indicates a further 
move toward re-integration with the mythic.  This shift is evident in two ways: first, Divine Days 
seeks to integrate competing traditions in a syndetic rather than syncretic fashion.  While 
previous models of the encyclopedic novel have shown a tendency to subvert dominant discourse 
and elevate marginal discourse, Divine Days reveals the mutual interconnection of multiple 
discourses.  Second, Divine Days actively participates in mythic integration of irony by avoiding 
the general irony that pervades Infinite Jest and Gravity's Rainbow and by supplementing local 
irony with signifying.  I conclude that these two shifts contribute to the novel's anagogic 
perspective (or “double-vision,” to use Frye's term) that represents a nearly complete re-
integration with the mythic according to Frye's theory of the encyclopedic form. 
                                                 
122
  Frye's theory of “interpenetration” appears only briefly in his published work but he wrote about it extensively 
in his personal notebooks that have been published by the University of Toronto Press as a part of The Collected 
Works of Northrop Frye.  While Frye never definitively outlines this theory, it meshes closely with other topics 
he dealt with frequently, such as double vision, anagogy, and certain forms of irony.  Although I will discuss each 
of these topics in greater detail below, a provisional definition for “interpenetration” can be: the mutual and 
necessary interactions of concepts, thoughts, or ideas originally considered to be in tension with one another.  
Frye often presents interpenetration as a cyclical alternative to the teleological Hegelian dialectic. 
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 I have divided the chapter into three sections.  The first section examines the personal 
tension that the protagonist Joubert Jones experiences because of his desire to be a part of two 
different communities.  Jones, an aspiring playwright, wishes to distance himself from his 
traditional community to legitimate his creation of high art.  At the same time, he wants to write 
about members of his community and to adopt an African American oral tradition that includes 
storytelling and signifying.  Forrest works to reconcile these traditions in the character of Jones 
by showing that he is able to integrate these traditions.  Forrest represents this tension in a 
broader way in the novel, as well, by including numerous allusions to works of Western literature 
while also employing a trickster figure.  The second section of this chapter centers on mythic 
integration, arguing that Forrest's “gumbo” style of narration mirrors the syndetic nature of the 
interpenetrative encyclopedia and that Forrest's use of local irony and signification reveal a 
stronger focus on “discursive communities” and shared, prior knowledge.  Finally, in the 
concluding section I draw these threads together to demonstrate Divine Days' engagement with 
anagogic “double vision.”  My interaction with “double vision” mirrors Wallace's “double-bind” 
but offers a new solution to the problem of binary thought in the form of reintegration. 
 Divine Days also adds an important dimension to this dissertation by providing an 
example of the encyclopedic novel that engages the Western canon itself as an authoritative 
discourse.  Up to this point, this dissertation has focused almost solely on the Western tradition in 
literature.  In part, this is due to the fact that Northrop Frye's Anatomy of Criticism is also very 
focused on Western literature with the Bible as its ur-text.  Denis Diderot's work also focused on 
specifically European modes of thought and the form of the encyclopedia that I have adopted as 
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my model (from Pliny's pedagogical model to Chambers' and Diderot's dialogic model and 
beyond) seems to be a particularly Western construct.  Forrest builds tropes from the Africana 
literary tradition into his novel in ways that contend with the marginalized nature of this 
tradition.
123
  While there is much work to be done with this novel regarding its place in the 
Western canon, I am primarily interested in the ways that Divine Days contends with competing 
traditions and its role as an encyclopedic novel because the novel does draw together elements 
such as doubling, use of irony, and marginality from different traditions, but in a way that 
attempts to reconcile rather than critique or replace.  Because of this, my consideration of Divine 
Days as an encyclopedic novel will fall more on the conceptual elements defined by Frye than on 
the formal elements derived from Diderot. 
 Divine Days is a massive novel, even in the context of other encyclopedic novels, that 
spans over 1,100 pages.  Beginning on February 16, 1966, the novel is the Joubert Jones' journal 
that details one week in his life.  The novel is a künstlerroman that follows Joubert's 
development as a dramatist.  Having previously worked as a freelance journalist for the Forest 
County Dispatch, Joubert writes extensively about his desire to learn the craft and includes many 
of his ideas for plays that he wants to write, all of which revolve around some of the prominent 
figures in the community.  The main plot line centers around Joubert's working to transition back 
into a civilian life after a term of service in the military while also attempting to remake himself 
as an adult and an artist in a community that has only known him as a child.  The narrative 
structure of the novel is such that the main plot line makes up less than half of the bulk of the 
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 The cover of the paperback edition of this text features a quote from Henry Louis Gates that underscores this 
double tradition.  Gates calls Divine Days “The War and Peace of the African-American novel.” 
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novel, the rest turning to Joubert's branching digressions and personal histories of people Forest 
County, where he lives.  These narrative digressions reveal Joubert's family history and focus 
prominently on two characters who never appear in the narrative-present: Sugar-Groove and 
W.A.D. Ford. 
 The conflict between Sugar-Groove (a mysterious figure who drifts in and out of town 
and is a source of inspiration for Joubert) and W.A.D. Ford (a huckster who starts a disreputable 
church) and the influence that the two men have on a young Joubert are the real centers of the 
novel.  Although neither Sugar-Groove nor Ford are in the narrative-present of the novel, the two 
loom large in Joubert's life and in the novel and the are constant sources of stories in Joubert's 
journal.  At the opening of the novel, Joubert has already written one play, Divine Days, about 
Ford and begins to think about writing a second play about Sugar-Groove.  The majority of the 
narrative digressions in Divine Days retell stories from Joubert's youth that involve one or the 
other of these two older men.  At one point, Joubert reveals that he has been keeping three 
separate journals on Ford: one is an “intelligence report” made up of Ford's own words (38), a 
second that is Ford's own account of his life (this often contains contradictory stories), and a 
third that is “straight news reportage” about Ford (39).   
 The structure of the novel and the prominence of these two conflicting characters gives 
Forrest space to work out the tensions of small-town life and the nature of influence on a 
community.  Sugar-Groove and Ford captivate everyone in the town and Joubert's plays are his 
way of puzzling out how two characters, so different from one another, can become so important 
within a community.  Parallel to the influence of the two men in the community is literary 
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influence in Joubert's life.  Forrest makes rich use of literary allusion from across canons.  He 
frequently layers allusions, making unexpected combinations to demonstrate the catholicity of 
Joubert's influences.
124
   
5.2 Integrating Competing Traditions: Frye's Interpenetration 
 In the first three chapters of this dissertation, I have sought to show the ways in which the 
encyclopedia is a radical form that defines ways of knowing and collates information based upon 
a particular epistemological structure (ie., pedagogic or dialogic).  The encyclopedia, and by 
extension the encyclopedic novel, attempts to define modes of thought for a particular time and 
place.  In other words, the text reflects cultural attitudes toward knowledge by reflecting tensions 
between authoritative and marginal discourses.  The interpenetrative encyclopedia takes this 
definition and extends its self-aware critique to the novel form itself.  Rather than accepting the 
precept that marginal discourse is separate from, or ancillary to, authoritative discourse, the 
interpenetrative novel argues for a greater reconsideration of the relationship between authority 
and the margin.   
 The interpenetrative encyclopedia argues for more than equality of discourse: it argues 
for the mutual-necessity of authoritative and marginal discourses.  In this way, the text is not 
diagnostic in the sense of pointing out an ill in the hopes of then looking for a cure, but 
explicative because it points out the fact that these tensions are themselves part of the 
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 Joubert's consideration of Raskolnikov in Fyodor Dostoevsky's Crime and Punishment is one such example of 
Forrest's layering of allusions: “. . . his name is Raskolnikov.  Here's the perfect blend for me.  Even greater than 
Hamlet.  And second only to King David” (1052).   
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discourse.
125
  Divine Days presents this mutual-necessity primarily in a tension and resolution 
between academic and oral traditions.  In the remainder of this section, I define what Frye means 
by “interpenetration” and what this, in turn, means regarding the cultural tensions Forrest 
includes in his novel.  This will include examining a part of Frye's definition of the encyclopedic 
form that I mentioned in the introduction but have not fully explored until now: the relationship 
of the author to the text and to his or her community.  Interpenetration and the encyclopedic 
author are two key aspects of the novel's approach to mythic re-integration. 
 It is necessary to first explore what Northrop Frye means by “interpenetration” and to 
consider how this concept fits into the encyclopedic form.  While Frye never formally outlined a 
definition for “interpenetration” in his published work, what he left behind in his many volumes 
of personal notebooks helps to tie together a series of ideas that he explores in many different 
works.  Frye's musings on interpenetration are varied, and sometimes he uses the term to indicate 
another scholar's missed turn or as a metaphor for a universal perspective.  At its basis, 
interpenetration is an irresolvable dialectic: Frye writes, “I wish we could throw away the notion 
of 'reconciling,' and use instead some such conception as 'interpenetration.'  Literature itself is 
not a field of conflicting arguments but of interpenetrating visions” (Frye, Collected vol. 13: 
216).  Much like the encyclopedic form in the mythic mode, interpenetration builds multiple 
perspectives together into a unified vision.   
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 This definition of the interpenetrative encyclopedia also tracks onto Jacques Ranciere's definition of “equality 
politics” discussed in chapter 2.  In short, the interpenetrative encyclopedia takes an active stance because it 
presumes the equality between discourses rather than attempting to justify the need for equality. 
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 At the center of Frye's concept of interpenetration is the desire to “get beyond subject-
object categories” (Frye, Collected vol. 5, xl), or “a sense of the universal here” (vol. 13: 162).126  
In effacing the categories of subject and object, Frye seeks a totalizing, or universal, view that 
includes a broad view of history both secular and spiritual.  One such example considers the 
nature of God: “God's centre is everywhere, but his circumference must be everywhere too: 
things get defined and outlined, not just absorbed” (vol. 6: 53).  Thus, to use Hegelian terms, the 
coexistence of thesis and antithesis is the key to interpenetration.  The non-resolution of 
competing forces is neither progressive nor teleological but part of a broader spectrum of 
myth.
127
  At one point, Frye does hint at a political dimension of interpenetration that pre-figures 
Ranciere's elevation of disagreement in politics.  Frye writes, “interpenetration of belief is unity 
with variety, like metaphor; reconciliation, conversion, agreement, are all forms of imperialistic 
compulsion” (Denham, Unbuttoned 149).   
 In terms of the encyclopedic novel, interpenetration should be interpreted as the mutual-
coexistence of competing discourses.  This model of interpenetration differs from the models of 
the encyclopedic novel explored in this dissertation so far and from Diderot's Encyclopédie 
because all of those iterations sought to replace or supplement one mode of thought with another.  
The interpenetrative encyclopedia demonstrates the futility of attempting to legitimate a marginal 
discourse because that discourse is already a part of broader dialogue between the authoritative 
and the marginal.   The interpenetrative encyclopedia makes good on the early promise of the 
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 Sárá Tóth identifies the similarities between Frye's interpenetration and Martin Buber's I-Thou principle (128-9). 
127
 Frye mentions Hegel in connection with interpenetration several times in his notebooks, at one time opining that 
“Hegel showed how the thesis involved its own antithesis, although I think the 'synthesis' has been foisted on 
him by his followers” (Frye, Collected vol. 6: 616). 
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anarchistic encyclopedia because it seeks to bring together not just a plurality of voices, but also 
a unity-in-difference – all perspectives into a universal.   
 In Divine Days, Forrest establishes a complex network of metaphors to refer to oral and 
literary traditions using the barbershop and the college, respectively.  Forrest establishes the 
tension between traditions early in the novel.  As the novel opens, Joubert Jones has just arrived 
back in America after serving an Army tour at a base in Germany.  Joubert begins work at 
Eloise's Night Light, a bar owned by his Aunt Eloise, while he tries to restart his flagging literary 
career.  The opening pages are peppered with many literary allusions from Willa Cather to 
Shakespeare and also with gossipy stories about the locals who patronize the bar.  Because the 
eleven hundred page novel is structured as a record – one week's worth of Joubert's journal – it 
often digresses to include his musings on literature and his role in life.  One such example has 
him criticizing the amateur literary output of Joubert's friend Sergeant Franklin Hamilton for 
being too plain, too single-voiced, which he follows with a consideration of his own position: 
But my problem was more complex [than Hamilton's]; my heritage is hounded by the 
voices of oral tradition, literary tradition.  Chased up into the church, the steeple in order 
to reveal the people.  Twelve voices went into the curating of One Apostles Creed.  I liked 
that passage about the resurrection and the life everlasting.  What playwright wouldn't?  
What must I do to produce a Black literary revival, in order to be saved?  First of all shut 
my mouth up!  And listen to those voices wherever that [sic] take me”  (16-7).  
Joubert's embattled position between oral and literary traditions complicates his relationship with 
either tradition, forcing him to consider the constraints of one tradition over the other.  The 
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scattered nature of Joubert's writing style, free-associating from topic to topic, demonstrates his 
inability at the outset of the novel to reconcile these two traditions.   
 Forrest then complicates the alignment of oral tradition to the barbershop and the literary 
tradition to the college by introducing Dr. Allerton Jamesway, one of Joubert's former professors 
with whom he developed a friendship.  In an extended description of a lunch the two shared, 
Forrest shifts the seat of the oral tradition from the barbershop to the bar where Joubert works.  
After hitting the numbers and using his winnings to purchase a typewriter and some books about 
drama writing, Joubert meets Prof. Jamesway for lunch.  Joubert is anxious to justify his desire 
to re-enroll in the college, recognizing that his associations with his aunt's bar and “low” 
activities such as playing the numbers may carry unwanted implications about his character.  In 
this scene, Forrest complicates the tension between the oral and academic by exposing the 
intersections with both class and race.  Joubert worries that he could not “reveal how [he] had 
enough money to buy his used typewriter, because of money [he] had won in the Numbers Game 
in a lower middle-class Negro bar” (88).  In this way, Forrest shifts the dichotomy between the 
barbershop and the college to one between the bar and the college, with the important difference 
that Jamesway recognizes the barbershop as a cultural center in the community, versus a “lower 
middle-class Negro bar.”   
 This shift in tensions is important because it begins to open Joubert's eyes to the fact that 
it is his own internalized sense of division that may prevent him from becoming the writer he 
dreams of being.  Joubert acknowledges that Prof. Jamesway was “very much appreciated in the 
[sic] Williemain's barbershop” (89).  Because Jamesway is respected in the community and has 
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already bridged the gap that Joubert wishes to cross (Jamesway reveals that he also learned about 
Sugar-Groove in Williemain's barbershop), Joubert begins to see the interpenetration of the oral 
and academic.  However, Jamesway is also a forgotten entity in Joubert's community.  The 
addition of class to the tension between the oral and the academic seems to have effaced 
Jamesway from the community: “Dr. Jamesway was unappreciated (almost unknown among the 
black middle-class) even though many of the teacher-class had read his works in college 
probably force-fed upon them.  [. . .] most of the Negroes in the middle class that I knew 
assumed that Dr. Jamesway was dead” (89).   
 The discussion between Joubert and Jamesway begins to elevate the barbershop in 
Joubert's estimation.  While he already respected the role of the barbershop in the community, he 
still retained the notion – reflected in his thoughts about the Night Light Lounge – that the 
barbershop was somehow lacking in comparison to the college because of class differences.  But 
what Joubert had perceived as a class tension has more to do with the seedy nature of the bar and 
the influence that it has on Joubert's behavior.  Before parting after their lunch, Prof. Jamesway 
advises Joubert that he must choose his own path: 
“It's almost impossible for me to advise you, Joubert, about a life that you must settle 
upon, for your own good.  You do tend to be very self-deprecating.  I haven't seen the 
boastful side of your ego, yet it must be there.  I do believe that you need to strike out for 
yourself; and strike for yourself in the direction that's best for your future, and the future 
of your own talent” 
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Prof. Jamesways' words leave Joubert torn because he can recognize the truth in what he says but 
still doubts his own abilities.  Jamesways' words forecast the realization of interpenetrating 
influences that Joubert must come to in order to develop as the writer he wishes to become.  The 
path that he must strike out on is one that recognizes the interpenetrative nature of influence and 
one that leads to  Joubert's realization that, in his deliberations over the difficulty of mediating 
the oral with the academic, he does not need to mediate because he already has been 
incorporating these influences into his thoughts and work. 
 A second aspect of encyclopedism that Frye theorizes that is important here is the notion 
of the encyclopedic poet.  This figure is unique to the interpenetrative encyclopedia because the 
encyclopedic poet marks an important step toward reintegration into the mythic that other forms 
of the encyclopedic novel have not achieved.  This dissertation so far has invested heavily in the 
blending of genre, and that will continue to be an important factor in this chapter, but a new 
focus on the role of the author of the narrative is also necessary for full consideration of this 
novel.
128
   
 The role of the poet follows the same cycle that Frye defines in “Theory of Modes” in 
Anatomy of Criticism but Frye uses the term “encyclopedic” in a new way.129  For Frye, the 
encyclopedic poet is one who represents his or her own society and addresses it from a position 
within that society.  The encyclopedic poet aligns with the mythic mode because “the poet may 
                                                 
128
 Frye does not mean “author” in the contemporary narratological sense of a flesh-and-blood human being who 
exists outside of the text.  Frye includes “the poet” and “the poet's readers” as a part of the ethical elements of a 
work of literature (Anatomy 52-3).  In this case “the poet” might also be considered an implied author or even a 
narrator, in either case the poet exists within the text for Frye. 
129
 Frye frequently overlaps multiple meanings in a single term when he wants a particular term to carry additional 
weight or when he wants to blur boundaries between meanings.  One of the most prominent examples in this 
dissertation is his use of “irony” to mean a mode in his cycle of displacement, the position of a hero in relation to 
society, general irony, and local irony. 
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devote himself to being a spokesman of his society, which means, as he is not addressing a 
second society, that a poetic knowledge and expressive power which is latent or needed in his 
society comes to articulation in him,” and that this poetry is “educational in the broadest sense” 
(Anatomy 54).  Frye's reference to the “second society” indicates the poet's integration into his or 
her own society.  But rather than presenting variations in the progression of the modal cycle, 
Frye presents a gradation between “encyclopedic” and “episodic” poet.  The episodic poet is one 
who writes as an individual or as one outside of his or her society and, thus, must write back to 
that “second society.”  The degree to which the episodic poet is outside of society is equivalent to 
the displacement of myth into irony.   
 The encyclopedic poet also recalls another important aspect of this dissertation, which is 
the role that local irony plays in an encyclopedic narrative.  Much like Booth's “amiable 
community” or Hutcheon's “discursive community,” the encyclopedic poet must write to a 
community that already has a shared knowledge and understanding.  For Booth and Hutcheon, 
this prior knowledge is necessary for stable ironies to exist – the community must precede irony 
– and it is the same for Frye: a common knowledge must pre-exist the encyclopedic poet for him 
or her to be able to effectively communicate with that society.  Indeed, Frye anticipates this point 
in arguing that “a conception of a total body of vision that poets as a whole class are entrusted 
with, a total body tending to incorporate itself in a single encyclopaedic form” is implicit in the 
idea of an encyclopedic poet (55). 
 What makes Divine Days different from both Infinite Jest and Gravity's Rainbow in this 
regard, and what merits this discussion of the encyclopedic poet, is that Divine Days utilizes a 
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first-person narrator who is a writer as well.  Drawing again from the passage quoted above, 
Joubert asks himself “What must I do to produce a Black literary revival, in order to be saved?”  
This question explicitly connects Joubert's conception of his own art with his position in the 
community.
130
  In taking the responsibility for reviving the Black literary tradition and putting it 
explicitly in the context of being “saved,” Joubert elects himself spokesperson.  For Joubert, this 
means developing both the oral and literary traditions, finding a way to counter-balance the two.  
Still later in the novel, Joubert refers to himself as “the snotty-nosed, uncircumsized, unclean 
bard of [his] race” (437).    But navigating the differences between two traditions is not simply a 
way of finding his own voice, but of achieving recognition for the new voice of his society.  In 
this way, the encyclopedic poet shares with the encyclopedic form the goal of drawing together, 
of integration.   
 Taken together, interpenetration and the encyclopedic poet provide a new model for 
progress toward integration into the mythic.  Both of these concepts depend upon a syndetic 
rather than a syncretic model of integration characterizing previous iterations of the encyclopedic 
novel.  The syndetic model of integration refers to a process of sense-making where concepts or 
objects take on multiple meanings.  Rather than canceling prior meanings or altering a single 
meaning, syndetic integration asks the reader to layer meanings so that a single concept or object 
must carry multiple meanings at once.  As a narrative strategy, syndesis builds meaning in a 
single concept, object, word, or figure in order to build complexity.  The most prominent 
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 Joubert's question also echoes the concerns of canon formation and even the naming of African-American 
literature.  For example, Kenneth W. Warren argues that African American literature took shape in the context of 
racial subjugation and  prejudice during Reconstruction and in Jim Crow south and that, in the absence of that 
historical frame, “the coherence of African American literature has been correspondingly, if sometimes 
imperceptibly, eroded as well” (2). 
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example of this is Forrest's extensive use of the word “divine” to imply many separate but related 
meanings.
131
  I draw syndetic integration from the term “syndesis,” a term coined by Robert 
Plant Armstrong to explain differences in perception of certain objects by different cultures at 
different times.  Armstrong traces the concept of syndesis to Yoruba culture, in which objects can 
retain multiple meanings that may contradict one another but do not cancel out or replace one 
another.
132
   Rather, Armstrong defines syndesis as a process of accretion of meaning. 
 While the syndetic model of integration combines elements while respecting the 
individual integrity of these elements, the syncretic model relies upon reconciling differing 
elements to a single, authoritative voice.  The syncretic model becomes problematic for the 
encyclopedic form because it has the tendency to replace one form of authoritative discourse 
with another.  For example, Diderot's goal for the  Encyclopédie was to upend the authoritative 
hierarchy that privileged Church and State by replacing it with a rational skepticism.  This model 
of thought then became standardized to the point that Pynchon found it necessary to argue 
against this model of rationality and standardized access to knowledge.   
 Divine Days, on the other hand, does not attempt to subvert one tradition to another or to 
standardize the discourse.  Instead, Divine Days adopts a model of syndesis in which it makes 
broad connections between authoritative and marginal discourses to demonstrate a meta-
discourse that includes both.  Rhetorically, Forrest builds syndesis into his dialogue, frequently 
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 Forrest's use of the word “divine” is one that I will return to in greater detail below. 
132
 Armstrong traces “syndesis” to Yoruba culture in which he defines “works of presence” and “works of 
invocation” as differing aesthetic standards than Western “works of virtuosity” that are judged by the skill of the 
artist's production.  Armstrong's point is that both works of presence and of invocation may be interpreted 
differently depending upon their function, what they are meant to express, or how they make sense of the world.  
However, these interpretations are multiple, do not negate one another, and can both be and not be at the same 
time.  For more on Armstrong and snydesis, see The Powers of Presence 3-20. 
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opening character speeches with ellipses coupled with conjunctions in a way that mimics 
polysyndenton.  In dialogue, this form of syndesis has the effect of mimicking conversational 
patterns that highlight continuity from one speech into the next.  Forrest also uses the 
ellipsis/conjunction formulation to begin paragraphs of exposition.  Much like syndetic 
integration, this use of syndesis on the rhetorical level works to efface boundaries that would 
otherwise separate thoughts or flows of speech patterns and promotes an inclusive interpretation.   
 At one point, Forrest uses the ellipsis/conjunction construction to open a subheading.  
This example is significant because the syndetic momentum of the ellipsis/conjunction 
construction effaces the textual mark that indicates a sub-heading break, which forces the reader 
to consider the new sub-heading both a continuation of the previous episode and a unique 
episode at the same time.  While this tactic is not new, Forrest does call attention to the 
constructed nature of individual episodes within a larger narrative frame and encourages the 
perception of many interlinked episodes, such as those that make up Divine Days to comprise an 
overarching story that is mythic in scope.  The complex of interrelated stories is no longer Sugar-
Groove's story or Joubert's story, but a story of community. 
 In this example, Joubert reflects on the death of Aaron Snow, a heroin addict who was 
shot dead by Eddie Egglestone, a plain clothes police officer, in the course of a hold up.  Joubert 
had covered the death and funeral for the Forest County Dispatch and viewed Snow 
sympathetically.  The episode ends with Joubert's memory of Snow's distraught uncle.  The entire 
episode is narrated from Joubert's memory.  After the sub-heading, the narrative picks up with 
Eddie Egglestone sitting in Eloise's Night Light Lounge:   “. . .And even now, Eddie 
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Egglestone—despite his destain—could not forget how Aaron Snow swirled about like one of 
those bullfighters in Hemingway, when evilly pursued by the bull” (567).  This use of the 
ellipsis/conjunction works to bind the description of Egglestone's conflicted relationship with 
Aaron Snow to the previous episode, narrated from a different point of view at a different time.  
Egglestone, sitting at the bar, justifies his killing of Snow to Joubert: “Motherfuck if he did come 
at me with an artist crazed eye of absolute concentration and hopped up madness” (567).  
Egglestone's harsh characterization of Snow reflects his perspective as much as Joubert's does 
his.  The juxtaposition of these episodes calls attention to the conflicting feelings toward the 
same event about which both Joubert and Egglestone are “correct” even though their 
interpretation of events and of Snow differ.  On top of this, Forrest layers an allusion to 
Hemingway's use of the bullfights as a metaphor for the same interpersonal conflict.   
 Forrest also uses syndesis as a metaphorical structure for blending competing discourses.  
This is most apparent in the blending of oral and literary traditions through Joubert's desire to 
write academic plays that feature prominent figures in Forest County where Joubert lives.  Two 
figures, W.A.D. Ford and Sugar-Groove, are central to the mythology of Forest County and are 
subjects of two plays that Joubert plans to write.  Both Ford and Sugar-Groove's origins are 
obscured through most of the novel, and both are constant sources of gossip within the 
community, for they are rumored to possess supernatural abilities and are very charismatic.  The 
difference between the two is that Ford is revealed to be a charlatan preacher while Sugar-
Groove is admired by most of Forest County.  These two figures represent two archetypal 
African characters: the badman and the trickster. 
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 Early in the novel, Joubert refers to Ford explicitly as a trickster when describing the play 
All Souls that Joubert had written about him.  Ford arrived in town under mysterious 
circumstances, rented a storefront, and used the space to start DIVINE DAYS church.  By the 
time the novel opens, the church has been shuttered and Ford has disappeared amidst rumors of 
his sexual dalliances with female parishioners, and Eloise's Night Light has opened in the same 
storefront.  Joubert frequently reminisces about Ford and his influence on the people of Forest 
County, and he frequently attributes supernatural qualities to these influences.   
 Trickster figures in mythology are liminal characters who inhabit spaces between humans 
and gods.  These figures often bend or break the rules for proper conduct.  Henry Louis Gates 
traces the trickster figure in African traditions to Esu-Elegbara in Yoruba mythology, although 
the trickster exists in many different African and African-American traditions.  While Gates is 
quick to point out that this figure has appeared in many cultures in various forms, Esu-Elegbara, 
or Esu, is fundamentally a figure of mediation between states of being, such as between humans 
and gods.  Gates includes a partial list of qualities of Esu, the most important of which for this 
chapter are individuality, irony, magic, indeterminacy, sexuality, and betrayal.
133
  The inclusion 
of conflicting characteristics on the list represents the “complexity of this classic figure of 
mediation and of the unity of opposed forces” (6).  The significance of the trickster figure is that 
it is both an interpreter and is open to interpretation: the trickster is something of a cipher.   
 Ford's role as trickster in Divine Days is yet another instance of the integration of 
divergent tropes or characteristics.  While Ford's role as a trickster is one that deserves more 
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 Gates' list reads, “individuality, satire, parody, irony, magic, indeterminacy, open-endedness, ambiguity, 
sexuality, chance, uncertainty, disruption and reconciliation, betrayal and loyalty, closure and disclosure, 
encasement and rupture” (6). 
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coverage, my interest in this character is in its contribution to the mythic elements of the novel 
while providing another example of unity-in-difference that pervades the interpenetrative 
encyclopedia.  In one extended passage, Joubert recalls Ford's unique perspective on preaching 
and the importance of the goat to his theology.  Forrest writes: 
Workmen had to fumigate the premises [of All Souls church and Eloise's Night Light] 
because of the “divine” smell of the goat, before we could get started on the necessary 
reconstruction  of DIVINE DAYS, or what was left of it.  W.A.D. Ford believed that the 
bedraggled but wily goat was in actuality a holy animal.  The animal had received a bad 
rap for the last five hundred years.  The goat held a status of nobility at DIVINE DAYS.  
Ford sought to have all of his flock “nurse” their “lambs” on goat's milk.  Ford had no 
qualms about setting a blaze of firelight upon the sacred animal's flanks: commingling 
sacrifice with appetite sending up a message to God and creating a sacrifice and a 
sacrament.  This hunger for light initially fulfilled by pointing out the ever present power 
of the Star.  “Look to it,” he cried.  There was no separation line between the state of 
earthly delights and the temple of spiritual hunger.  Ford saw a starvation for light, “in 
toto.”  “In toto” was a favorite expression of Ford's (435). 
This passage is significant because it demonstrates Ford's subversion of gospel by elevating the 
“goat” while also introducing a vocabulary of liminality and integration, and also developing the 
significance of repeated words and phrases.  Ford subverts the parable of the sheep and the goats 
in Matthew by reinterpreting (misinterpreting?) the metaphor of goats as passed over to one 
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central to a Christian theology.
134
  Not only does this trickster invert the meaning of the parable, 
but he also blurs the lines between the spiritual and the earthly.  Terms such as “commingling,” 
“ever present,” and “no separation line” reinforce the notion of integration, though Ford's 
motivation seems to be to confuse and misdirect his flock rather than to guide them toward a 
mythic integration.  The metaphor of the goat takes on additional significance as Joubert 
describes actual goats “strutt[ing] about the grass-matted floors of DIVINE DAYS, like natural 
men; or even satyrs” (436).  Forrest's introduction of the mythical satyr in conjunction with Ford 
confirms the pan-mythical perspective of the narrative.  Given that the satyr is also a sexualized 
creature, this aligns with other of Ford's personality traits.   
 Finally, this passage is significant because it continues a trend that pervades the novel: 
Forrest uses many phrases repeatedly and in different contexts so that the phrases take on added 
meaning.  However, although the accrued meanings that the phrases take on over the course of 
the text is ironic, this does not create an instability of meaning.  The most repeated word in book 
is “divine,” and it is most frequently paired with “days” and capitalized.  “DIVINE DAYS” first 
refers to Ford's church, but then it becomes the title of the play that Joubert wants to write about 
Sugar-Groove.  Forrest also uses the terms “divine vigil” (147, 148, 754), “divinity's daimon” 
(1093, 1094), “divine one” (436), and “divine deeds” (624), among several others.135  The point 
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 The allusion to goats and sheep comes from Matthew: “And before him shall be gathered all nations: and he 
shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats: And he shall set the sheep 
on his right hand, but the goats on the left.  Then shall the King say unto them on his right hand, Come, ye 
blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world” (KJV Matthew 
25:32-4). 
135
 Forrest clearly recognized the power in the repetition of “divine” and particularly “DIVINE DAYS.”  In an 
interview with Eugene Redmond, Forrest remarked on the title, “I was going to use the title The Memoirs of 
Joubert Jones.  This is his name, the main character, Joubert.  After a while that seemed to be a little, well, I tried 
it on people and people would sort of say, 'Well, that's all right.'  And one of the churches in the novel is called 
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of this, like Gates' partial list of the characteristics of the trickster, is not to be definitive, or even 
to examine the meanings of individual instances of the term, but to show the complexity of the 
topic.  That Joubert links Sugar-Groove to Ford in his mind via the term “DIVINE DAYS” 
demonstrates a unity-in-differences between the figures and a great deal of associational thought.  
Forrest wants to challenge the concept of divinity by associating it with a clear charlatan (Ford) 
while also invoking the mythic (Sugar-Groove).   
 Ford's foil, Sugar-Groove takes on a mythic presence from the very opening of the novel 
and he takes the form of “badman,” another archetypal figure that extends from the Trickster.  
John W. Roberts  traces the origins of the badman to the trickster in much the way that Gates 
traced the contemporary trickster from Esu-Elegbara.  Roberts argues that many accounts of the 
badman in African American literature conceive of the character as one who opportunistic and as 
likely to victimize blacks as whites (220-1).  However, he goes on to show that the label of 
“dissembling trickster” that has been bestowed upon the badman by scholars unfamiliar with the 
origins of the figure are incorrect and that badmen are  black folk heroes who have “traveled as 
champions of African Americans who have been forced to negotiate the American landscape by 
being quick of wit and adept at detecting sleight-of-hand . . . whose characteristic behaviors have 
historically and traditionally served as models of and for behavior among people of African 
descent in America” (221).  Roberts likens the transition from trickster to badman to Br'er 
Rabbit, a figure that continually escapes capture through trickery.  Like Br'er Rabbit and like the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Divine Days and there are other allusions to 'Divine Days,' so I said I'll try this one and everyone I've mentioned 
it to has said it's intriguing, this 'Divine Days'” (Redmond 31). 
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trickster Ford, the badman may exhibit duplicitous behavior, but it is in the service of survival in 
a contentious atmosphere.
136
 
 Sugar-Groove is a figure who is well-known in the community but also is mysterious.  
His means of support is never quite known, and he is often attributed with supernatural 
characteristics and is the subject of much gossip in the the community.  Forrest establishes 
Sugar-Groove's mythic potential early in the novel when Joubert is coming to learn of what had 
transpired in Forest County during his absence: 
Sugar-Groove had apparently passed away some time during the last weeks of my two-
year army stint.  I say apparently passed away, but vanished into the sunset, or up into the 
heavens would also be vaguely helpful (thus another spoke in the wheel of his 
nicknames, Sugar-Smoke, will be revealed in prophecy) because one was never sure if 
someone might not report seeing Sugar-Groove out south, or out west or out east.  Nor 
were these Sugar-Groove sightings confirmed by bird-watchers, or sky-hawks, or sky-
kings, either (32-3). 
In addition to this, “nearly everything known about Sugar-Groove is by word of mouth, and thus 
filled with contradictions” (27), and pages later, “Nearly all Aunt Eloise knows (as well as 
everyone else, except Willieman) issues from legend” (31).  Sugar-Groove's position in the 
community as badman fulfills an archetypal position as a character to emulate.  Indeed, Sugar-
Groove will prove to be a more important symbol of integration in the course of the novel.
137
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 It does not seem coincidental that Joubert's Aunt Eloise often refers to him by the pet name “Br'er Bear.”   
137
 Dana A. Williams also mentions the badman influence in the character of Sugar-Groove. She writes that as 
badman, “a folk figure in African culture, Sugar-Groove adopts an ability to attract women, though he is not as 
uncaring or as unfeeling as his [trickster] counterpart” (101). 
 210 
 As Joubert learns more about Sugar-Groove and his history, he uncovers secrets about 
Sugar-Groove's origins.  When young, Joubert worked as a shoe-shine boy in Williemain's 
barbershop and one night he stayed late to shine Sugar-Groove's shoes and heard the story of 
Sugar-Groove's education and early life.  Joubert relates the story from Sugar-Groove's 
perspective in his journal.  Sugar-Groove seems to understand Joubert's role as a story-teller 
because he informs the young man that he had not told the story before but that he thought that 
Joubert would “make some sense out of it in the long run over a period of time,” and that he 
might be able to “make use of it one day” (312).  At the same time, Sugar-Groove emphasizes 
that this is “the general outlines of history—unwritten” (emphasis original, 312).  Sugar-Groove 
seems to challenge Joubert to write his unwritten history.   
 The story begins with a revelation: a young Sugar-Groove sets out to his father's home, 
and his father turns out to be Wilfred Bloodworth, a white former slave-owner.  The father, 
Wilfred Bloodworth, had “never acknowledged him as a son, only 'boy' in any public way” 
(314), and had been “materially . . . 'generous' to the young Negro, funding Sugar-Groove's two 
years at Tuskegee.  Sugar-Groove further reveals that his mother, Sarah-Belle, had been a slave 
in Bloodworth's house and had died in childbirth.  The climax of Sugar-Groove's story is a 
physical confrontation with Bloodworth when he was fourteen. 
 Sugar-Groove's confrontation with Bloodworth stems from a series of alluring pictures of 
Sarah-Belle that Sugar-Groove found tucked into Bloodworth's bible.  Sugar-Groove has never 
seen a picture of his mother and was shocked at the sight of her body and the way that she posed 
for the shot.  Sugar-Groove sees the photographs because Bloodworth, who blamed Sugar-
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Groove for the loss of Sarah-Belle, stood to leave the room and Sugar-Groove wondered what 
Bloodworth had been reading.  He sees the pictures and is shocked by the revelation of Sarah-
Belle's death and her image at the same time.  Sugar-Groove is conflicted over his feelings for 
his mother who 
posed for the white man, who would not (and could not) marry her down here.  Not 
would not leave this state and go to another state and marry her—the few that would 
allow them to be man and wife. . . What white man would when he could get all he 
wanted without giving up his freedom. . . Why that sonofabitch.  The youth was now 
crying with anger.  Why the pictures were stuck up in the Bible; each one smaller than the 
last.  Each one more revealing of her figure than the one before it on top of it.  Did he 
hate her for this?  Well, no in one way, because some part of him was happy just to see 
her face at any price.  Had Wilfred Bloodworth put a gun to get Sarah Belle to do this . . . 
pose in this way? (333). 
In the midst of his conflict, Bloodworth returns to the room and, seeing what Sugar-Groove is 
holding, tries to wrest the pictures from his grasp.  As the two grapple, one of the photographs 
rips in half and the two fall back, stunned.  When Sugar-Groove recovers, he hurls the envelope 
of money at Bloodworth shouting, “'. . .Keep your mother fucking white man's money!  My 
beautiful Mama weren't no white man's whore'” (336).   This conflict culminates in a question of 
“ownership” and authority to claim a dead woman.  Sugar-Groove cheapens what was, in 
Bloodworth's eyes, a relationship of love.  To Sugar-Groove, however, the relationship between 
Sarah-Belle and Bloodworth  is impossible to separate from the bonds of slavery, his image of a 
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mother he had never met, and the money that Bloodworth had given him as an allowance while 
never formally acknowledging him.  Bloodworth fails to see what is apparent to Sugar-Groove, 
that Bloodworth cannot justly claim Sarah-Belle and rebuff Sugar-Groove.   
 The scene ends as the furious Bloodworth attempts to kill Sugar-Groove for his insolence 
when the two hear a female voice whisper “How can you destroy what we created” (336), which 
allows Sugar-Groove to escape.  This scene is central to the novel and to Sugar-Groove's life 
because it reaffirms the interpenetrative, syndetic drive toward integration.  Sarah-Belle's 
disembodied voice reminds Bloodworth of their connection and that the two had created Sugar-
Groove.  Both men are forced to recognize the power that she has and that neither had the 
authority to claim her because of this power.  Dana Williams interprets the importance of this 
scene as one that humanizes the badman Sugar-Groove.  She writes that without revealing this 
conflict to Joubert,  
Sugar-Groove is little more than a culture hero who experiences rebirth repeatedly.  
Instead, by sharing with Joubert the complexity of his character and being as well as his 
survival strategies and secrets of transformation, Sugar-Groove escapes the limitations of 
the traditional culture hero, reveals the fullness of a culture hero's experience, and returns 
the boon—survival--to his community through Joubert (103). 
Sugar-Groove's lineage and position in the community demonstrate the complexity of the 
progression toward the mythic.  While Ford and Sugar-Groove both embody folkloric figures, 
Ford fails to become anything more than an archetype, a charlatan.  The trickster is not one to be 
admired or emulated, but the badman is because he understands survival. 
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 In using archetypal characters, Forrest also plugs into an oral tradition that mirrors 
Joubert's engagement with drama.  The performative nature of drama differs from the strict 
textuality normally associated with academics or a literary tradition.
138
  Joubert writes for the 
Forest County Dispatch and also keeps his journal, but he sees this sort of writing as a distraction 
or an exercise for his real work as a playwright.  Even Joubert's Aunt Eloise, who writes a gossip 
column in the same paper, refers to this writing as “avocational” and that this “'exercise' will 
exorcise the playwright in [his] soul” (9).   The drama that Joubert wants to write embodies the 
conflict between the college and the barber shop.   
 The college and the barbershop are Joubert's two greatest influences.  He spends much of 
his time either discussing the possibility of returning to college with his friend and professor 
from the local university or engaging with Williemain, owner of the barbershop and founder of 
the Royal Rights and Righteous Ramblings club that meets after hours in the shop.  The two 
influences represent different forms of development for Joubert.  The college is his opportunity 
for intellectual awakening and realizing his art, but this is in the service of his community and 
the stories that he wants to share.  The barbershop, however, represents a rite of passage: “To be 
a man among men means among other things, to be taken in the back of the barbershop after 
closing and for Williemain to offer you something out of his private stock” (42).  Joubert 
recognizes the competing discourses but works to bring them together throughout the novel.  
This is the purpose behind his journal and his plays: to integrate what may seem to be disparate 
elements of his life from an outsider's perspective, but which are both deeply intertwined within 
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 Richard Bauman and Donald Braid argue that considering oral traditions in terms of performance uncovers “their 
primary existence in the action of people and their roots in social and cultural life” (107).   
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his consciousness.  Thus, it is this bringing-together of seemingly competing discourses that 
enables Joubert to become the encyclopedic poet of this interpenetrative encyclopedia. 
 
5.3 Signifying Ironic Integration 
 One area in which Divine Days differs dramatically from the models of the encyclopedic 
novel discussed so far in this dissertation is in the use of irony.  At times Divine Days is highly 
ironic and bitingly satirical, but the irony is of a different tenor than the irony in either Gravity's 
Rainbow or  Infinite Jest.  Rather than the irony of Gravity's Rainbow that becomes a means of 
speaking back to authority or the irony of Infinite Jest that motions toward common 
understanding, Forrest's irony in Divine Days is based in gaming word play and focused on 
integration.  When Forrest uses irony to criticize, the object of critique is one that stands outside 
of the community and has the potential to disrupt the community.  At base, it is this notion of 
community that differs so greatly from Gravity's Rainbow and Infinite Jest because in the former, 
communities were artificial and destructive and in the latter, communities exist in a nascent 
form, based on common interest.  Community in Divine Days is more organic and based upon 
individuals' strong relationships with one another. 
 In this section, I will examine two kinds of local irony that Forrest uses in the novel.  
First is the replacement of local ironies with signifying.  I will pay particular attention to the 
double-voiced nature of this form of irony.  Second is satire aimed at preserving the integrity of 
the community by criticizing essentialist and/or nationalistic groups.  In both cases, the use of 
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irony in this text strengthens bonds and amplifies the humanistic tendency found in Wallace's 
Infinite Jest.   
 Signifying is a term that Henry Louis Gates associates closely with the trickster figure 
because of the indeterminacy that the trickster projects.  However, the indeterminate nature of 
this kind of irony extends beyond the trickster and badman figures in the text to become a trope 
that is used throughout the novel in normal conversation.  In signifying, indeterminacy differs 
from the indeterminacy typical of postmodern irony or the instability of irony that Booth 
theorized.  In the case of postmodern irony, there is a danger of irony canceling out meaning.  
The indeterminacy of postmodern irony is based in an inability to negotiate between negation 
and assertion.  The emptiness of Jamesonian pastiche recognizes potentially nihilistic irony 
behind which nothing lies—there may be no signifier, or referent.  Booth's unstable irony, on the 
other hand, reflects a characteristic of a certain kind of irony in which two “voices” are present in 
the text and the reader is unable to decide which of the two (it either) is correct.
139
   
 Rather than present an instability or reflect the danger of a crisis in representation, 
signifying encourages broader understanding by multiplying potential meaning for those who 
share common knowledge.  While Gates' argument is much broader in sweep and includes the 
political dynamic of signifying as a means to speak back to power, I would like to focus on 
signifying as a local trope.   Regarding the rhetorical usage of signifying, Gates draws a parallel 
between “signify” as a Saussurean relationship between a signifier and signified (sound-image 
and concept) and the “black linguistic sign, 'signification,'” describing the relationship between 
the two: “the standard English word is a homonym of the Afro-American vernacular word.  And, 
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 For more on instability in local irony, see Booth 55-62. 
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to compound the dizziness and the giddiness that we must experience in the vertiginous 
movement between these two 'identical' signifiers, these two homonyms have everything to do 
with each other and, then again, absolutely nothing” (44-5).  For Gates, this means that the 
relationship between the terms is both present and absent; it is, “paradoxically, a relation of 
difference inscribed within a relation of identity” (45).  To put this in terms that I have used 
already in this chapter, there is a unity-in-difference.   
 Signification negotiates the subtle differences that overlay a word or term.  I have 
provided one example of this already: Forrest's extensive repetition of “divine” throughout the 
novel.  This represents a form of signification in that multiple meanings accrue to the word as it 
is used in multiple contexts and the reader is not left with the instability of determining which 
version, or “voice,” is the correct one, but of combining the meanings to create something new.  
In this way, Forrest can use the word “divine” both ironically and not, at the same time.  This 
occurs many times in the novel, but one example of this usage occurs when Joubert considers the 
tasks that lie before him: attending to his duties at Eloise's Night Light, writing his memoir of 
Sugar-Groove, and going to his evening with Royal Rites and Righteous Ramblings at 
Williemain's barbershop.  Joubert writes, “At least large portions of these days shall be divine” 
(43).  This phrase means a variety of things and is both ironic and non-ironic at the same time 
because of the use of this particular word that has already begun to accrue meaning novel.  The 
word “divine” also carries a specific meaning for Joubert that differs from others in his 
community because he has kept his play a secret from most of the people in town.  The title of 
his play, Divine Days, is both a play on Ford's continued repetition of the word and also Joubert's 
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ironic comment on what he sees as the profane nature of Ford's All Souls church.  It is 
impossible to determine a single meaning of the phrase because it shifts depending upon 
perspective and prior encounters with the word “divine.”  Forrest's use of the term grows in 
complexity when the reader, who knows that the title of the novel is also Divine Days, interprets 
Joubert's use of the word differently even from the characters in the novel.  Forrest repeats 
“divine” in a variety of contexts and depends upon the reader to track the shifting meaning over 
the course of the novel.   
 Another way that Gates writes about signification is in the game “the dozens.”  The 
dozens is a form of jocular ribbing in which players bond by insulting one another and the goal is 
not to become angered by the ridicule.  It is a test of emotional strength for participants.  This is 
another trope that occurs throughout the novel, but it is more frequently observed in the form of 
characters telling embarrassing stories about one another in a large group context.  This happens 
frequently at the Night Light either in the form of making fun of the food that waitresses bring to 
give to patrons or in ridiculing a patron's drunkenness.  In one particularly humorous example, 
the regulars of the Night Light recall Mac Mac (McGovern McNabb) passing out in the bar and 
the regulars' attempts to awaken him.  The attempts to awaken him began with Joubert applying 
smelling salts, and when this failed to work, other patrons insulting him to shock him out of his 
stupor, which then escalates eventually to the decision to pour ice down his pants to snap him 
awake (230-256).  The dozens in this case is not the event itself but recounting the event 
afterwards in Mac Mac's presence.  As Joubert retells it, there is no way to know what has been 
exaggerated to get a rise out of the now lucid Mac Mac and what had actually occurred.  Much 
 218 
like the case of the word “divine,” what “actually” happened is beside the point because it is a 
rhetorical ploy to form bonds with others through multiplied meaning.   
 The second way that Forrest uses irony in Divine Days is to satirize potentially fractious 
elements in the community.  Forrest employs a more standard use of irony to critique these 
groups, but what makes this form of irony different is in the respect that it expresses for the 
cohesion of the community.  Specifically, Forrest is critical of members of Afro-centric 
communities and any limiting terms applied to black Americans.  Forrest describes Fulton 
Armstead, proponent of the multi-valent “double Black Letter 'A.'” which he variously defines as 
“All-African,” “African-American,” and “Absolutely African” (633).  Armstead is presented as a 
buffoon who spouts Pan-African rhetoric but does not understand what it means.  He claims 
affinity with other blacks that befuddles them, such as the “shocked African student” upon whose 
shoulder Armstead would throw his head, “embracing not so much the African, but Africa the 
pure” (633).  Armstead also collects African art but does not understand it.  Forrest does not 
criticize the interest in African heritage, but the essentialism that assumes that African Americans 
are culturally similar to Africans and that men like Armstead can dictate what “African” entails.   
 Forrest expresses this ironically through his characterization of Armstead's thoughts on 
race relations: “But God, or Allah help an Afro-American if he or she happened to be sitting with 
any white friends (colorful, or plain, or those who had put their lives on the line in the South).  
For no matter their firing-line credentials, you were simply 'bewitched by whiteness' and your 
blackness, lacquer-thin, 'moth-eaten' and 'Asleep,' or 'white-washed'” (635-6).  Forrest's ridicule 
of Armstead differs from the ridicule of Mac Mac not because this is a story shared amongst 
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laughing friends but a screed against a mindset that temporarily adopts the buzzwords and 
attitude of “the man.”  Forrest's satire points out the hypocrisy of what he considers to be black 
nationalism or Afro-centrism by evoking the notion of purity.  Forrest expands on his 
consideration of racial and cultural alliances in his interview with Madhu Dubey.  It is worth 
quoting the exchange to capture Forrest's tone: 
Dubey: It was clear to me from reading the novel that your understanding of African-
American culture is strongly opposed to any kind of purist or singular conception of 
cultural identity, or even a bifocal conception.  I'm thinking here of the various references 
in the novel to the Du Boisian notion of double-consciousness . . . Could you elaborate on 
what precisely you find so confining about these? 
Forrest: I resist anything in this culture that has to do with purity.  That's so anti-
American in the first place.  And yet at the same time it's crucible on which so much of 
race relations and white supremacy is based—the idea of purity.  But there certainly aren't 
any pure Americans culturally, not at this time, that's one thing for sure.  And obviously 
the heritage, the background of blacks is very complex, not just on color lines but lines of 
culture (65). 
For Forrest, the importance of identity lies in multiplicity and complexity.  A unified, or “pure” 
version of race or culture is, to him, inconsistent with American identity.  In a different interview, 
Forrest expresses similar thoughts on  a question about his influence from “across the racial and 
cultural spectrum”: “Wherever I can get influence, wherever I can be moved by something, 
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maybe I can use it . . . This is what we're talking about, where I can get new techniques.  So I 
don't have any problem with that at all” (33).   
 The use of irony in Divine Days is of a piece with the novel's broader integrative 
progression.  Community and respecting the integrity of the community, along with the complex 
individuality of its members becomes of paramount importance.  The potentially fractious 
Armstead is not just a variation but a potential threat because of his notions of purity.  The use of 
signifying also extends the in-joke ironic mentality that was present in Infinite Jest from a local 
ironic utterance to a rhetorical mode of speech.  Forrest expresses an additional form of 
signification in the juxtaposition between vernacular speech and Joubert's heightened academic 
engagement.  However, there is still a division between discourses and rhetorical speech patterns 
and in Joubert's consideration of his writing career.  Although these elements are brought 
together they are not fully incorporated and this is what makes Divine Days a part of the 
progression toward the mythic and not mythic, itself.  Joubert is an imperfect encyclopedic poet 
because he cannot quite bridge the gap to fully speak for his society.  He is displaced from this 
community to the extent that he perceives himself to be displaced due to his aspirations to 
education and artistry.   
 
5.4 Conclusion: Double Vision and Double Consciousness 
 One of the figures who has been glaringly absent from this chapter is W.E.B. DuBois, 
although I have made several glancing references to his ideas.  I have purposefully left DuBois 
for last in order to address his notion of double-consciousness in the context of the encyclopedic 
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novel and in light of Forrest's sometimes ironic engagement with some of the ideals that DuBois 
forwarded.   Finally, I also want to introduce another concept that bears some affinity to DuBois' 
double consciousness and that is Northrop Frye's double vision.  These concepts share some 
affinities that illuminate the characteristics of the interpenetrative encyclopedia and Forrest's 
novel. 
 “Double-consciousness” is a condition that DuBois introduces at the beginning The Souls 
of Black Folk that address the position of an individual of African descent living in America.  It 
is worth quoting DuBois at some length: 
the Negro is a sort of seventh son, born with a veil, and gifted with second-sight in this 
American world, – a world which yields him no true self-consciousness, but only lets him 
see himself through the revelation of the other world.  It is a peculiar sensation, this 
double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of 
others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt 
and pity.  One ever feels his two-ness, – an American, a Negro; two souls, two thoughts, 
two unreconciled strivings; two warring ideals in one dark body, whose dogged strength 
alone keeps it from being torn asunder (3). 
DuBois' power is such that this double-consciousness has formed a strong backbone for African 
American criticism and is often under the current of contemporary critics.  For example, “two-
ness” is present in Gates' signification, a two-ness of interpretation and meaning.  It is echoed in 
Joubert's tension between the college and the barbershop.   
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 But the tension that DuBois has expressed has not gone unchallenged.  Kenneth A. 
Warren questions double-consciousness in a post-Jim Crow America.  Likewise, Leon Forrest 
expresses some discomfort with the idea in Divine Days.  For DuBois, double-consciousness is a 
mark of the continual other-ness of the black American that is both internalized and externalized.  
It represents for him a fear of never attaining a true self-consciousness because the mind is 
always divided.  This tension, however, runs counter to the process of integration.  Where 
DuBois sees two-ness as a rift, Frye sees it as a unified encyclopedic vision. 
 In “Theory of Symbols,” Frye draws from medieval anagogic symbolism to define a 
phase of writing that he also calls the anagogic.  Medieval anagogy is the perception of the 
universal in a polysemous symbol.  But in order to conceive of the anagogy, one must see double 
because the symbol contains the individual, the archetypal, and the universal.  Frye writes, 
“When we pass into anagogy, nature becomes, not the container, but the thing contained, and the 
archetypal universal symbols, the city, the garden, the quest, the marriage, are no longer the 
desirable forms that man constructs inside nature, but are themselves forms of nature” (119).  
The anagogic symbol offers something of the God's-eye perspective of mankind.   
 Anagogic symbolism becomes important to Divine Days and to DuBois' double-
consciousness because anagogy aligns with mythic encyclopedism in Frye's “Theory of Modes.”  
The concept of unity-in-difference that pervades the interpenetrative encyclopedia marks a 
glimpse at the universal.  Joubert's attempts to bridge gaps and to embody conflicting urges 
brings DuBois' double-consciousness back full-circle and attempts to combine what was 
unreconcilable to DuBois.  Forrest is aware of the conflict of doubling and addresses it in the 
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novel.  In a moment of crisis, Joubert questions the nature of his own consciousness and the 
conflict between the college and the barbershop.  He writes,  
Oh, conflicted me... 
Not Du Bois simple-formula of double-consciousness, but rather one of a hundred hog-
headed cheese voices of madness from my literary genesis.  I am contorted between the 
voice in Finnegan's Wake [sic] [. . .] Despising the parts, and fondly horrible home to 
parts of the sum . . . the nightmare of my history . . .  (unbracketed ellipses original,713) 
Joubert's concern over his identity is not limited to a two-ness but extends to a multitude and 
includes his white literary influences.  In this moment, Forrest confirms the multiplicity and 
complexity of the individual that extends beyond the cultural and racial and includes every other 
influence.   
 The double vision of anagogy, the ability to see on an individual and universal basis is the 
culmination of Frye's encyclopedic vision.  Like interpenetration, it collapses difference into a 
singularity within nature.  This is Divine Days' contribution to the encyclopedic form: it 
demonstrates the move beyond individual concerns to see the unity-in-difference that marks the 
movement into a mythic re-integration.  Leon Forrest's Divine Days has moved incrementally 
toward that re-integration by incorporating seemingly competing discourses and showing that 
they already do coexist.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION: META-ENCYCLOPEDIC DISCOURSE 
 
"It is a laborious madness and an impoverishing one, the madness of composing vast 
books--setting out in five hundred pages an idea that can be perfectly expressed orally in 
five minutes.  The better way to go about it is to pretend that those books already exist, 
and offer a summary, a commentary on them" 
 -Jorge Luis Borges, Foreword to Garden of Forking Paths, 67 
 
6.1 The Meta-Encyclopedia 
 In this dissertation I have argued that the contemporary encyclopedic novel traces two 
lines of influence from Diderot's Enlightenment Encyclopédie and Frye's conceptions of the 
encyclopedic form and have endeavored to show a progression of the encyclopedic novel from 
Pynchon's anarchistic encyclopedia that posits a radical individuality to Wallace's rhetorical 
encyclopedia that attempts to overcome Pynchon's individualistic priority to a broader 
humanistic re-integration.  Finally, Leon Forrest's Divine Days approaches most closely the 
turning point from the ironic mode into the mythic that Frye predicts in his “Theory of Modes” 
in Anatomy of Criticism.  This trajectory describes a broad arc of historical development and 
organic growth that mirrors a desire for cultural re-integration that has shifted focus from the 
narrowly nationalistic purview to a broader international and finally inter-cultural integration. 
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 There is another body of literature that deals with many of the same concerns as the 
contemporary encyclopedic novel but does not possess the characteristics of that genre as I have 
outlined them.  This body of literature is comprised of short stories and novels that adopt one or 
another of the elements of the encyclopedic novel.  I call this body “meta-encyclopedic” texts, 
and it consists two types of texts: one that adopts the encyclopedic form, and one that address the 
concept of the encyclopedia.  These texts are meta-encyclopedic because they take the tools of 
the encyclopedic form and bend them against the concept of the encyclopedia itself.   
 Very often meta-encyclopedic texts critique the project of encyclopedism by attempting 
to deflate its pomposity or dispute its conception of knowledge or authority, but there is another 
element to the meta-encyclopedic texts that extends from Frye's encyclopedic form.  The satirical 
nature of many of these texts, and their often overt political interventions, serve to point the way 
for future encyclopedic projects.  Frye's overarching narrative of the encyclopedia is one of 
redemptive integration.  These texts do not lie on this narrative path toward reintegration but 
serve as sign-posts to help correct the course by pointing out flaws in our conception of the 
encyclopedia. 
 In this conclusion, I offer a brief excursus of four texts that exemplify elements of the 
meta-encyclopedia.  This exploration into the meta-encyclopedic must necessarily be brief 
because a full study would require an inquiry into a different body of criticism and a different 
body of source texts.  Rather, what I hope to offer here is a suggestion for further study into 
encyclopedism in contemporary literature.  The first category often utilizes a highly ironic 
approach that adopts an informative rhetorical stance in order to undercut the surface meaning of 
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the text and, in some instances, is aimed at deflating the encyclopedic project.  The second 
category seeks to address the idea of the encyclopedia as it exists in the popular imagination.  
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to these categories as “meta-encyclopedic form” and 
“meta-encyclopedic content,” respectively. 
 
6.2 Meta-Encyclopedic Form 
 Meta-encyclopedic texts mimic encyclopedic form, or reference text forms in general, to 
engage in a self-reflexive critique of totalized knowledge.  These texts use formal characteristics 
of the encyclopedia in order to point out the pitfalls and inadequacies of the form.  These texts 
also often adopt an exaggerated dry, informative, or “objective” tone.   
 Roberto Bolaño's Nazi Literature in the Americas is an uncharacteristically brief novel 
that is constructed as a biographical encyclopedia of fictional fascist and extreme-right authors 
and publishers.  The novel is divided thematically into fourteen parts, each of which contains 
biographies of different groupings of authors from across the Americas.   Section headings such 
as “Forerunners and Figures of the Anti-Enlightenment,” “Wandering Women of Letters,” and 
“North American Poets” reveal the tenor of the novel: Bolaño never breaks his satirical tone in 
the body of the novel and leaves both the ironic ambivalence and fictional integrity of the work 
completely intact.  At the same time, the headings are merely descriptive in a banal, faux-
objective way.  The significance of these groupings is effaced by the dry descriptions. 
 There is only one point at which Bolaño reveals a hint of his ironic stance and that is the 
epigraph.  The quote, by Augusto Monterroso, is an ironic reimagining of Heraclitus' dictum that 
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one cannot step into the same river twice: “If the flow is slow enough and you have a good 
bicycle, or a horse, it is possible to bathe twice (or even three times, should your personal 
hygiene so require) in the same river” (xi).  This paratext establishes the ironic stance of the 
novel, but on the periphery, and not in the body of the text, proper.  The quote also reveals 
something of Bolaño's fears that history can be repeated, that it is possible to see the rise of 
fascism again.   
 The light-hearted tone of the epigraph contrasts sharply with the dry, informative tone of 
the body of the text that clearly mimics the writing style and structure of modern encyclopedia.  
The first entry, titled “Edelmira Thompson de Mendiluce,” describes Edelmira's first encounters 
with literature, her marriage to Sebastian Mendiluce, a wealthy man twenty years her senior, 
their travels to Europe and finally Edelmira's radicalization following a meeting with Adolf 
Hitler.  What is striking about the passage is the way that Bolaño empties it of judgment or 
comment:  
In 1929, the stock-market crash obliged Sebastian Mediluce to return to Argentina.  
Meanwhile Edelmira and her children were presented to Adolf Hitler, who held Luz and 
said, “She certainly is a wonderful little girl.”  Photos were taken.  The future Führer of 
the Reich made a great impression on the Argentinian poet.  Before leaving, she 
presented him with several of her own books and a deluxe edition of Martin Fierro.  
Hitler thanked her warmly, beseeching her to translate one of her poems into German on 
the spot, a task which, with the help of Carozzone, she managed to accomplish.  Hitler 
was clearly delighted.  The lines were resounding and looked to the future.  In high 
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spirits, Edelmira asked for the Führer's advice: which would be the most appropriate 
school for her sons?  He recommended a Swiss boarding school, but added that the best 
school was life itself.  By the end of the audience, Edelmira and Carozzone were 
committed Hitlerites (6). 
After Edelmira's return to Argentina she uses her husband's money to start a publishing house 
that is dedicated to literary arts and political commentary.  Later in the entry, Bolaño reveals that 
Edelmira may have financed a magazine and publishing company called The Fourth Reich in 
Argentina.   
 What makes Nazi Literature in the Americas significant is that it adopts the dry editorial 
tone of the modern encyclopedia that attempts to remain objective but, in doing so, implies a 
tacit acceptance of the events described.  Bolaño satirizes the modern encyclopedia's attempted 
objective stance in presenting information by presenting material that, in another novel, would be 
presented in a negative light.  The novel demonstrates that objectivity in relating past events 
decontextualizes those events and has the greater purpose of exposing the danger of history 
without commentary. 
 Meta-encyclopedic form is not always so dour, though it does tend to carry a critical 
edge.  Compare Bolaño's Nazi Literature in the Americas, for example, with a text such as 
Ambrose Bierce's Devil's Dictionary.  Bierce's work is well known for its cynical perspective on 
the world.  His lexicon redefines many words to reflect his personal antipathies.  The purpose of 
Bierce's dictionary varies from point to point.  At times his definitions seem to simply display a 
curmudgeonly rejection of convention, such as his definition of the word “bigot”: “One who is 
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obstinately and zealously attached to an opinion that you do not entertain” (11).  At other points, 
Bierce presents definitions that are jokes for their own sake, such as “armor”: “The kind of 
clothing worn by a man whose tailor is a blacksmith” (7), or “Brain”: “An apparatus with which 
we think that we think” (13).  Very often, however, Bierce ventures into political satire, offering 
such definitions as “Conservative”: “A statesman who is enamored of existing evils, as 
distinguished from the Liberal, who wishes to replace them with others” (18).  Significantly for 
this project, Bierce also comments on the constraining nature of lexical systems – such as 
“Dictionary”: “A malevolent literary device for cramping the growth of language and making it 
hard and inelastic.  This dictionary, however, is a most useful work” (24).   
 Taken together, these examples demonstrate Bierce's perspective that an “objective” or 
“authoritative” dictionary is lacking because of the artificial constraints it places on language, 
which mirrors Bolaño's concerns about objectivity in history.  A word has a “just-so” meaning 
that, for Bierce, cannot capture the full range of meaning behind the word.  In the case of his 
definition for the dictionary, Bierce also demonstrates a self-reflexivity that is an important 
element of his critique.  By claiming that his own dictionary is a useful tool in spite of the 
limitations inherent to the form, Bierce jokes about the paradoxical utility of the dictionary as a 
lexical reference.  Although The Devil's Dictionary is not an encyclopedia, the ironic adaptation 
of the reference form is parallel to the parodic encyclopedia. 
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6.3 Meta-Encyclopedic Content 
 The second division of meta-encyclopedic texts includes those that address the content of 
encyclopedic discourse.  This can run the range from the proposition of a heterological discourse 
as an alternative to authoritative discourse, to challenging the authority of texts, to commenting 
on the futility of data acquisition.  It is this last concept that I turn to for my examples of text 
concerned with meta-encyclopedic content.  Throughout this dissertation, I have peppered in 
allusions to the works of Jorge Luis Borges, and here I want to direct attention to one of his 
fictions that deals directly with content of the encyclopedic project.   
 The passage that I quote in this chapter's epigraph perfectly encapsulates this meta-
encyclopedic approach to writing, and Borges made much of the invented book, library, city, or 
province.  In this manner, Borges' work is largely speculative, and thus abstracted from either 
Bolaño's novel or the encyclopedic works discussed in the preceding chapters.  It is this 
abstraction, though, that gives his work a timeless quality.  Because the books to which Borges 
refers never existed, they will never fall out of fashion, and what makes Borges' criticism so 
biting is that there is an indeterminacy at the root level of interpretation because the reader can 
never fully understand who the audience for the books Borges describes is supposed to be and 
projects his or her own interpretations onto that imagined audience of an imagined book.   
 The two fictions I will explore here are “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” and “The Book of 
Sand.”  These two fictions have a number of things in common.  Both contain books with 
vanishing pages, both feature characters who become obsessed with these books, and both find 
the infinite monstrous.  Despite these similarities, however, the two fictions approach the 
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question of knowledge from opposite directions.  “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is about the 
creation of a world from a wisp, a hint of a hidden reality, while “The Book of Sand” takes the 
paradoxical stance common in Borges' fictions that the infinite is a negation.   
 “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” is made up of two parts and a fictional “Postscript.”  The 
first part details vanishing pages, the second details the discovery of an imaginary book, and the 
postscript details the way that the imaginary world in the book begins to erode the real world and 
replace it.  The plot of the fiction is quite intricate for such a short narrative, and I cannot do it 
full justice here, but will restrict my comments to the relevant elements.  In the first section, the 
narrator and his friend discover an encyclopedia entry about a fictional province called Uqbar.  
However, the two discover after cross-checking that the entry only exists in the friends copy of 
the encyclopedia and not in other copies of the same edition.  Nowhere else can the two find any 
reference to the mysterious Uqbar and details about the nation remain unknown to the narrator 
for some time.   
 The second part takes place two years later when the narrator finds a book addressed to 
another friend of his who has died.  This book turns out to be A First Encyclopaedia of Tlön. Vol. 
XI. Hlaer to Jangr, which contains the same unknown phrase, “Orbis Tertius,” that the missing 
encyclopedia entry from the first section has also contained.  Given the cross-referencing in the 
volume of the encyclopedia, the narrator is able to infer the content of other volumes of the 
Tlönian encyclopedia and a third friend suggests that the two set about reconstructing the full set, 
proposing that a full generation of scholars could complete the task.   
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 Finally, in the postscript written seven years after the second part, the narrator reveals yet 
more about these strange encyclopedias.  A secret society in the seventeenth century had 
endeavored to invent a nation – Uqbar – but then in 1824 one of the hereditary members of the 
society “laughed at the modesty of the project” and proposed to invent not only the planet where 
Uqbar is located – Tlön – but to compose “a systematic encyclopedia of the illusory planet” (79).  
In 1914, the society secretly published the First Encyclopaedia of Tlön, one volume of which the 
narrator found in the second part.  After the publication in 1914, the secret society undertook to 
write the encyclopedia in one of the Tlönian languages.  In the last couple of pages of the fiction, 
the narrator describes the intrusion of some Tlönian objects and ideas into the real world.  At the 
end, the narrator fears that Tlön will overtake the real world. 
 The significance of this fiction lies partially obscured by the complicated plot, but it 
stems from a Viconian notion of the self-constructed nature of societies.  The narrator writes, 
“Tlön may well be a labyrinth, but it is a labyrinth forged by men, a labyrinth destined to be 
deciphered by men” (81).  Writing and thinking about Tlön made it more real with each iteration 
and each discovery.  The  Tlönian project could as easily have been a project of a secret society 
to influence events in the real world.  Whether the secret society members wanted to test their 
imagination by inventing a new world or if they actually wanted to effect real change in the 
world, the end result is the same: the incursion of  Tlön into reality.  This is a significant point 
because it recognizes that the ways in which we order the world, write about it, and think about it 
have real bearing on that world.  This point goes straight to the heart of the encyclopedic project 
to record knowledge for the betterment of humankind.  The germ of an idea blossoms into a new 
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reality and the human intellect has the ability to shape the nature of that new reality.  The danger 
that Borges points to is the unexpected ways in which human imagination and invention can leap 
out of control.  In this way, “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius” mirrors Bolaño's message in Nazi 
Literature in the Americas, which is that the way we describe the world influences the world.     
 The second Borges fiction, “The Book of Sand,” is much less complicated than “Tlön, 
Uqbar, Orbis Tertius,” but conveys a similar meaning.  Another unnamed narrator tells the story 
of a bible salesman who arrives at his door with an unusual book.  As the narrator looks through 
it, the bible salesman tells him to look on each page well because he will never see it again.  This 
is because the book is filled with an infinite number of pages with no beginning and no end and 
it is impossible to locate a single page in an infinite range.  The book is “called the Book of Sand 
because neither sand nor this book has a beginning or an end,” and the salesman proves this by 
asking the narrator to try to locate the first page: “I took the cover in my left hand and opened the 
book, my thumb and forefinger almost touching.  It was impossible: several pages always lay 
between the cover and my hand.  It was as though they grew from the very book” (481). 
 The narrator, fascinated, purchases the book but quickly becomes obsessed and finds the 
book to be monstrous and hides the book in the basement of the library to be rid of it.  Borges 
never reveals the contents of the book and leaves it to the reader to interpret the monstrosity.  
Given other fictions, such as “The Garden of Forking Paths,” in which a book contains all 
possible plot lines of a single story, and “The Library of Babel,” in which Borges describes a 
library holding every book and every variation of that book (including translations into every 
language and every possible combination of typos), it is clear that the infinite is monstrous 
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because it obviates uniqueness.  The individual no longer matters in the face of the infinite.  This 
is the reason the narrator of “Book of Sand” must pay attention to each page because he will 
never see it again since the individual page will become lost in the infinite. 
 For Borges, the infinite negates individual possibility and his characters recoil from it.  
The Book of Sand frustrates the narrator because it is impossible for him to figure out.  He only 
gains the scantest knowledge in his examination of it and can barely describe it.  The infinity of 
pages is so overwhelming that this is really all that he knows about it.  The monstrosity of the 
book even transfers to the narrator.  He writes, “ I realized that the book was monstrous.  It was 
cold consolation to think that I, who looked upon it with my eyes and fondled it with my ten 
flesh-and-bone fingers, was no less monstrous than the book.  I felt it was a nightmare thing, an 
obscene thing, and that it defiled and corrupted reality” (483).   
 “Book of Sand” is a meta-encyclopedic text because it address the limits of knowledge 
and, implicitly, the limits of the encyclopedic project.  If Diderot's vision for the encyclopedia is 
to compile information for future generations, then at some point this compilation would exceed 
our ability to make use or sense of it.  Borges interactions with the meta-encyclopedic reveal a 
deep mistrust of the project of encyclopedism.  In Borges' hands, the encyclopedia seems 
authoritarian and inhuman.  Just as the Book of Sand is monstrous to the narrator, mirrors are 
monstrous to the narrator of “Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.”  He writes that he and his friend 
“discovered . . . that there was something monstrous about mirrors” (68).  The monstrosity of 
mirrors sparks the friend to remember a line from the entry on Uqbar in his recalcitrant 
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encyclopedia: “Mirrors and copulation are abominable, for they multiply the number of 
mankind” (68).  Borges never reveals what it is that the narrator discovered. 
 There is a vast unknown at the center of both of these fictions by Borges that burrows 
into the minds of his narrators and becomes an obsession.  For Borges, the desire to know is 
positive, but it is the utter refusal of the infinite to be known that mars the encyclopedic.  Borges' 
contribution to encyclopedic discourse is an important one because of his distrust.  He wants to 
warn us of these limitations and to show us that we cannot always control our creations.   
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